

NUR BILGE CRISS

ISTANBUL UNDER
ALLIED OCCUPATION

1918-1923



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND ITS HERITAGE

Politics, Society and Economy

EDITED BY

SURAIYA FAROQHI AND HALIL INALCIK

Advisory Board

Fikret Adanir · Idris Bostan · Amnon Cohen · Cornell Fleischer
Barbara Flemming · Alexander de Groot · Klaus Kreiser
Hans Georg Majer · Irène Mélikoff · Ahmet Yaşar Ocak
Abdeljelil Temimi · Gilles Veinstein · Elizabeth Zachariadou

VOLUME 17




956.015
09180
v. 17

ISTANBUL UNDER ALLIED OCCUPATION

1918-1923

BY

NUR BILGE CRISS



BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON · KÖLN
1999

Levant. 251773

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Criss, Bilge.
Istanbul under allied occupation, 1918-1923 / by Nur Bilge Criss.
p. cm. — (The Ottoman Empire and its heritage, ISSN1380-6076
; v. 17)
Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.
ISBN 9004112596 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Istanbul (Turkey—History—20th century. 2. Turkey—History
—Revolution, 1918-1923. I. Title. II. Series.
DR731.C75 1999 98-42291
949.61'8023—dc21 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Criss, Nur B.:
Istanbul under allied occupation : 1918-1923 / by Nur Bilge Criss. -
Leiden ; Boston ; Köln : Brill, 1999
(The Ottoman Empire and its heritage ; Vol. 17)
ISBN 90-04-11259-6

ISSN 1380-6076
ISBN 90 04 11259 6

© Copyright 1999 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands

*All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written
permission of the publisher.*

*Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal
use is granted by Brill provided that
the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright
Clearance Center, Rosewood Drive 222, Suite 910
Danvers MA 01923, USA
Fees are subject to change.*

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	VII
Foreword	IX
I Introduction	XV
II A Survey of İstanbul during the Armistice	1
Turkish Society	21
İstanbul Fires	27
Housing and Transportation	28
Refugees	29
Education in İstanbul	32
Health Facilities	33
The Near East Relief Agency	34
Ottoman Finances	35
Civic Administration	38
III The Domestic Political Situation	40
The Palace	41
The Press	45
In Search of Identity	50
IV The Allied Administration	60
V An Allied Dilemma	81
The Prospect of Bolshevik Subversion	82
The Turkish Labor Force, Leftist Movements and Strikes	88
VI Resistance and Underground Organizations in İstanbul (1918-1920): Çup Intelligence and Karakol	94
Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization)	94
Karakol (Black Arm / Police)	98
The Decline of Karakol	113

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VII Resistance and Underground Organizations in İstanbul (1920-1923): M.M., Felâh, auxiliary groups	115
The National Defense Group (Müdafaa-i Milliye (M.M.))	115
Women of the Underground	118
Defections to Ankara	121
Arms Smuggling	122
Sabotage	126
Anti-Nationalist Organizations	129
The Felâh Group (Deliverance)	132
Contraband	133
The War Matériel Manufacturers' Group	135
The Naval Assistance Group	136
The British Discover Felâh	136
VIII Towards Evacuation	140
Conclusions	156
Epilogue	161
Bibliography	162
Index	177
Illustrations	179

PREFACE

İstanbul was occupied by the Allies shortly after the signing of the Mudros Armistice between the former and the Ottoman Empire on October 30, 1918. By the end of November that year, resistance to foreign occupation and to the seemingly inevitable dismemberment of Turkey took strong roots in the city and entrenched itself into an increasingly organized and determined underground.

Between 1918 and 1923 many of the conditions that breed successful resistance movements were present in Turkey. For example, the victors underestimated the defeated; the occupiers were engrossed with bureaucratic procedures and were assailed by a variety of issues such as the influx of Russian refugees into İstanbul, Bolshevik propaganda, and the Turkish left. The British, French, and Italians, as major Allied occupation forces, were also hindered by an inability to establish a balance of strength among themselves in their haste to promote respective national interests.

Great Britain's imperial traditions caused it to fail to recognize the difference between change and continuity in a society predicated upon a culture and history quite different from its own. The British perceived Muslim society as monolithic. They thought that Turkey's *raison d'être* was religion, and expected the Turks to be passive on the grounds that "Muslim" means "submission to the will of God." And submission was what the Allies required of the defeated Turks. The British officially adopted a policy of support for the Sultan-Caliph and those clergymen who were to ensure Turks' cooperation and submission. Yet the Turks, by the turn of the century, were neither traditional Muslims nor Ottomans in the old sense. The old regime's "Sick Man of Europe" had already been buried in Turkey by the Young Turks. However, it would take a long time before the world came to terms with this fact.

Also unrealized by the Allies was the broad base of support the Nationalist underground could draw upon, i.e. many İstanbul Turks, Jews and Armenians were united by patriotism. The resistance movement also had the unconditional support of major institutions in the country, such as the military, guilds, women's associations, and the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, which was the counterpart of the Red Cross in the West.

In the underground, commitment to the shared objective and bonds of personal loyalty were more important than potentially divi-

sive struggles among ambitious leaders. When the British arrested and exiled members of the underground whom they thought to be the leaders of resistance, the movement did not cease. The smuggling of men and arms to Anatolia continued. The domestic opponents of the Nationalists publicly declared themselves pro-Ally and lost credibility. But most importantly, neither the domestic opposition nor the foreign adversaries were determined; the Nationalists were.

FOREWORD

This is a study of a city under foreign occupation. It does not claim, however, to be a definitive history of the Armistice era in İstanbul. The objective is to bring some cohesion to a very chaotic time in the history of the city. Many relevant topics have been studied by other historians.¹ There are official histories of the period.² Memoirs of officials who were in the forces of occupation,³ and of statesmen who

¹ Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913-1923* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931); Philip P. Graves, *Briton and Turk* (London: Hutchinson, Constable and Co. Ltd., 1934); Harry H. Cumming, *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938); Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963); Laurence Evans, *The United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey 1914-1924* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965); Gordon E. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds. *The Diplomats* 2 vols. (New York: Atheneum Press, 1972), "From Mudros to Lausanne," by Roderic H. Davison, 1: 172-209; Paul Helmreich, *From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1974); Bilâl Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri* 2nd ed. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1976); Briton Cooper Busch, *Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1975); Sina Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele* (İstanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1983); Erik J. Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984); Tanık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler (Mütareke Dönemi 1918-1922)* 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986); Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Paylaşılması* 2nd ed. (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1986).

² Enver Ziya Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi 1918-1944* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1945); Enver Behnan Şapolyo, *Kemal Atatürk ve Milli Mücadele Tarihi* (İstanbul: Rafet Zaimler Yayinevi, 1958); Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Milli Mücadele Başlarken* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959); *Türk İstiklal Harbi* 8 vols. (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1962); Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi* 14 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1967); Hamza Eroğlu, *Türk İnkılâp Tarihi* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1982); Ahmet Mumcu, *Tarih Açısından Türk Devriminin Temelleri ve Gelişimi* 9th ed. (İstanbul: Anka Ofset Basımevi, 1984).

³ Harold Armstrong, *Turkey In Travail* (London: John Lane, 1925); Pierre Emile Joseph Martin Nayral de Bourgon, *Dix Ans de souvenirs (1914-1924)* 8 vols. (Nîmes: Imp. de Chastanier frères et Alméras, 1933); Charles Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back* (London: John Murray, 1940); John Presland, *Deedes Bey* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1942); Nevile Henderson, *Water Under the Bridges* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1945); Andrew Ryan, *The Last of the Dragomans* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1951); Harry Luke, *Cities and Men* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1953); R. Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary 1917-1956* (London: The Cresset Press, 1959); John G. Bennett, *Witness* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1962); Martin Gilbert, *Sir Horace Rumbold: Portrait of a Diplomat (1869-1941)* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1973).

participated in the Paris Peace Conference have been published.⁴ Most of these works discuss the period from the viewpoint of "high politics"; namely, affairs of state and government. An exception is the *Unionist Factor* by E. J. Zürcher, who studied the role of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası, henceforth, CUP) in the Turkish War of Independence. This subject necessarily involved lesser known figures, because leaders of the CUP had fled the country. These obscure people, whose stories remained in equally obscure journals published in the '50s and '60s in Turkey, had made very important contributions to the success of the Nationalist Movement. In addition, the Unionist factor also made a difference in the shaping of the Turkish Republic. A one-dimensional perspective, especially one viewed from the top, does not present a full account. So that it does not serve to support deconstructionists and relativists, it is worth noting that this work builds upon official history for the purpose of enriching history. The intention is not to belie official history. Defending the older version of this account in "apocalyptic language as though history was a zero-sum game in which the old heroes would be inevitably demolished and forgotten were new heroes and heroines to enter the scene both marginalizes and thus does injustice to those not acknowledged".⁵

Unofficial history not only brings a human dimension to affairs, but also, as in Zürcher's book, introduces hitherto unacknowledged factors which contributed to the Nationalists' success. Likewise, a study of a city under foreign occupation needs to dwell on unofficial as well as official politics, for a number of reasons.

Formal histories tend to make generalizations which can be misleading. For example, in Turkey, an inaccurate picture has emerged, in which all the successive Ottoman governments during the Armistice and Sultan Vahidettin collaborated with the enemy and the Allies supported the Sultan consistently. The history of İstanbul during the Armistice is not solely that of the collaborationist activities of one Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha, and the intrigues of the Sultan. Grand Viziers Ali Rıza Pasha (October 12, 1919 – March 3, 1920), Salih Hulûsi Pasha (March 8 – April 2, 1920), and Tefvik

⁴ Carlo Sforza, *Makers of Modern Europe* (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1928); Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1933); Idem, *Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925, A Study in Post-War Diplomacy* (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1934); David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference* 2 vols. (New Haven, Connecticut: University of Connecticut Press, 1939); A. J. Sylvester, *The Real Lloyd George* (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1947).

⁵ Gerda Lerner, *Why History Matters* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 203.

Pasha (October 21, 1920 – November 4, 1922) followed a policy of covert resistance to the terms of the Armistice and to Allied authority.

In February 1919, Admiral Arthur G. Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner in İstanbul, demanded that twenty-three Turks who were accused of having mistreated British prisoners of war be turned over to the British for court martial. The Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs refused to comply, because this request violated Ottoman sovereignty, which had been recognized in the Armistice convention.⁶

The National Pact, which stated that portions of the Ottoman Empire where the Turks were in a majority should remain under Turkish rule, was adopted in the Ottoman Parliament during Ali Rıza Pasha's Grand Vizirate. Lord Curzon, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, accused the Ottoman government of violating the spirit of the Armistice:

Mustafa Kemal is the official governor (sic) of Erzurum and that, in itself constitutes a link between him and Constantinople which leads one to think that any attempt to disown responsibility for what the Young Turk may be doing in Asia cannot successfully be made in Constantinople... In flagrant violation of the Armistice, there has been a constant interchange of arms and armed men between the capital and the Nationalists.⁷

In March 1920, Admiral Calthorpe urged the Ottoman government to denounce the Nationalists so that the people of Anatolia would stop supporting them. Salih Hulûsi Pasha refused to do so, which sealed the fate of his cabinet. When Damad Ferid Pasha came to power, the Nationalists were disavowed; the Sheikhulislam issued a *fatwa*, which announced that it was a holy duty to kill them.

But thefts and the smuggling of war matériel from İstanbul were carried out with the knowledge and connivance of the Minister of War, Ziya Pasha, who was a member of Tefvik Pasha's cabinet. His role was to cover up these actions. In addition, he procrastinated on issues such as the destruction of Ottoman war matériel by the Allies. Hence, he tried to gain time for the underground to accomplish the thefts. At the London Conference of January 1921, (where some conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres were modified) Tefvik Pasha, in a gesture of solidarity, relinquished his authority to the Nationalist delegates. Therefore, for nearly half the time İstanbul was occupied, the Allies had to face resistance to and sometimes open defiance of their authority.

⁶ Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri*, pp. 55-57.

⁷ *The Times*, March 12, 1920, p. 1, c. 3.

Official outlooks and "high politics" do not account for the human element or for coincidences which change the course of history either. The conscious choice of many common people as well as of many members of the Ottoman élite to opt for the Nationalist cause made the difference for the outcome of the Nationalist Movement. İstanbul offered its intellectual and material resources as well as its manpower to Anatolia. A careful study showed that one-third of the war matériel used in the War of Independence came from İstanbul.⁸

Further, it was merely a coincidence that the Bolsheviks in Russia were in search of a friendly government to the South, even if it should be "bourgeois." A rapprochement between the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks in 1920 was instrumental in the British decision to leave İstanbul in Turkish hands.

A mistaken assumption in Western academic and official analyses regarding the cause of the Turkish Nationalist Movement needs to be corrected. The Greek occupation of İzmir was not the cause of the Nationalist Movement. Resistance to the terms of the Armistice and to foreign occupation was being planned as early as November 1918, long before the Greeks landed in İzmir. This contention is supported by evidence from unofficial sources. Therefore, the following questions arise: What was İstanbul's contribution to the Turkish War of Independence through the resistance? How was the underground organized? Who were the men and women who played a role in it? What was their *modus operandi*?

Without placing the resistance movement and the Allied occupation in the physical, socio-economic and political setting of İstanbul, this study would have been one dimensional. A broad approach was necessary in order to bring some cohesion to the era. That is why this is not only a political-military history.

Another issue which needs to be addressed is the status of the occupiers. This not only involves the relationship between force and resistance, but also the organizational dynamics of the occupation. From the Allied stance, what was it like to function in a less-than-friendly environment? As occupying powers, how loyal were Britain, France and Italy to the spirit of alliance during the Armistice? Why was there dissension, and how did that help the Nationalists to succeed? A propos of a discussion of the resistance and underground

⁸ Bülent Çukurova, "M.M. Grubu Haberalma Raporlarında Grup Faaliyetleri ve Bazı Zararlı Cemiyetler," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Ankara, 1989); *Türk İstiklal Harbi (İdari Faaliyetler)* vol. VII, *passim*; Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, *Kurtuluş Savaşında İstanbul ve Yardımları* 2 vols. (İstanbul: Ülku Matbaası, 1975) 2: *passim*.

groups in occupied İstanbul, other pertinent issues are analyzed as follows:

The Introductory Chapter discusses the political reasons for the occupation, the future of İstanbul, dissension among the Allies, the organizational structure of the resistance and the Nationalist movement. This provides the framework within which the city populace, the Palace, the intellectuals, the press, and the forces of occupation interacted.

Chapter Two surveys İstanbul during the Armistice. It discusses the socio-economic conditions of the city, such as refugees, fires, schools, hospitals, social agencies and finances. Chapter Three takes up the domestic political situation, specifically the Palace, the press, and the reaction of the intellectuals to the dismemberment of Anatolia. Chapter Four analyzes the Allied administration. This involves its organizational structure and activities, the relationships of Allied officials and dissension among the Allied administrators. Chapter Five, "An Allied Dilemma," discusses problems with the Russian refugees, Bolshevik propaganda, and the impact of the Turkish labor force and strikes on the Allies. Resistance and underground groups are examined in the next two chapters. Chapter Eight, "Towards Evacuation," relates the history of the transition period in İstanbul, from Allied administration to Turkish authority. Following the definitive victory of the Turkish Nationalists against the Greeks in 1922, the Turkish forces came close to armed conflict with the British. But diplomacy, at the level of military commanders (not governments), prevailed. The Mudanya Conference ended the Greco-Turkish War on October 11, 1922. Finally, the Turkish peace was concluded at the Lausanne Conference, five years after the Mudros Armistice.

Nowadays, people associate Russian food, the cafés and old restaurants with "la belle époque d'Istanbul." However, not many people know that the American hospital is named for Admiral Bristol (Mark Lambert Bristol, 1868-1939) because he was the United States High Commissioner of the Armistice period and a sponsor of the hospital. The official state policy is to remind the people once a year how close the Turks came to losing İstanbul. Hence, close to a century after the occupation, October 6 is still celebrated as the day of İstanbul's liberation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My gratitude goes to late Professor Roderic H. Davison who not only encouraged me to undertake this study, but also stood by me throughout the whole ordeal despite the physical distance between us. Professor Muriel Atkin was extremely generous with her time and scholarly advice. I owe her much. Professor Charles Herber devoted precious time to the drafts. Professor Halil İncelik was very supportive of the work and instrumental in publishing this book.

Professors Erik J. Zürcher, Selim İlkin, Mete Tunçay, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Esendal, late Prof. Dr. Uğur Derman, Mr. Tunç Bilget, Mr. Sinan Kuneralp and Mr. Cemal Kutay were all kind enough to share information and directed me to sources. Special thanks are due Mr. Taha Toros and late Mr. Samih Tiryakioğlu who allowed me to study in their personal archives. I am indebted to Dr. Bülent Çukurova for controlling my transliterations from Ottoman newspapers. Ms. Müge Keller displayed her usual professionalism while typing the book.

Finally, without the solidarity of my spouse, Wayne E. Criss, this study could not have been accomplished.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

After the young men had taken part in the war which was to make all future war impossible, the old men applied themselves to making the peace which would render all future peace impossible.¹

When the Peace Conference in Paris was formally initiated on January 18, 1919, in the aftermath of World War I, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was a foregone conclusion. However, the European peace took precedence in the Conference deliberations.

While the Mudros Armistice between the British and Ottoman governments was being signed on October 30, 1918, Admiral Arthur G. Calthorpe, the British signatory, had orally assured his counterpart, Rauf Bey, that there would be no Allied military presence in Istanbul. Yet on November 13, 1918, the Allied occupation of Istanbul began. There were multiple reasons for Allied demonstration of power. First, the Allies wanted to ensure that the terms of the Armistice were carried out. Vital clauses of the Mudros convention were: demobilization of the Ottoman army and surrender of all arms to the Allies; occupation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles forts; and most importantly, the ambiguous clause VII, which allowed the Allies to occupy any area if they thought there was a security threat.² Secondly, the Allies wanted to impress upon the Turks that there was to be no leniency in the upcoming peace settlement. The British High Commissioner, Admiral Calthorpe, expressed this attitude in a letter dated June 6, 1919, to Lord Curzon,

In accordance with the instructions, both written and verbal, which the members of this High Commission have received, it has been our consistent attitude to show no kind of favour whatsoever to any Turk and to hold out no hope for them, but that the treatment to be meted out to the Ottoman Empire as the result of war is likely to be of great severity.³

¹ Ryan Papers, epigram from a personal letter from Aubrey P. Edgcumber to Ryan, December 20, 1919.

² İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları (1920-1945)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983), pp. 12-14.

³ Şimşir, BDOA, 1: 6.

Thirdly, the Allies had to exert authority over the Sultan and the Sublime Porte in order to ensure their cooperation regarding the future of Turkey. However, an unexpected challenge to the partitioning of Turkey and to foreign control came from a number of military commanders, who turned resistance into a full-fledged Nationalist Movement.

The Allied occupation of İstanbul was completed in two phases; from November 13, 1918 to March 20, 1920, İstanbul was occupied *de facto*; on March 20, 1920, the Allies declared that they were occupying the city *de jure*. However, by October 1923, the Nationalists succeeded in getting İstanbul back. Viewed from İstanbul, there appear to be at least five major reasons why the Nationalists succeeded: 1) the British underestimated the Turks; 2) the Nationalists inherited from the CUP regime institutions which provided for organizational continuity; 3) domestic opponents of the Nationalists, assembled in the Freedom and Entente Party (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası, henceforth FEP) were very weak; 4) issues regarding the future of İstanbul and the occupation of the capital inadvertently helped the formation of an alternate Nationalist government in Ankara; and finally, 5) dissension among the Allies, both at the level of "high politics" in Europe, and at the level of the Allied forces of occupation in İstanbul, served the Nationalist cause extremely well.

A number of people in Turkey resolved to resist the occupation and to organize a struggle against dictated peace terms. Article V of the Mudros Armistice stated that the Turkish army was to be demobilized, except for military units assigned to border patrol and internal security. Yet certain army commanders refused to surrender. The Commander of the Second Army, Nihat Pasha (Anılmiş, 1879-1954) equipped Cilician Turks with arms; the Commander of the Sixth Army in Iraq, Ali İhsan Pasha (Sabis, 1882-1957) moved to Diyarbakır without surrendering any arms; the Commander of the Ninth Army, Yakup Şevki Pasha (Subaşı, 1876-1939) who was in the Caucasus, moved to Erzurum, but only after supplying the Turkish populace of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum with weapons; Fahrettin Pasha (Türkkan 1868-1948), Commander of Mecca and Medina, continued fighting for two more months after the Armistice was signed.⁴ By 1919, a Nationalist Movement began, and the Kemalist group assumed its leadership. The story of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk,

⁴ Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri*, p. 12.

1881-1938) has been told elsewhere.⁵ Suffice it to say that the Ottoman government sent Mustafa Kemal as Chief Inspector of the Ninth Army Command with the mission to suppress brigandage towards the Greek population of the Black Sea coastal towns. The Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha, and the Sultan had no idea that they were opening Pandora's box. There were other reasons to send the energetic, young general away from İstanbul. He would have posed a threat to Damad Ferid if he could rally political support; he had lobbied to secure a portfolio as the Minister of War in the post-war Ottoman cabinet; he was very ambitious. At the same time, he had a reputation of being anti-German and anti-CUP. This was good enough to obtain approval from the Sultan and the cabinet for his assignment. Once he was in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal set out to organize a unified Nationalist Movement with the help of his friends Rauf (Orbay, 1881-1964), Refet (Bele, 1881-1963), Ali Fethi (Okyar, 1880-1943), Ali Fuat (Cebesoy, 1882-1968), and Kâzım (Karabekir, 1882-1948) who had impeccable reputations as commanders.

Back in İstanbul, the Allied attitude towards the Turks was based on several stereotypes: the Turks were ruled by Islamic fatalism, they were backward, and they harbored enmity towards all Christians. Prejudice against the Turks was reflected in the later writings of British civil servants who dealt with Turkish affairs. Harold Nicolson, from the British Foreign Ministry, was one of those. He was to account for the failure of the Allied Powers to impose the Treaty of Sèvres on the Turks by arguing that the former had misapplied the principles of authority and consent.

In dealing with highly civilised, and therefore sensitive, organisms such as the Central Powers, this combination (of authority and consent) might survive for a decade or two owing to the nervous prostration of the victims. Yet in dealing with purely animal organisms such as Turkey there was no nervous prostration: the victim recovered overnight.⁶

Again, according to Nicolson, the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George's philhellenism was "based upon his hatred of the Turks, 'that

⁵ Ali S. İkbâl, *Kamal: Maker of Modern Turkey* (London: Herbert Joseph Publishers, 1934); Elaine D. Smith, *Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement, 1919-1923* (Washington, D.C.: Judd and Detweiler Inc., 1959); Lord Kinross, *Birth of a Nation* 4th ed. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966); Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Tek Adam* 3 vols. 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966); Falih Rıfka Atay, *Çankaya* (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1969); Roger R. Trask, *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform 1914-1939* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1971); Sabahattin Selçuk, *Anadolu İhtilali* (İstanbul: Doyuran Matbaası, 1981).

⁶ Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase*, p. 69.

human cancer,' that marauding herd."⁷ Andrew Ryan was of the opinion that "for the great majority of Moslems, however, the Christians were under-dogs."⁸

The occupiers, as a matter of policy, remained aloof from the Turks, and surrounded themselves with the cosmopolitan elements of İstanbul. This limitation compounded their underestimation of Turkish society in general and the fighting spirit of the CUP in particular. The occupiers assumed that the CUP was incapacitated: its leaders had fled the country and the party was officially dissolved. However, in a hierarchical structure like that of Turkish society, secondary and tertiary followers of an ideal can rise to leadership. This was to be the case with the Turkish resistance. Patronage, friendship, and family networks comprised the backbone of the resistance movement.⁹ People from all walks of life were recruited to the underground, including women and members of the clergy.

Analyses of the Turkish Nationalist Movement produced in the West argue that had it not been for the imprudent decision of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference to land Greek troops in İzmir on May 15, 1919, the Nationalist Movement would not have been born. Without the Greek occupation, the Turks would have acquiesced to Allied controls, albeit with "sulky fatalism,"¹⁰ and peace conditions could have been imposed on them. The Greek occupation did indeed rekindle patriotism and cured many Turks of lethargy. However, the assumption does not prove that the Turks would have accepted Allied domination. An entirely different picture emerges when the period between 1918-1923 is studied from Turkish sources. The war was *not* over as far as the leaders of the CUP were concerned. *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa*, (Special Organization, henceforth, TM), the intelligence service formed by Enver Pasha (1881-1922), the CUP Minister of War, had issued strict orders to begin a resistance movement. Enver Pasha had reorganized the military as of 1913 by promoting young, professional officers and by retiring older, non-schooled officers. Talât Pasha (1874-1921), the Grand Vizier, had been the master organizer not only of the CUP, but also of the civilian sector of the society for the purpose of economic revitalization. Luckily for the Nationalists, organizational acumen was something the British would never admit the Turks had. They thought of the CUP only in terms of being pro-German and chauvinist. Yet Pan-Turkism, which was ram-

⁷ Ibid., pp. 93-94.

⁸ Ryan, *The Last of the Dragomans*, p. 218.

⁹ Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, passim.

¹⁰ Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase*, p. 103.

pant in both civilian and military education, gradually turned into Turkish nationalism in the minds of the new generation of officers and civilians. Adherents of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islam were forced to face a bitter reality at the end of the war. There was nothing to save except for Anatolia; irredentism was clearly impossible.¹¹

Misled by the pro-Ally (i.e. pro-British) attitude of the Sultan, the British underestimated the Nationalist Movement. Until 1921, they insisted that the Nationalists and the CUP were one and the same. The British considered the Nationalist Movement to be a desperate but doomed attempt by the CUP to regain power. Based on the belief that religion was the most important aspect of Turkish society, the British decided that the Sultan-Caliph was the only strong symbol around whom the Turks would rally. By March 1920, they officially adopted a policy to support the Sultan.

The Nationalists and the CUP were not the same, but the former inherited major institutions which had been either initiated or reorganized by the CUP. These institutions provided the organizational framework of the resistance. The Nationalist resistance recruited manpower from the military, the TM, artisans' and manufacturers' guilds, Ottoman Red Crescent Society, and women's associations. There were at least 17 women's associations established between 1908-1918, three of which were directly organized by the CUP; namely, *İttihat ve Terakki Kadınlar Şubesi* (Women's Branch of the CUP), *Teali-i Vatan Osmanlı Hanımlar Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Ladies' Association for the Elevation of the Country), and *Osmanlı Kadınları Terakkiperver Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Women's Progressive Association).¹²

The first underground group, *Karakol* (The Guards' Society) was modeled after the CUP's intelligence service, the TM. Once a national assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, henceforth, TBMM) was established in Ankara on April 23, 1920, other underground organizations were formed, such as the *Müdafaa-i Milliye* or M.M. (The National Defense Group), *Felâh* (Deliverance), *Muavenet-i Bahriye* (Naval Assistance), and *İmalât-ı Harbiye* (War Matériel Manufacturers) groups.

Another aspect which helped the Nationalists was the weakness of the domestic opposition party, the FEP. The Palace and FEP adopted a policy of appeasement towards the Allies in the hope of softening the conditions of the peace treaty. Most of the leaders of the FEP were also members of the Friends of England Society. The FEP did not have a strong power base; and, instead of trying to build one, they concen-

¹¹ Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam* (Ankara: Türkiye Matbaası, 1959), passim.

¹² Serpil Çakır, "Bir Osmanlı Kadın Örgütü: Osmanlı Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Nisvan Cemiyeti," *Tarih ve Toplum* 66 (June 1989): 16-21.

trated on wreaking vengeance on CUP followers. Further, the FEP was not a cohesive group. The only thing its members had in common was a blind hatred for the CUP.¹³ The FEP attracted anti-Unionists of every spectrum as well as opportunists. Thus, its leading members began to fight for party leadership. The anti-Damad Ferid Pasha faction seceded in 1920 and called itself "The Moderate Freedom and Entente Party." In order to counter the effects of popularity loss, Damad Ferid Pasha threw his lot with the Allies. This strategy was supposed to convey the message that he was supported by the Allies and, therefore, was the only strong statesman left in the Ottoman realm. In reality, Damad Ferid's sympathy for the Allies was one-sided.

Constantinople government derives what little authority it does possess from the Sultan, and from the illusion that it enjoys Allied, especially British, support... Ferid Pasha, already unpopular, among the active politicians, can only retain power either by convincing the Sultan that the above illusion is a reality and thereby securing the continued confidence of at least the Sultan, or by converting the illusion into reality, and thereby again widening the circle of his supporters.¹⁴

The "moderate" faction rejoined the FEP within three months of the split. In any case, the FEP was never represented in the Parliament, because it boycotted the 1919 election, which was to be the last election of the Ottoman era. Even when the Damad Ferid cabinets were in power, the relationship of the FEP with the government was not a formal one. The FEP had no seats in the Parliament and could not influence policies.¹⁵ Therefore, the FEP tried to influence public opinion through anti-nationalist propaganda. The FEP emerged as a symbol of anti-Unionist/anti-nationalist mentality rather than a solid political party.

The Allied attitude towards the future of İstanbul and their formal occupation of the city were yet additional reasons for the Nationalists to establish their own alternate government in Ankara. Since the war, Allied nationals in Europe spread propaganda to place İstanbul under international administration. Advocates of this idea argued that

¹³ Refik Halid Karay, *Minelbab İlelmihrab* (İstanbul: İnkılâp ve Aka Koll. Şti. 1964); Rıza Nur, *Hürriyet ve İtilâf Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Öldü?* (Dersaadet: Akşam Matbaası, 1335); Tahsin Demiray, ed. *Canlı Tarihler* 6 vols. (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945), 3: "Gördüklerim, Yaptıklarım," by Ahmet Reşit Rey; Hasan Amca (Hasan Vasfi), *Doğmayan Hürriyet, Bir Devrin İçyüzü, 1908-1918* (İstanbul: M. Sıralar Matbaası, 1958); Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler* 2: 264-307; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası," *Yakın Tarihimiz* 2: 23 (August 1962), pp. 308-309.

¹⁴ FO 371/5056, September 23, 1920. Memo from Ryan to the Foreign Office.

¹⁵ Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, pp. 270-273.

the Turks first entered İstanbul as alien conquerors and had remained there as aliens.¹⁶ Accordingly, İstanbul was neither Muslim nor Turkish. Without explaining how they obtained population figures, these writers claimed that there were 685,000 non-Muslims and 485,000 Muslims in the city. The Turkish portion of the Muslim population was, to a large extent, a transient population. Based on the assumption that all the Turks in İstanbul were civil servants, they claimed that the Turks did not remain in İstanbul for long. Therefore, the permanent Muslim population there consisted of Arabs, Albanians and Kurds. The essence of these unfounded claims was to "prove" that İstanbul was not a Turkish city.

Early during the Armistice, the Allies wished to impose upon İstanbul a new Straits regime based on the principle of free navigation. The status of the Straits involved the issue of ridding Europe of the Turks in the minds of British statesmen. British officials debated whether to remove the Sultan from İstanbul. The most vociferous exponents of this idea were Lord Curzon and Lloyd George. Opposed to the idea was the Governor-General of India, Edwin Montagu. Montagu believed that Muslim sentiment in India would be outraged if the Sultan were expelled from İstanbul. Britain had used Muslim soldiers in its forces against the Turks during the war with no opposition from the faithful. But expelling the Sultan-Caliph entailed much risk, according to the Governor-General.¹⁷ Under the circumstances, placing İstanbul under a mandate seemed to be an attractive solution. By 1920, it became obvious that the United States would not accept a mandate over İstanbul or Turkey. The British would not accept a minor power having charge of the Straits for fear that this might cause future problems. Even a United States mandate would not have been that desirable either. That would have meant a strong American fleet in the Mediterranean, which did not suit British policy. Not only would an American fleet rival British power in the Mediterranean, it would have to be fuelled by Middle Eastern oil. According to an American naval report, the British authorities were already reluctant to share the oil.¹⁸ The Supreme Council decided

¹⁶ Leonard S. Woolf, *The Future of Constantinople* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1917); C. G. Bello, *Notes et Réflexions Sur La Turquie, L'Angleterre, la France et le Problème de Constantinople* (Paris: Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, 1920), p. 118; Henry O. Dwight, "Constantinople as a Centre of Islam," *The Moslem World* 1 (1911): 229-240.

¹⁷ A.L. Macfie, "The British Decision Regarding the Future of Constantinople, November 1918-January 1920," *The Historical Journal* 18: 2(1975), p. 390.

¹⁸ U.S. Records 867.00/836, June 1, 1920. From Force Commander H.S. Knapp to the Chief of Naval Operations.

that the Sultan could remain in İstanbul. An important factor which contributed to this decision was the rapprochement between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists in 1920. Here was an opportunity to win over the moderate Turks to the Allied side.

The fear of Bolshevism, however, had a fortunate consequence later on, as it brought about in 1920 a complete change in British ideas concerning Turkey and Constantinople. The London cabinet realised that Turks were the first nation that the Bolshevik propaganda could reach, and to which the Moscow Government could most easily and effectively give its support against British policy in Asia Minor, which would make the situation in the East still more complicated. So, in order not to drive the Ottoman Government into an open resistance, England first showed an inclination to share the view, held by France from the outset, that the Turks should be allowed to remain in Constantinople.¹⁹

Subsequently, Lord Curzon came up with the scheme to internationalize İstanbul, but insisted once again that the Sultan should be expelled. This time, the French supported Governor-General Montagu. They argued that Muslim sentiment in Morocco, Algiers and Syria would be offended. Lord Curzon came back with the "Vatican proposal," which would permit the Sultan to reside in İstanbul from time to time. However, the French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, opposed him. "It is quite bad enough to have one Pope in the West," he said.²⁰ The fact that the status of a Caliph was very different from a Pope had no bearing on these discussions. The issue was how to confine the Turks to Asia without creating opposition in the Muslim colonies of Europe. Although no decision had yet been reached about İstanbul, news of the "Vatican proposal" reached the city:

Constantinople and the Straits are to be internationalized, and France and England will conjointly have the predominating influence in the control. The new capital of the Turkish Government will be in Asia Minor, but the Sultan will remain as the spiritual head of all the Mohammedans, and the religious capital of Islam will continue to be Constantinople.²¹

This news created a sensation in İstanbul. Letters of protest began to arrive at the Allied High Commissions. On February 1, 1920, the British High Commissioner, Admiral Sir John M. de Robeck (1862-1928), transmitted a protest telegram to the President of the House of Commons, which read,

¹⁹ Gaston Gaillard, *The Turks and Europe* (London: Thomas Murky and Co., 1921), p. 97.

²⁰ Macfie, "The British Decision Regarding the Future of Constantinople," p. 397.

²¹ "The Future of Turkey," *The Orient* 7: 6 (January 7, 1920), p. 51.

The General Municipal Council of Constantinople, in its first sitting held on 15th instant, has instructed me to transmit you the following statement: It is impossible to separate from the other Ottoman countries the capital of Turks, Constantinople, which is full since centuries with their historical monuments and buildings and with the tombs of their monarchs and ancestors. Such an unjust separation cannot be conformed to the high spirit of justice and freedom distinguishing the noble British nation and could not be put into application. Signed: Djemil, Prefect of Constantinople and President of the Town's General Municipal Council.²²

On February 3, 1920, after the protest demonstration in Sultan Ahmet Square which took place on January 13, Admiral de Robeck forwarded to Lord Curzon a letter, which was submitted to the British High Commission. The letter contained signatures of the leading citizens in İstanbul, who protested the occupation of the city, schemes to internationalize it, and in a threatening tone, stated that the sole responsibility for anything that might happen subsequently rested with the British.²³

One year later, the Allies still disagreed over the future administration of İstanbul. The editor of *The Orient*, the organ of the American Bible House in İstanbul, offered a new proposal:

What valid objection can there be to making Constantinople a neutral city under the government of an international commission composed of delegates from three countries known to have no aims for its political control? An ideal Commission might consist of delegates from Switzerland, Finland, and the United States, with Denmark, Norway, Brazil and Japan as possible alternates.²⁴

Accordingly, the League of Nations could give İstanbul a charter as a free city to be under the self-government of its inhabitants. All property which formerly belonged to the Imperial family would be turned over to the city to finance self-government. *The Boston Herald* applauded this proposition, which would be an experiment in city government by commission. İstanbul had always been governed autocratically, argued the Bostonian journalists. Here, perhaps, was an opportunity for the city to enjoy democratic government for the first time in history.²⁵

What the above proposal ignored was that the *de jure* occupation of İstanbul on March 16, 1920, had brought about an unintended re-

²² FO 371/5162, February 1, 1920.

²³ FO 371/5162, February 3, 1920.

²⁴ "Constantinople As a Free City," *The Orient* 8: 43 (October 26, 1921), p. 405.

²⁵ "A Free Constantinople," *The Boston Herald*, November 29, 1921, p. 3, cs. 3-4.

sult. Nationalists reacted to the dissolution of the Ottoman Parliament by declaring the establishment of their own government in Ankara.

Although the Supreme Council in Paris had decided not to expel the Sultan from Istanbul, Allied governments still lacked a clear-cut policy on managing Istanbul or Turkish affairs in general. The British contingent in Istanbul felt the need for a policy most acutely.

In reality, the *de facto* occupation of the city was illegal and the Allies could not exert authority except through the Ottoman government. General Milne, Commander of the Army of the Black Sea, constantly pressed Admiral de Robeck to intervene with the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because the Turkish military authorities disregarded his instructions. Even when Admiral de Robeck intervened, the result was still procrastination by the Turks. The Allied High Commissioners were powerless to impose their will; they had no means of enforcing the Armistice terms. Hence, Admiral de Robeck advised his government that Istanbul should be occupied *de jure*.²⁶ Ryan, the senior Political Officer, also repeatedly urged his government to adopt a "positive policy" in view of the Bolshevik defeat of the White Armies and the threat of Bolshevik control in the Caucasus and the Caspian regions.²⁷

In order to establish a permanent influence in Turkey after the peace treaty was signed, the British decided to support the Sultan. Ryan informed his superiors that the only way to obtain the Sultan's cooperation as well as that of the sympathizers of England was for the Allies to offer them the prospect of a tolerable peace. This meant the retention of Istanbul as the capital, expulsion of the Greeks from İzmir, and elimination of any future Kurdish and Armenian states. These potential states would have severed the eastern, southeastern and Cilician provinces from Turkey. Instead, the clear-cut policy that His Majesty's government adopted was abrupt punishment of the Turkish Nationalists' defiance. The recalcitrant attitude of the Turks led Lord Curzon to consider seriously the destruction of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles fortifications. He sent an "Urgent" and "Secret" proposal to the Admiralty and the Army Council on March 10, 1920:

It has been suggested to his Lordship that if the destruction of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles fortifications are now proceeded with, it would produce upon the Turks a moral effect which at the present time

²⁶ FO 406/43, p. 183. From de Robeck to Curzon, February 29, 1920.

²⁷ FO 371/5043, February 11, 1920. From de Robeck to Curzon.

is highly desirable. Such action, it is urged, would be an unmistakable sign not only of the defeat of the Turks, but also of the power and determination of the Allies. It is suggested that without any previous warning being allowed to reach the Turks, Allied authorities might begin to blow up the forts along the Bosphorus and what the deep impression which would thereby be created in the minds of the inhabitants of Constantinople would contribute greatly to relieve the present situation.²⁸

Admiral de Robeck was not in favor of this proposal or of actively suppressing the Nationalists as had been suggested by the Foreign Office as a reprisal. He maintained that Mustafa Kemal would react to this with counter-reprisals against the Christians in Anatolia and could very well cut off food supplies to Istanbul by holding up the Anatolian railways.²⁹ The Admiralty, however, agreed with Lord Curzon and his plan was partially carried out, since earlier the same month, the Allied Supreme Council had already decided that Istanbul should be formally occupied. The Allies hoped that, in this way, they could impose peace terms on the Nationalists and compel them to cooperate with the Istanbul government. There were also a number of practical reasons for the occupation. The British could then arrest all the undesirables, i.e., nationalistic elements in the city, and curb resistance. The Allies hoped to gain a positive image both in Turkey and in other Muslim countries by upholding the rights of the Sultan-Caliph and, within Turkey, they counted on this policy to split the Nationalist Movement, based on the assumption that many of its supporters would choose to rally around the Sultan. The occupation would help suppress the Nationalists in the Ottoman Parliament. And lastly, it would improve the management of the city by introducing more effective financial and judicial control.

When the Supreme Council decided to proceed with the occupation, the Allied Commanders and High Commissioners in Istanbul resolved that the occupation would last six months.³⁰ The Supreme Council opposed taking over the civil administration or dissolving the Parliament.³¹

During the Ali Rıza and Salih Hulusi Pasha cabinets (October 2, 1919 – April 2, 1920), there was a rapprochement between the Nationalists and the Ottoman government. The former agreed to confer with an Ottoman delegation concerning the modifications they

²⁸ FO 371/5043.

²⁹ E.L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds. *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* Series I (London: Oxford University Press, 1952-) IV: 977.

³⁰ FO 371/5043, March 10, 1920. From de Robeck to Curzon.

³¹ *Ibid.*, From Curzon to de Robeck.

wanted made to the Treaty of Sèvres. In return, the Nationalists promised to cease resistance to the peace conditions. Once an Ottoman delegation went to Amasya to negotiate with the Nationalists, the entire purpose of the meeting changed. The Ottoman government officially recognized the Nationalist Representative Committee. This Committee, *Heyet-i Temsiliye*, comprised of elected deputies to the Sivas Congress (September 4-11, 1919). It was a formal body which would unite resistance to foreign occupation. In addition, the Ottoman delegation agreed, in principle, with the National Pact adopted at the Sivas Congress.³² Subsequently, Nationalist deputies from Anatolia participated in the last Ottoman Parliament, which opened on January 12, 1920. The United States High Commissioner reported,

Recent reports indicate that efforts to prevent Turkish elections and produce Coup d'Etat by bribery have failed. Intrigues have, however, resulted in deciding non Mussulman populations not to participate, together with elements opposed to Nationalists, thus compromising result elections as expression feelings majority populace (sic).³³

The majority of the 140 deputies were Nationalists, with Rauf Bey acting as Mustafa Kemal's representative. Rauf Bey was a firm believer in legal formalities. He thought that if the British could be provoked to react to a Nationalist Parliament, they would take severe action, perhaps even close the Parliament, upon which a government could be formed in Ankara legitimately.³⁴

The British did not need much provocation. On January 28, 1920, Şeref Bey (Aykut, 1874-1939), deputy from Edirne, read the National Pact in the Parliament, which then was adopted. The essence of this pact was that areas with a Turkish majority were to remain within the Turkish state. Şeref Bey, formerly of the CUP, was to pay for this act by being exiled to Malta after the occupation.³⁵ The Ottoman Parliamentarians voted to suspend the meetings when on March 16, 1920, two deputies, Rauf Bey and Kara Vasıf (Karakol, 1881-1931) were arrested by the British inside the Parliament. The British had no intention of dissolving the Parliament, and did not foresee this result.

³² Mazhar Müfit Kansu, *Erzurum'dan Ölümine Kadar Atatürk'le Beraber* 2 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986), 1: 419-424.

³³ U.S. Records 867.00/981, October 31, 1919. From Bristol to Secretary of State.

³⁴ "Rauf Orbay'ın Hatıraları," *Yakın Tarihimiz* 3: 32 (October 4, 1962), pp. 176-178 and 3: 33 (October 11, 1962), pp. 208-212; Feridun Kandemir, *Hatıraları ve Söyleyemedikleriyle Rauf Orbay* (İstanbul: Sinan Matbaası, 1965).

³⁵ Cemal Kutay, *Mehmed Şeref Aykut* (İstanbul: n.p., 1985), pp. 238-245.

The occupation was initially planned to take place on March 13, 1920. However, on the 11th, the French Military Commander in İstanbul received a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris counselling caution, consultation with the Allies, and delay.³⁶ Admiral de Robeck asked Lord Curzon for authorization to act independently of the French and Italians if it were the Government's intention to proceed with the occupation. If not, then all the High Commissioners should immediately receive identical orders from their governments. On March 13, Lord Curzon informed the French Ambassador in London of the delay which was caused by the French in İstanbul. Curzon told the French Ambassador that he had authorized de Robeck to go ahead with the occupation, based on instructions received from the Supreme Council, and that even if the French and Italian Commanders declined to cooperate, the British would act alone.³⁷

The occupation took place on the morning of March 16. Allied High Commissioners issued a communiqué to the public the "main object" of which was "to impress on all Turks, and especially those in provinces, that Constantinople is practically held as a pledge for good conduct."³⁸ Allied declaration was printed in all the İstanbul newspapers except the Nationalist *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, which chose not even to mention the occupation. *L'Illustration*, a French weekly, described the occupation as follows:

C'est le 16 mars dernier que, en conformité de la décision des haut commissaires anglais, français et italien, un corps d'occupation, composé de détachements des trois nations, sous les ordres du général anglais Wilson, est entré à Constantinople. A vrai dire, la ville, où des éléments britanniques assuraient la "police," était déjà occupée en fait. Les effectifs plus importants amenés sous un triple pavillon permirent de prendre position en divers points stratégiques, de mettre la main sur certains services officiels, le ministère de la Guerre, notamment, et de procéder à l'arrestation des personnages qu'on savait d'accord avec Moustapha Kemal, Enver pacha et Talaat. Une proclamation du général Wilson, déclarant la ville en état de siège, a affirmé la caractère provisoire de l'occupation... Elle a confirmé, en outre, la décision apaisante des alliés de ne pas priver les Turcs de Constantinople si toutes garanties étaient acquises contre le retour des troubles et des massacres.³⁹

³⁶ FO 406/43, p. 215. From de Robeck to Curzon, March 12, 1920.

³⁷ FO 371/5043, March 13, 1920. From Curzon to French Ambassador.

³⁸ Ibid., March 16, 1920. From de Robeck to Curzon.

³⁹ "Nos Troupes A Constantinople et en Syrie," *L'Illustration* (April 10, 1920) pp. 214-215.

On March 17, 1920, the Allied Passport Office announced that no one would be allowed to travel beyond the Anatolian Lighthouse on the Bosphorus or to the east of Pendik on the Asian side without a visa from the Passport Office.⁴⁰

The military occupation of İstanbul brought the Allies' conflict of interest to the surface. Serious splits between the Allies were reflected in the American and European press. In April 1920, *The New York Times* reported that the French and Italians were critical of the Allied occupation.⁴¹ On April 2, *La Libre Parole* stated that the March 16 occupation of İstanbul was carried out only to establish British supremacy on the Bosphorus.⁴² In June, *The New York Times* reported that the French press resented the Hythe Conference actions of May 1920, which reiterated partition, sanctioned war on the Turks, and handed over to Greece the task of settling affairs in the Near East. The paper quoted Robert Lambel of *La Liberté*:

What will it cost us to support it? Is France, the secular protector of Islam, going to lose all her advantage and prestige and her political tradition in supporting the most determined enemies of the Crescent, and those, moreover, who have never ceased to covet Constantinople?⁴³

An American scholar attributed splits between the Allies to the fact that the division of Turkey had given France too small a share for it to make an engagement in a new war worthwhile. The Italians, too, were disappointed with the British for making concessions to the Greeks, at Italy's expense. This discontent gave rise to Franco-Italian support for the Nationalists.⁴⁴ Other French grievances against Britain were that contrary to prior agreements, the latter did not want to share Mosul's petroleum with France and stirred Amir Faisal to attack the French troops in Syria. In short, France saw Britain as following an entirely selfish policy, without any regard to the interests of its allies.

Indeed, the Allies had begun to part ways as early as 1919, because of competing interests in Syria, Mesopotamia, Cilicia, and the Aegean. French public opinion did not see the merit of landing Greek troops in İzmir. The Italians were offended because they were deprived of the rich territory of the Aydın province that had earlier

⁴⁰ "Resmî Tebliğ," *Alemdar*, March 17, 1920, p. 1, cs. 3-4.

⁴¹ *The New York Times*, April 22, 1920, p. 1, c. 3.

⁴² Yves Le Iannou, "La Fin De L'Empire Ottoman Vue Par La Presse Française (1918-1923)," *Turcica* 9 (October 2, 1978): 182.

⁴³ *The New York Times*, June 22, 1920, p. 1, c. 2.

⁴⁴ Frank H. Simonds, "Greek vs Turk: A New Phase of the Eastern Question," *American Review of Reviews* 62 (August 1920): 159-168.

been promised to themselves. Hence, both countries confined their imperial aims in Turkey to economic concessions. In the summer of 1919, the domestic situation in Italy became unsettled and there was threat of a revolution. The Italian government withdrew its troops from Anatolia and abandoned ideas of territorial acquisition. "But, in going, they sold their arms and ammunitions to the Nationalists despite the likelihood that they would be used against their own Allies."⁴⁵

As a British agent in Rome warned London, the Italian government favored a strong and independent Turkey in the Near East, in order to counterbalance the imperial aims of neighboring states, "together with the fact of having at least tolerated as you are aware—Italian businessmen and artisans to lend material support to the Anatolian forces at the most critical moments."⁴⁶ A note was pencilled in, in London to the underlined phrase which said, "They have done much more than this."

The Italian government desired to mediate between the Nationalists and the central Ottoman government, without entering into formal negotiations with the former, according to the same British agent. If this information was true, the Italians probably did not wish to be the first nation to recognize the Nationalists.

In October 1920, British intelligence in İstanbul confirmed that numerous barrels of Italian-owned oil had been sent from Antalya on the Mediterranean coast to the interior of Anatolia for the use of the Nationalists. Further information indicated that Italians had unloaded fieldguns in Antalya destined for the Kemalists.⁴⁷ The British Ambassador in Rome informed the Foreign Office that he had communicated to the Italians that according to reports received by the British in Turkey and the Caucasus that, "the Italian agents in those countries did not give us the loyal support which we had the right to expect and that their sympathies seemed to be rather with our enemies, and more especially with Turkish Nationalists."⁴⁸

The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs was quick to deny this allegation, saying that such information was probably obtained from Greek sources, the British Ambassador added. Official denials aside, it was obvious from various reports that the Italians were no longer loyal to the alliance. They were only interested in promoting their commerce.

⁴⁵ Luke, *Cities and Men*, p. 69.

⁴⁶ FO 371/5057, Secret Political Report, İstanbul, October 2, 1920.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Navy telegrams from Egypt GHQ to Constantinople, October 23, 1920.

⁴⁸ FO 371/5057, November 6, 1920. From Sir G. Buchanan to Curzon.

The irreconcilable differences between Allied interests only increased with time. Intercepted telegrams from Anatolia showed that the Kemalists were in touch with an Italian merchant house in İstanbul. The Nationalists wished to purchase 25,000 pieces of clothing for the army, 100,000 army cots, 100,000 tents, 150,000 water jugs and other materials. The agent who sent the telegram proposed to deposit the payment in an Italian bank in Antalya which was to be transferred to the seller upon receipt of the merchandise.⁴⁹

According to a French intelligence report of June 10, 1921, the director of a large Italian firm informed the French that a Nationalist agent had contacted him to purchase 100,000 Lebel, Mauser and Mannlicher guns and related cartridges.

Le Gouvernement d'Angora fait déposer 180,000 Livres Turques, comme provision à la Banca di Roma de Constantinople. Moustapha Kemal se serait adressé à ce commerçant le croyant seul capable de s'aboucher avec le Gouvernement Français pour la fourniture des fusils.⁵⁰

On August 10, 1921, the Allied representatives in Paris agreed that their respective firms would be allowed to sell war matériel to belligerents in general. The neutrality of the Allies vis-à-vis the Greeks and Turks was still in effect, which barred them from selling weapons to these particular belligerents. The only "solution" was for the Allied governments not to interfere with their firms and purchasers.⁵¹ This approach legitimized contraband to a certain extent.

As a prelude to the French-Turkish accord of October 20, 1921, the French made gestures of goodwill towards the Nationalists. In January 1921, the then-French High Commissioner, Jules DeFrance, wrote to General Charpy in a secret note that the French Foreign Ministry had sent a letter written by Ahmet Rıza Bey, (1859-1930, the former president of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies and Senate) in Rome to Mustafa Kemal, and that the letter should be secretly forwarded to Mustafa Kemal. DeFrance asked General Charpy to send this letter by a special courier.⁵² It is likely that the letter contained information on European attitudes towards the Nationalists as well as news about a potential rapprochement with the Italians.

On January 23, Hamid Bey (Hasancan, 1870-1943), Ankara's political representative in İstanbul, asked General Charpy to transmit a

⁴⁹ FMA 20N1112 C/48 Dos3, Telegrams dated 20, 27, 30 January and 5, 7 February, 1921.

⁵⁰ FMA 20N1104 C38/1 Dos2.

⁵¹ Serhan Ada, "Kurtuluş Savaşında Diploması ve Askeri Yardım," in 2. Askeri Tarih Semineri 3-5 Ekim 1984 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1985), pp. 338-349.

⁵² FMA 20N1106 C38/4 Dos1, January 31, 1921.

letter that he wrote to the French Minister of War. In it, he stated that the National Pact, which by then had been ratified by the last Ottoman Parliament, had drawn the national borders of Turkey. Accordingly, the Nationalists were sending to Paris a delegate to negotiate the French-Turkish accord on the basis of the National Pact.⁵³

One year later, Sir Horace Rumbold, the British High Commissioner, was to complain bitterly to the Assistant Foreign Secretary, Sir Lancelot Oliphant, in a secret and confidential letter, "I would like to emphasize that as far as I can make out, my French colleague loses no time in communicating to the Nationalist agent, all that passes at the meetings between the High Commissioners."⁵⁴ In a letter to his mother, Sir Horace was to accuse the French of "always playing the dirty on us."⁵⁵

Hamid Bey's telegrams to the General Staff in Ankara point to a collaboration between the French and the Nationalists. On June 27, 1921, General Maurice Pellé furnished Hamid Bey with a destroyer by which the latter secretly traveled to İzmit (ancient Nicomedia) to investigate a mass killing by the Greeks. Further, correspondence between the French government through Franklin-Bouillon (1870-1939), the negotiator of the French-Turkish agreement, and the Nationalists' Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Kemal Bey (Tengirsek, 1878-1968), took place through Hamid Bey and General Pellé.⁵⁶

By 1922, friction between the Allied forces of occupation had become tangible. Initial pretensions that it was the Turks who tried to drive a wedge between the Allies had been abandoned.

When the Roman Catholic Pope Benedict XV died on January 22, 1922,⁵⁷ the Catholic Church held a Requiem Mass in İstanbul. The seating arrangement of High Commissioners and diplomatic corps presented a problem, because the French insisted on being placed in the position of honor, behind the symbolic catafalque. The British and Italians objected, arguing that France had renounced its protectorate over the Eastern Catholics in San Remo in May 1920. The Apostolic Delegate, Monsignor Dolci, supported the French demand, which settled the matter. However, the British and Italian

⁵³ Hamid Bey was the second manager of the Ottoman Bank and a member of the Red Crescent Society's Board of Directors. See Fethi Tevetoglu, "Kızılaycı Hamdi Bey," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 3: 9 (July 1987), pp. 681-690; FMA 20N1112 C/42 Dos5.

⁵⁴ Rumbold Papers, No. 242-243, August 15, 1922.

⁵⁵ Ibid., September 20, 1922.

⁵⁶ Himmetoglu, *KSİY*, 1: 312-377.

⁵⁷ Benedict XV (Giacomo Della Chiesa) (1854-1922). He was elected Pope as Pius X's successor one month after the outbreak of World War I.

High Commissioners rejected the position of favor accorded the French, and therefore, boycotted the mass.⁵⁸ Bitterness between the Allied forces deepened with further acts of dissension.

(A) French ship was stopped as it sailed down the Golden Horn in the first week of January 1922. It was laden with ammunition and stores for the Turks in Anatolia and its hold-up by the British caused a diplomatic incident.⁵⁹

It was especially frustrating for the British that the Treaty of Sèvres, which Damad Ferid had signed on August 10, 1920, could not be enforced. The Nationalist Parliament in Ankara had promptly rejected the treaty, and even the Sultan did not sign it. Therefore, it remained unratified. Meanwhile, the domestic problems which tied the hands of the Allies prevented them from enforcing ratification. England faced labor unrest and problems with Ireland; in France the issues were economic problems and dissatisfaction with German war reparations; Italy was threatened with a socialist uprising; and the fear of Bolshevism was widespread. Allied armies had been demobilized by this time, so it became more difficult to justify to the soldiers in the occupation forces why they were still under arms when their friends had returned home.

These factors, combined with the Nationalist military victories over the Greeks in 1921 and 1922, and the political recognition of the Nationalist government by the Russians (March 16, 1921) and the French (October 20, 1921), compelled the British to soften their stance. Since European public opinion opposed undertaking another war in Turkey or elsewhere, enforcing the Treaty of Sèvres on Turkey was clearly impossible.

The Allies had declared neutrality in the Greco-Turkish war and then offered to mediate between the two countries. The Armistice was signed in Mudanya on October 11, 1922. By this convention, Eastern Thrace and Izmir were ceded to the Turks. The status of Istanbul remained unsettled. But the Nationalists would agitate to take over the administration of Istanbul before peace was signed with the Allies. The Nationalist government sent Refet Pasha to Thrace as an extraordinary commissioner for the takeover. However, before he proceeded to Thrace, the Pasha remained in Istanbul for some months and succeeded in taking over the administration of the city and of the ministries on behalf of the Turkish National Assembly. Foreign occupation in Istanbul did not end until the Lausanne Peace

⁵⁸ U.S. Records 867.452/I, January 31, 1922. From Bristol to Secretary of State.

⁵⁹ Armstrong, *Turkey in Travail*, p. 244.

Treaty was signed on July 24, 1923. Istanbul was officially evacuated by the Allies on October 2, 1923. On October 6, Istanbul reverted to the Turks, and the Nationalist troops marched in.

CHAPTER TWO

A SURVEY OF ISTANBUL DURING THE ARMISTICE

Having been the seat of government of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, İstanbul reflects imperial traditions both in ambiance and in its architectural composition. One of the main characteristics of the Ottoman realm was highly centralized government.¹ While an immense control mechanism grew, Turks, Arabs, Albanians, Bosnians, Tatars, Greeks, and Armenians came to the city to take part in the opportunities that an expanding empire presented. Added to the population were Jewish refugees from the Spanish Inquisition, who made İstanbul one of the largest cities in the world during the sixteenth century. In 1920, İstanbul boasted an estimated 1 million to 1,200,000 inhabitants; 560,434 were Muslims; 384,689 Greeks; 118,000 Armenians; and 44,765 Jews. The rest of the people consisted of the foreigners and the Levantines.² Levantines were people of European descent who settled in the Near East. Having accumulated fortunes from trade, the Levantines made up a "high society" of their own and were instrumental in introducing Western social norms to Ottoman İstanbul.³

Constantinople is Turkey, in a far greater degree than most capitals can be said to be the heart of their countries. The extreme centralization of government has been largely responsible for this fact. One incidental result is the picturesque and amazing cosmopolitanism in appearance, though not in spirit.⁴

The terms the city's inhabitants employed to refer to it reflect their pride about İstanbul. These included: *Der-i Saadet* (the Abode of Hap-

¹ Halil İnalcık, "İstanbul," *The Encyclopedia of Islam* 2nd ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954-) 4: 224-248.

² *Constantinople Today: or the Pathfinder Survey of Constantinople: A Study in Oriental Social Life*, Clarence Johnson, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1922), p. 16. The writers obtained minority population figures from synagogues and churches. The figure on the Muslim population must have been projected based on the last official census taken in 1900; *Tableaux Indiquant le nombre de divers éléments de la population dans l'Empire Ottoman au 1er Mars 1330 (14 Mars 1914)*, (Constantinople: Imp. Osmanié, 1919), p. 22.

³ Gürol Sözen, "Son Levantenler," *Günışık*, May 30 - June 22, 1988; Said N. Duhani, *Eski İnsanlar Eski Evler: 19. Yüzyıl Sonunda İstanbul'un Sosyal Topoğrafyası* transl. Cemal Süreyya (İstanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu, 1982); Idem, "Beyoğlu Pera İken," *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 1/2: 3-8 (April - September 1968).

⁴ *Pathfinder Survey*, p. 79.

piness), *Dâr-ı Devlet* (the Gate of the State), *Âsitane* (the Treshold), *Âsitane-i Saadet* (the Treshold of Happiness), *el-Farruq* (the Abode of Justice), *Umm-i Dünya* (the Source of the World), *Dârü's Saltana* (the Abode of Sovereignty), *Dârü's Saltanatü'l Âliyye* (the Abode of Exalted Sovereignty), *Dârü'l İslam* (the Abode of Islam), and *Belde-i Tayyibe* (the Pure City).⁵

At the turn of the century, the map of İstanbul was divided into boroughs along ethnic lines. In the Old City were the Muslim-Turkish boroughs of Bayezid, Aksaray, Eminönü, Unkapanı, Fatih, Şehremini, Eyüp and Kasımpaşa. Jewish settlements were predominantly in Hasköy, across the Golden Horn and Balat to the west of the city. The Grand Rabbi's office was situated in Sirkeci, north of the Topkapı Palace. The Greeks lived in Pera, across the Golden Horn, and Phanar, on the Golden Horn where the Greek Patriarchate is located. Samatya and Kumkapı were Armenian boroughs. The Armenian Patriarchate, St. Mary's is located in Kumkapı, to the south of the Old City. Across the Old City and the Golden Horn was Pera, the business center of İstanbul. Pera was a world apart from the rest of the city, because it was a microcosm of a European city. Foreign embassies were located there. Diplomats, foreign businessmen, rich members of the minority groups, and the Levantines lived there. Foreign banks such as Crédit Lyonnais, the Ottoman Bank, and Bank of Salonica had their offices along the Grand Rue de Pera.

Scattered on the European and Asian shores of the Bosphorus were waterfront kiosks (yalı), palaces of the Imperial family, and the summer residences of foreign embassies. On the Anatolian side of the sea of Marmara were Üsküdar (ancient Scutari) and Kadıköy (ancient Chalcedon), marked by more suburbs with summer kiosks.⁶

Turkish Society

Given that the Ottoman Empire was engaged in nearly eight years of continuous warfare (1911-1918), social disintegration was inevitable. Until World War I, men in İstanbul were exempt from conscription. The ferocity of war put an end to this privilege. Minorities were also called to serve in the military for the first time in the history of the

⁵ İlber Ortaylı, *İstanbul'dan Sayfalar* (İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1986), passim.

⁶ Henry Otis Dwight, *Constantinople and Its Problems* (London: Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier, 1901); H.G. Dwight, *Constantinople Old and New* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915); Charles Diehl, *Constantinople* (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1924); George Young, *Constantinople* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1926).

Empire; but they did not participate in action and served behind the lines. At the end of the war, many families were left with the elderly, children and young widows. The rise in the cost of living forced the formerly well-to-do families in the city to survive on what valuables they could sell. Added to this situation were fires which devastated a large number of homes and businesses.

As a result of wars and destitution, the traditional Ottoman way of life changed: women who had been segregated now began to appear in the workplace in larger numbers. However, this was not a direct cause and effect. The Young Turks (i.e. the CUP) were progressive in their attitude and policies towards women. Having been influenced by European positivism, the Young Turks espoused rational attitudes towards female enlightenment and women's rights. Therefore, women's participation in work life was not an abrupt social change. There was a cadre of educated women who were experienced in social work, school teaching, and writing. The textile industry employed many women workers.

Turkish social strata were composed of the military, civil servants, and small businessmen. The major social unit was the immediate neighborhood, where the well-to-do and the poor lived side by side. In Ottoman cultural lore, every family that was financially better off than its neighbors was responsible for their welfare. The ideal occupation for educated young men was a clerical position in one of the ministries, although the State could only pay civil servants every two or three months. Many salaried personnel borrowed money (usually from minority usurers) against their paychecks at 5 percent interest. The Ottoman Debt Administration and the Customs Administration were the only institutions which paid salaries on time, because they were establishments of the European capitulatory regime, which controlled the economy of the Empire.⁷ The Young Turks sought to combat the ill effects of the capitulations when they came to power.

The CUP government tried to strengthen small businesses by turning the old guilds into business associations. The CUP leadership, moreover, wanted to create a Turkish bourgeoisie. Therefore, they distributed credits without regard to reputation or qualifications. During the war the system only produced some nouveau riche profiteers. This caused much popular resentment; some CUP leaders of secondary importance were implicated in graft and corruption. The CUP government had unilaterally abrogated the capitulations during

⁷ Atay, *Batış Yılları* (İstanbul: Dünya Yayınları, 1963), p. 16; Burhan Felek, *Geçmiş Zaman Olur ki...* (İstanbul: Felek Yayıncılık, 1985), pp. 203-208; Karay, *Uç Nesil Uç Hayat* (İstanbul: Semih Lütfi Kitabevi, n.d.).

the war, a readily enforceable measure since diplomatic relations with Allied countries had been severed. However, the state of war did not facilitate the revitalization of the Ottoman economy. The Straits were closed and the Mediterranean ports were blockaded, which halted the collection of customs dues. Requisitions and mobilization weakened the civilian population.⁸ Like everyone else in Europe, the CUP believed that this would be a short war. The Armistice, four years later, caught the Turks in an economically desperate situation. Soon afterwards, when the Allies occupied Istanbul and when the socio-economic condition of Turkish families had declined, the Bank of Athens granted credit to Greeks who desired to buy Turkish properties in Istanbul. Some Greeks began to offer very high prices to Turkish property owners. In order to curb this trend, on May 28, 1919, the Ottoman government passed a law so that the Ministry of Waqfs (charitable endowments) could purchase any property from the owners at attractive prices.⁹

Economic need and decrease in the male population forced Turkish women to seek employment. During the war, the CUP had organized an association for working women under the auspices of Enver Pasha's wife, Naciye Sultan. In 1919, women began to work as cashiers, ticket officers on Bosphore steamers, post office clerks, and secretaries. The Istanbul municipality hired women as street cleaners and garbage collectors. Articles highlighting feminism began to appear in journals. Sabiha Zekeriya Hanım,¹⁰ in an article which might be classified as socialist feminism, argued,

Women can no longer be confined to the home as a disseminator of compassion and happiness. This is true not only because of wars, but also because the world feminist movement is a social reality that cannot be ignored. The way of life has changed, the old estates have crumbled, women have the right to earn their living.¹¹

⁸ Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1918), pp. 64-66.

⁹ Gökbiçgin, "Meclis-i Vüela Mazbatalarına Göre 1919 Senesinde Ecnebi İşgalleri ve Talepleri Karşısında İstanbul Hükümeti," in *II. Türk Tarih Kongresi Ankara 12-17 Nisan 1956* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1960), pp. 707-722; Atay, *Nişin Kurtulmamak?* (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1953), p. 42.

¹⁰ Sabiha Zekeriya Sertel (1897-1968), a leftist journalist, she graduated from the American College in Salonica and from Columbia University as a social worker. She wrote for the leftist paper *Tan* with her husband, Zekeriya Bey, until 1945 when the premises of the paper were vandalized by an ultra-nationalist mob. The Sertels were arrested and detained. They left Turkey in 1950. Sabiha Hanım died in Baku and her husband came back to Turkey in his old age; Müzehher Vâ-Nû, *Bir Dönemin Tanıklığı* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, n.d.), pp. 60-130.

¹¹ Sabiha Zekeriya, "Kadınlara Çalışma Hakkı," *Büyük Mecmua* (September 18, 1919), p. 170.

A plea for women's suffrage, albeit at the municipal level, appeared in *Türk Dünyası*. According to the journal, women had to pay the regular fare when they crossed the Galata Bridge like everyone else. If they did not have a voice in municipal affairs, why should they pay? And, since they did pay, why should they not have a voice?¹² In 1920, *The Orient* reported that the Ottoman Press Association was reorganized under the name of the Turkish Press Association and that among its governing board was a woman, Emine Semiye Hanım.¹³ The same year, *L'Illustration* was to highlight Turkish feminism and refer to Emine Semiye Hanım as an active CUP agent before 1908:

L'évolution de la femme turque se poursuit, sûrement et rapidement, malgré les révolutions et les guerres, peut-être même favorisée par ces événements. Bien que certaines femmes ne dédaignent pas de jouer un rôle politique à l'occasion—telles Eminé Samié, qui a été un agent actif du Comité Union et Progrès avant 1908, Nakié, qui harrangua la foule sur la place Sainte-Sophie, et Halidé Edib, qui occupe le fauteuil de l'Instruction publique à Angora (sic)... La Société du Croissant Rouge Ottoman, a puissamment contribué à populariser ce mouvement, et le docteur Bessim Omer pacha, président honoraire du Croissant Rouge, est certainement l'un des apôtres du féminisme turc, d'un féminisme scientifique et social. Il avait d'ailleurs la partie belle, car, en sa qualité de gynécologue et d'accoucheur, il pénétrait dans les palais impériaux comme dans les plus humbles maisonnettes en bois, et une bonne partie des dames turques de la génération actuelle est venue au monde par ses soins.¹⁴

While women could not actively participate in the CUP after it became a political party, because they did not enjoy political rights, they may well have played a role in it as long as it was an association. Semiye Hanım's is the only case of a woman who was reported to have been a CUP member. The subject calls for further research based on the premise that an illegal association could not have afforded the luxury of tokenism and could use all the help it could get without discrimination.¹⁵ Between 1867 and 1927, there were approximately forty wom-

¹² "Turkish Women in New Employments," *The Orient* 7: 3 (December 17, 1919), p. 22.

¹³ *The Orient* 7: 10 (February 4, 1920), p. 98; Emine Semiye (1868-1944) born in İstanbul, she was the daughter of historian Ahmet Cevdet Pasha. She studied sociology and psychology in Switzerland and became writer of short stories and fiction. During Abdülhamid's reign, she joined the illegal CUP on the island of Seroz, where her husband served. By 1922, she had served as a teacher of Turkish Language and Literature in İstanbul, Edirne, and Anatolia.

¹⁴ "Féminisme Turc," *L'Illustration* (October 30, 1920), p. 306.

¹⁵ Recent research shows that there was a Women's Branch of the CUP. Çakır, "Bir Osmanlı Kadın Örgütü," Introductory Chapter, n. 12.

en's journals published in the major cities of the Empire. Women's criticisms of their inferior status and demands in these journals ranged from rejecting arranged marriages, to abolishing polygyny, gaining equal status in inheritance laws and child custody, and arguing for the right to initiate divorce. But, perhaps more importantly, they demanded the right to engage in paid work. They were careful, however, to distinguish their movement from that of women in the West as they perceived it. They emphasized that as Muslim women, their primary responsibility rested with motherhood and wifedom.

By 1913, some had become "radical" enough to announce that they were feminists and as such their mission was to enforce social change. These women gathered around the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Nisvan Cemiyeti* (Association for the Defense of Women's Rights, henceforth ADWR) and its publication, *Kadınlar Dünyası* (Women's World, henceforth WW), which was published between 1913 and 1921. They were quick to point out that demanding political rights was a prerogative, reserved for the future. They kept on delving into the political realm, however. For example, some WW writers supported the drive of the Committee of Union and Progress government's national economy philosophy. In an article urging mothers to boycott European-made Nestle milkpowder, Atiye Şükran Hanım commented that not only the national wealth was being wasted to enrich Europe, but it was also a national shame not to produce one's own basic nutrition products.¹⁶ Economic self-sufficiency, as well as expanding the purpose of liberty, introduced by the 1908 Constitutional Revolution to also embrace women's rights, were the major political issues these feminists took up, however cushioned their discourse was in social terms.

Perhaps we will never know how aware they were, that they were actually demanding a political change towards a totally secular regime (for the Ottoman state was not a theocratic one in reality, religious law being applied mainly to family affairs, which directly affected women.) Although changes in women's social and legal status could not be induced other than in a secular regime, the Ottoman feminists confined their discourse to social change. At the same time, their status as political non-entities legally did not hinder many women from political activism before and during WW I and its aftermath, the era of Allied occupation of İstanbul.

Between 1913 and 1918 women were directed into social causes under a myriad of state sponsored organizations such as the *Osmanlı Himaye-i Nisvan Cemiyeti* (The Ottoman Association for the Protection

¹⁶ Atiye Şükran, "İşimiz Hep Buna Benzer," *Kadınlar Dünyası* 26 (April 29, 1913).

of Women), *Osmanlı Kadınları Çalıştırma Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Association for the Employment of Women—for the war industry) and charity organizations. But the ADWR was not state-sponsored, and was therefore the first indigenous Women's Movement in The Empire. They publicly identified themselves as feminists.

There were no objections from religious quarters to women working, but there were limits to what the religious establishment considered respectable jobs; the theatre was not one of them. In 1920, a decree prohibited Muslim women from performing on the theatrical stage. The director of a Turkish theatrical company rejected the logic of the ban, saying,

The authorities grant permits to women who lead a loose life, and these are even countersigned by physicians of the public health administration. Under such circumstances, I do not see how they can refuse to art what they allow to vice.¹⁷

During the war, women were accepted in higher education, but they attended separate classes. In March 1919, Damad Ferid Pasha had several members of the clergy in his cabinet. These people, led by the SheikhuIslam, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, started a negative propaganda campaign against İstanbul University because male and female students attended classes in the same building, although they were segregated. Men had lectures in the morning and women in the afternoon. Even this was too much for the conservatives. They threatened to close down the University because of its irreligious and immoral standards. Professor Rıza Tevfik (Bölükbaşı) invited the Grand Vizier to a conference where he lectured on academic freedom in order to protect the University from adverse propaganda. He must have succeeded in persuading the Grand Vizier, because attacks on the University subsided.¹⁸

In October 1919, the University administration agreed, on principle, to admit female students to the Medical School. However, this did not materialize until after the Republic was established in 1923.¹⁹

In 1921, male and female students at the University were still segregated. A recent lycée graduate, Süreyya Hanım (Ağaoğlu, 1903-1989), requested that the Dean of the Law School admit her. Since a new section had to be opened for women in the School, the Dean asked her to find at least three more female students to merit a new section. Süreyya Hanım did exactly as she was told, and became the

¹⁷ *The Orient* 7: 46 (October 13, 1920), p. 453.

¹⁸ Mustafa Ragıp Esatlı, "Filozof Rıza Tevfik," *Akşam*, April 1, 1943, p. 2, cs. 1-2.

¹⁹ Galip Âtâ, "Hanımların Tıp Tahsili," *Büyük Mecmua* (October 2, 1919), p. 156.

first practicing woman lawyer in the country.²⁰ Middle-class women had a very good reason for wanting to pursue education, because poverty was a constant threat, when not the reality.

Many women who supported the Nationalist Movement as writers, orators, and activists, were the educated wives, sisters, and daughters of the Young Turks. A number of women in İstanbul who spoke foreign languages held and attended balls and tea parties where they interacted with Allied officers. They informed the Nationalists of the attitudes of these officers as well as of their activities.²¹ Some, like Halide Edip and Samiye Asker, defected to Anatolia to participate in the War of Independence. Others acted as couriers to the underground while they travelled to Ankara to join their husbands.

İstanbul Fires

Another problem which contributed to poverty and social disintegration in İstanbul was the destructiveness of fires. Most homes were built of wood and when fire broke out, adjacent neighborhoods were left to the mercy of the winds. There was no organized firefighting, only small fire departments in each neighborhood. The men in these departments were more interested in bargaining with the home owners than in putting out the fire. Thus, mosques and poorhouses had to accommodate the homeless who were not fortunate enough to have relatives with whom they could take refuge. The combination of fire victims and the simultaneous flood of refugees exhausted the municipal and social services.²² In 1918, a total of 1475 homes burned; in 1919, 158 homes; in 1920, 747 homes; in 1921, 600 homes; in 1922, 100 homes and in 1923, there were 380 homes devastated by fire.²³ The drop in homes burned may be attributed to modern fire trucks and extinguishers that the Allied forces introduced to the city.²⁴ In 1921, the great fire in Üsküdar occurred after a long period of drought.

²⁰ Süreyya Ağaoğlu, *Bir Ömür Böyle Geçti* (İstanbul: İshak Basımevi, 1975), pp. 22-25.

²¹ Sârâ Korle, ed. *Geçmiş Zaman Olur ki: Prenses Mevhibe Celâlettin'in Anıları* (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1987), pp. 254-264.

²² Cemil Topuzlu, *80 Yıllık Hatıralarım* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Yayınları, 1982), pp. 124-128.

²³ Ş. Ziyaoglu, *Yorunlu İstanbul Kütüğü* (İstanbul: Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu, 1985), p. 258.

²⁴ FMA 20N1184 n.n. Dqs2, 23 February 1922, "Appareils de secours contre les incendies."

The Prefect of the city puts the exact number as 694 houses and 31 shops. But in proportion the number of inhabitants is very much higher than ordinary, owing to the already overcrowded condition of the city. In many cases two and even three families were living in one house... So it would be safe to estimate the number of burned out of their shelters as at the very least 7,500 and very possibly over 10,000.²⁵

Despite all the pain and deprivations its inhabitants had to suffer, the city could still lure an outsider.

Byzantium is dead. New Rome is dead. Constantinople is ill. Soon this one-time Queen City of the East will be replaced by a modern European center of business and commerce, functioning on the most famous cross-roads in the world. Stamboul—home of Roman emperors, capital of magnificent sultans, scene of fabulous tales which every one has read—is now falling into decay upon its seven hills. Everything has an air of being second-rate and outworn. Acres of land laid bare by careless fires constitute one-fourth of the city's area, and the remainder is for the most part covered by unpainted, weather-stained houses and rotting window lattices above and small, dirty shops beneath. Mosques and tombs are dusty and neglected. Yet, in spite of all this, Stamboul retains its magic of a uniquely situated city, and from afar has still a beauty that is incomparable.²⁶

Housing and Transportation

Before and during the Armistice there was a constant flow of refugees into İstanbul. Turks immigrated mainly from the Balkans, Thrace, the Eastern provinces and from the İzmir-Aydın regions of Anatolia, which were under Greek occupation. Russian refugees numbered approximately 150,000 in and around İstanbul. Moreover, the Allied occupation forces requisitioned private houses. Although information on the exact number of requisitioned homes is not available, given the problem of housing in the city, the Allied occupation could only have exacerbated the situation.

By 1920, rents rose so high that a league was formed to fight profiteering landowners. *The Bosphore* accused the Russians of causing the problem by agreeing to pay "senseless" rents because they were irresponsible with money. The editorial urged the government not to allow "foreigners" to settle in the capital.²⁷ Yet, for the average Rus-

²⁵ "The Scutari Fire Sufferers," *The Orient* 8: 34 (August 24, 1921), pp. 333-334.

²⁶ Solita Solano, "Constantinople Today," *The National Geographic Magazine* XLI: 6 (June 1922), p. 647.

²⁷ "Exorbitant Rents in Constantinople," *The Orient* 7: 41 (September 8, 1920), p. 408.

sian, refugee life was different. The American Near East Relief journal, *The Acome*, reported that, "With the sanction of the authorities, the mosques in Constantinople are being used by Russian refugees for sleeping quarters."²⁸

Transportation was also problematic because of overcrowding as well as coal and electricity shortages. During the war, the boats of the *Şirket-i Hayriye* steamer company had been used to transport military personnel and most of the engines of its ferry boats were broken. The few steamers that ran along and across the Bosphorus were handicapped by the coal shortage. The trolley system was inadequate and overcrowded. During the war, the Germans had supplied İstanbul with carloads of coal, but now none was available. During the second half of 1920, English coal became available in abundance and for a lower price than the local coal, but the steamer company still followed a strictly limited schedule because of financial constraints.²⁹

In the winter of 1919, the supply of electricity and water was frequently cut off and the food supply was very low. American flour arrived in February 1919, and white bread was sold to the people at comparatively low prices.³⁰

Refugees

In 1921, the Ottoman Red Crescent Society estimated the number of refugees in İstanbul as 50,000 Muslims, 40,000 Russians, and 4,000 Greeks and Armenians. The American Red Cross gave the refugee figures as 65,000 altogether, adding that between November 1920, and April 1921, they had helped 85,524 people.³¹ This number must have included the poor inhabitants of İstanbul in addition to the Russian refugees settled in the environs of the city.

The Ottoman Ministry of the Interior gave the number of Turkish refugees who remained in İstanbul after the Balkan wars and other waves of immigration until 1921, as 65,000. Russian refugees numbered anywhere between 65-90,000 in İstanbul alone. The Russian relief organizations in İstanbul were the All Russian Union of Zemstvos, the Russian Embassy, the Russian White Cross, the Rus-

²⁸ *The Acome* (January 31, 1920) 2: 5.

²⁹ "Problems with Transportation," *The Orient* 7: 2 (December 10, 1919), p. 14; "Constantinople Under the Armistice: Discontent and Distress," *The Times*, January 19, 1919, p. 4, cs. 1-2.

³⁰ Hester Donaldson Jenkins, *An Educational Ambassador to the Near East* (New York: Fleming A. Revell Co., 1925), pp. 256-258.

³¹ *Pathfinder Survey*, pp. 205-206.

sian Registration Bureau, the Union of Russian Towns, and the Central Union of Russian Invalids. Not all Russian refugees chose to stay in İstanbul. Since 1919, individual families who managed to secure visas through the Russian Provisional Government-in-exile in Paris had been going to France, thus making Paris the capital of the Russian emigré community.³²

On April 22, 1920, *Alemdar* reported that the Allied representatives in İstanbul had agreed to the proposal of the Ottoman government that Russian refugees be removed from the city because of the crowded conditions and unemployment problems.³³ This proved to be wishful thinking, because there were more to come by the end of 1920.

The accommodations for the refugees are necessarily limited by the fact that so many great fires had congested the stable population of the city, even before the refugees came... Considering these difficulties, the various relief agencies have indeed done remarkably well. Despite necessary overcrowding, and the inadequacy of shelters provided, there has been no serious outbreak of disease among the refugees, and the typhus that came with the Russians from the Crimea was soon stamped out.³⁴

In November 1920, 135,000 Russian refugees arrived from the Crimea, which brought the total number of Russians in the city to 167,000; some 69,000 people were housed in camps in Gallipoli, Çatalca and the island of Lemnos. French camps in the city and the suburbs accommodated 4,488, with 3,450 who were ill, housed in the French hospitals. The Russian Embassy, controlled by the supporters of the old regime, housed about 7,000 people. The British ran a camp for 2,000 on the Asian side, at Tuzla. The French Red Cross ran a hospital and a convalescent home on the Bosphorus in Büyükdere, while the Russian White Cross ran a hospital and a home for invalids in St. Stephano.³⁵ Until April 1921, the Russian refugees were fed by the French. Cases of starvation were rare in the city, and when it happened, it was due to the inability of the refugees to get in touch with the source of relief such as a soup-kitchen.

In 1921, Serbia gave asylum to 22,306 Russians, Bulgaria to 3,840, Romania to 2,000 and Greece to 1,742. Repatriation of Russian refugees presented problems. A group of them returned to

³² Michael Ignatieff, *The Russian Album* (London: Penguin Books, 1988), pp. 144-146.

³³ "Rus Mültecileri Gidecek," *Alemdar*, April 22, 1920, p. 2, c. 3.

³⁴ *Pathfinder Survey*, p. 209.

³⁵ "General Wrangel at the University Club," *The Orient* 9: 1 (January 1922), pp. 1-2.

Odessa and were shot. There were only a few cases of Russians, who had not been connected with the "volunteer army," who returned home safely. The United States High Commissioner, Admiral Bristol reported,

General Pellé confirmed the rumor that many of the Russian refugees were willing to return to Soviet Russia, but stated that they were having difficulty with Russian commanders in various concentration camps who were doing everything possible to oppose the return of men formerly under their command in order not to break up their military organization. General Pellé intimated, however, that he would find means to break down this opposition (Subsequently, I have been reliably informed that ships bearing from 5,000 to 10,000 Russian refugees have left Constantinople for a Russian Bolshevik port, possibly Novorossisk).³⁶

Again in 1921, there was an abortive attempt to send Russian refugees to Brazil. A French boat brought back 1,200 of them to İstanbul.

Originally 3,000 refugees, who stated that they were agriculturalists, were sent to Brazil who had agreed to receive them. When they arrived there, a certain number, either because they did not like the country, or because they had wrongly declared themselves to be agriculturalists when they were not, refused to stop or were refused by Brazil.³⁷

The British refused to accommodate these people in the Selimiye barracks in Kadıköy. The consensus was to leave them to find work for themselves.

Since the İstanbul municipality had no funds to start much needed public works projects, such as roadbuilding, forestry and industries for women, unemployment was high among the refugees as well as among the native inhabitants. Allied police reports showed that there was an increase in the number of prostitutes in the red light districts and that the newcomers were mostly Russian women refugees.³⁸

By the end of 1921, there were 34,000 Russians left in İstanbul. A journalist described them as follows:

As in Pera, Russian refugees are everywhere, selling flowers, kewpie dolls, oil paintings of Constantinople, cakes and trinkets, books and newspapers printed in Russian. They sleep in the open streets and on the steps of the mosques. They loaf, beg, work when they can find a job, and sometimes sob with hunger. A few Russians have been lucky enough to find posi-

³⁶ U.S. Records 867.00/1385, February 15, 1921. From Bristol to Secretary of State.

³⁷ FMA 20N1091 C/27 Dosl. Official Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Directing Committee of Generals of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation, September 27, 1921.

³⁸ *Pathfinder Survey*, p. 224.

tions in restaurants as waitresses or coatboys. A princess may bring the patron's coffee and a general hand him his stick. Professors, ex-millionaires, women of high birth, beseech one to buy cigarettes or paper flowers.³⁹

Education in İstanbul

Turkish schools were divided into religious (madrasah, of which primary schools, mektep, were part) and civil schools. Two civil schools, one for men and the other for women, trained teachers for schools of all grades, (Dâr'ül Muallimat and Muallimin).

The Greeks and Armenians had primary and secondary schools. The Jewish community supported 23 schools, including Alliance Israélite schools, where the instruction was in French.⁴⁰ In addition, there was a large number of foreign schools. The American schools were Robert College (founded in 1863), which offered secondary and undergraduate education for boys; the Constantinople College for Women (founded in 1871), the counterpart of Robert College; and the American School at Gedikpaşa, a co-educational elementary school.⁴¹ In 1920, The Mission Language School was opened in Üsküdar to train newly appointed missionaries in the languages they were to use.⁴² As of 1920, a two-year pre-medical and a four-year medical school, in addition to a nursing college for women were added to the Constantinople College for Women. The students practiced American methods of medicine and nursing at the American Hospital, which was formally opened on August 20, 1920. The Hospital served American civilian residents in the city as well as the Russian refugees.⁴³ In 1921-22, there were 18 students in the Medical Department and 24 in the Nursing School. President Mary Mills Patrick reported,

In a city like Constantinople, full of refugees driven from their homes, hungry and without work, an academic education is not sufficient. One cannot see the destitute Russians standing at every street corner, the Turkish refugees in the mosques, whole families so closely crowded that

³⁹ Solano, "Constantinople Today," p. 654.

⁴⁰ *Pathfinder Survey*, p. 379. Although information on the number of Turkish schools in the city was not available, it is safe to assume that there was an abundance of mosque-run schools for the Turkish children in almost every neighborhood at the primary level.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 415-416.

⁴² "Schools in Constantinople," *The Orient* 9: Extra (March 8, 1922), p. 20.

⁴³ Jenkins, *An Educational Ambassador*, p. 225.

they are separated only by a quilt hanging between them, and Armenians and Greeks in the Near East Relief orphanages without the conviction that practical education is in great demand. The college, therefore, offers two years' courses in commerce and agriculture, home economics and normal training... In the present poverty of the Near East, women must work. One finds in Pera, in Constantinople, a dry goods establishment carried by women alone.⁴⁴

İstanbul had four British schools. The English High School for Boys in Şişli, its counterpart for girls in Pera, a co-educational school in Galata, and a primary day-school sponsored by the English Friends Mission in Kumkapı. Italian schools consisted of two elementary schools, one for boys and the other for girls, a preparatory and a vocational school.⁴⁵ French educational institutions outnumbered all other foreign schools. Between 12,000 and 15,000 students attended 17 elementary and 6 secondary schools.⁴⁶

Based on the population figures in İstanbul and the fact that the city's inhabitants showed an exceptionally high level of interest in politics in general, it may be assumed that there were more schools in İstanbul than in other Turkish cities. Most Turkish children who attended the Galatasaray secondary school (managed by French educators), invariably went into public administration and political science in higher education. Subsequently, they held posts as civil servants. The secular, Western style education that this cadre received may have encouraged the spread of Nationalism in many corners of the country, with these people as role models.

İstanbul Turks were not ambivalent towards Western-run schools, because they did not link the appealing political ideas to the unwelcome foreign occupation. In fact, the Allied occupation was against the values that were taught in these schools, i.e. freedom, nationalism, rational thought and justice.

Health Facilities

While infant mortality, deaths from typhus, typhoid, diphtheria, and influenza were prominent, tuberculosis caused more deaths than any other disease. In 1920, the average annual mortality rate from tuberculosis in the city was 2,640/1,000.⁴⁷ On July 1, 1920, a new Cana-

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

⁴⁵ *Pathfinder Survey*, pp. 416-417.

⁴⁶ *Pathfinder Survey*, p. 418; Emil Thomas, "French Education in Constantinople," *The Orient* 8: 16 (April 20, 1921), pp. 152-153.

⁴⁷ *The Orient* 7: 21 (April 21, 1920), p. 19.

dian Hospital for Tubercular Children was opened. It served only poor Greek, Armenian and Jewish children, and was managed by the Near East Relief Agency.⁴⁸ Even in 1922, one in six of the 16,256 deaths in İstanbul was due to consumption.⁴⁹

Turkish health facilities consisted of eleven medical institutions including hospitals, dispensaries and polyclinics, ten of which were non-sectarian. Eight social service agencies served the poor, the homeless, women, children, and the elderly.⁵⁰

Greek and Armenian health facilities were run by parish councils, which in turn were under their respective Patriarchates. The Jewish community had two hospitals, a national and a maternity hospital.⁵¹

Although statistics on mortality and the incidence of disease may not be accurate, most contagious diseases were kept under control effectively. Ethnic community health facilities and aid from the American, British and French Red Cross organizations relieved the Ottoman Health Department of tremendous responsibility.⁵² A decentralized effort to provide health care proved to be more efficient than a centralized organization might have been, because distribution channels of medicine were not held up by bureaucracy. The division of labor among doctors and nurses (even though this division was mostly along ethnic lines) facilitated their work. Yet any ailing person had access to medical care regardless of ethnic status. The doctors of İstanbul did not discriminate.⁵³

The Near East Relief Agency

In 1919, an American Committee for Relief in the Near East was established in New York for aid to those who suffered from the deprivations of war. By 1920, this committee was renamed The Near East Relief Agency. Relief workers organized the distribution of food, medicine, and materials. In addition, they established handicraft and sewing shops, which provided employment for many a sufferer.⁵⁴ The

⁴⁸ Ibid., 7: 32 (July 7, 1920), p. 1.

⁴⁹ Frank A. Ross, C. Luther Fry and Elbridge Sibley, *The Near East and American Philanthropy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), p. 167.

⁵⁰ Grace C. Morey, "Medical and Social Agencies Available for the Relief of Dependent Women and Children in Constantinople," (typewritten MS) (İstanbul: The Bosphorus University Near East Collection, 1921), pp. 4-12.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 13-41.

⁵² Topuzlu, *80 Yıllık Hatıralarım*, p. 201.

⁵³ Ibid., passim.

⁵⁴ *The Acorn*, 2: 2 (January 10, 1920), p. 24.

agency opened the Trachoma Orphanage on the Bosphorus besides managing the Yedikule Canadian Hospital for Tubercular Children.⁵⁵

One of the Agency's most important contributions to İstanbul was to lower the price of food. Relief workers provided the poor with food at much below the inflated market rates. The arrival of thousands of tons of American flour and condensed milk lowered the price of bread and milk by 30-50%. Relief stores opened in Topkapı, Pera, Aksaray, Mahmutpaşa, Rumelihisarı, and Üsküdar, which sold bread, beans, blankets, candles, cloth, milk, flour, rice and sugar. However, not everyone was happy with the lowering of prices.

The fall in prices has brought complaints on the part of unscrupulous merchants whose interest lay in keeping prices up; but the Government, after thorough investigation, has stood by the Relief Committee, for they see that it is purely a charitable work and not an attempt to injure legitimate trade of any sort.⁵⁶

The American Red Cross also delivered foodstuffs and medication for the refugees. Relief workers cooperated with the Red Cross to distribute these materials.⁵⁷

Ottoman Finances

During the war, the economy had survived on German credit, but now the Ottoman economy was bankrupt. According to the British commercial agent in İstanbul, activities of German and Austrian banks, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Orient Bank, and Wiener Bankverein had a disastrous effect on Ottoman finances, because their policies favored the speculator and the monopolist. Missions of the Central Powers during the war had become centers of business for these banks. Illegal banking transactions, such as sending abroad quantities of gold with officers and using the military and diplomatic couriers to bring in foreign money, played havoc with the economy.

The average rate of exchange for the Turkish gold pound in comparison with paper money rose from 131 piastres in 1916 to 352 piastres in 1917 and to 452 piastres in 1918. This gradual rise was caused principally by the incessant demand from the provinces of Syria and Mesopotamia where paper money suffered a much more rapid depreciation than in

⁵⁵ Ibid., 2: 39 (July 31, 1920), pp. 42-45.

⁵⁶ "Breaking the Market at Constantinople," *The Orient* 7: 12 (February 18, 1920), p. 116.

⁵⁷ FMA 20N1126 C/41 Dos1, November 27, 1920.

Constantinople. In addition peasants of the interior would not consent to sell their agricultural produce, except for gold, or at the proportional current rate of paper lira. All the gold in Constantinople, and also that which was brought in secretly from Germany and Austria, went down through Anatolia, chiefly to Syria and the Arab provinces. In the accompanying speculation the Turkish gold pound fetched up to 500 and 600 paper piastres. Silver money also rose, the medjidié at one time being changed at 92 paper piastres.⁵⁸

During the Armistice the Ottoman government had to face other problems, such as loss of production because of the war, loss of income from occupied provinces, and a decrease in tax revenues. The Greek occupation of İzmir denied the Treasury revenues from one of the richest provinces. The cost of living increased twenty times compared to what it was before the war.⁵⁹ Moreover, the French forces of occupation demanded 320,000 LT for their expenses in the month of December 1918, which the Treasury paid. Although the French requested money again in April 1919, the government had to refuse. By September 1919, the Allies permitted the Ottoman Bank to loan 8 million LT to the government, which brought very little relief. By 1920, the Ottoman budget deficit had risen to 100 million LT.⁶⁰ In 1920, the United States Trade Commissioner, Elliot G. Mears, who was a representative of the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, presented the following figures about the Ottoman budget deficit:⁶¹

Years	Actual Receipts (in million LT)	Actual Expenditures	Deficits
1912	27,269,751	29,908,282	2,638,531
1913	27,544,759	38,919,877	10,475,117
1914	29,201,865	35,329,950	6,128,085
1915	24,739,164	57,841,339	33,102,175
1916	27,326,793	65,546,105	43,219,312
1917	25,199,526	82,980,780	57,781,254
1918	Estimated		85,226,362
1919	Estimated		94,509,235

⁵⁸ "War Finance and Banking in Turkey," *The Orient* 7: 31 (June 30, 1920), p. 308.

⁵⁹ US Records 867.00/835, December 20, 1918. From the American Consul in Salonica to Secretary of State.

⁶⁰ Akşin, "Mütarekenin İlk Yılında Osmanlı Hükümetinin Mali Durumu," in *Seha L. Meray'a Armağan* 2 vols. (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1981), 1: 316-324.

⁶¹ Elliot G. Mears, "Turkey's Budgets," *The Orient* 7: 49 (September 1, 1920), p. 396.

Since April 1920, when the Nationalists severed communications with the capital, the financial position of the Ottoman government had grown steadily worse. In August, the situation became so difficult that Damad Ferid Pasha requested the Allies to apply at once the financial control provided for by the Treaty of Sèvres. Since that time, Ottoman finances were practically in the hands of the Ottoman Debt Administration, commented *The Times*.⁶² In fact, it was a premature gesture on Damad Ferid's part as well as wishful thinking on the part of the British paper. As long as the Treaty of Sèvres remained unratified, the Financial Control Commission could not begin "to pledge certain revenues of the Turkish Government for a loan,"⁶³ without a struggle with the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury; they were not in full control.

The Ottoman government secured another loan of 1,200,000 LT from the Imperial Ottoman Bank in January 1921. In return, the government agreed to the Bank's financial control over the sale of war matériel. Negotiations with the Bank had lasted over a year, because the Ottoman Ministry of Finance, the Inter-Allied Financial Commission of Control, and the Bank were involved. The Ottoman Minister of Finance, whom *The Times* accused of being opposed to the Treaty of Sèvres, resigned in protest of the concessions given.⁶⁴ Sir Horace Rumbold, in a personal letter to his predecessor wrote,

We have agreed to consider a sum of about LT 252,000 gold now under embargo at the Ottoman bank as forming part of the stocks on which you authorized. Turks to get an advance from the Banks, but our consent is subject to the condition that Block and Co should have absolutely effective control over Turkish receipts and expenditures. The Turks are willing to give them nominal control but not effective control, and we are engaged in a fight with Sefa and his colleague, Rechid, the Finance Minister about this question. The bone of contention is that given the insufficiency of the Turkish receipts it is necessary to determine which services should be paid first. We think it necessary to pay the police, gendarmerie, customs officials, etc. regularly so as to ensure public security and the proper receipt of the customs revenues, the other employees having to take their chance. The Turks, on the other hand, wish to pay a percentage of their salaries to all employees impartially.⁶⁵

The President of the Financial Commission, Adam Block, had advised the British High Commissioner that priority should be given to

⁶² "Turkey: A Chaotic Financial Situation," *The Times*, January 28, 1921, p. 1, c. 4.

⁶³ Rumbold Papers, Nos. 19-24, December 6, 1920. From Sir Horace to Curzon.

⁶⁴ "Turkish Government Secures Loan" *The Orient* 8: 4 (January 26, 1921), p. 33.

⁶⁵ Rumbold Papers, Nos. 52-56, January 4, 1921. From Sir Horace to Curzon.

paying the police, gendarmery, prisons, hospitals, revenue collecting departments, and then to widows and orphans. Even then, the payments would be in arrears, because there was no increase in receipts.⁶⁶

The economic policy of the successive Ottoman governments was to limit exports and encourage imports in order to renew the stocks and meet the requirements of the people. Hence, budget deficits grew and forced the Treasury to liquidate what gold stock there was left. The trade deficit in 1919-1920 fiscal year was 54,330,000 LT; in 1920-1921, 121,770,000 LT; in 1921-1922, 90,950,000 LT; and in 1922-1923, 44,470,000 LT.⁶⁷

In addition, the government had to contend with massive foreign debt. In 1919, the Ottoman foreign debt was estimated at 450,000 LT. "This sum," *The Times* said, "may be considerably increased by the claims of foreign companies and of Allied subjects on account of loss and damage suffered during the war, which is estimated as 55,000,000 LT."⁶⁸ Neither the Allies nor the Ottoman government was able to find a remedy as long as the peace treaty was not ratified and the Greek-Turkish war in Anatolia continued.

Civic Administration

Under the circumstances, the main problem of the municipality was lack of money. On May 5, 1919, Prof. Dr. Cemil Pasha (Topuzlu, 1866-1958) became the mayor of İstanbul. He recruited women as refuse collectors; had the streets washed; built facilities for auctions, charging a tax on every item sold; and he regulated slaughterhouses.⁶⁹ He knew that he needed authority to carry out his responsibilities. Therefore, he had accepted the mayorship of the city along with the acting governorship of the İstanbul province. But the Minister of the Interior assigned a new governor. This act, coupled with pressures from the French and American High Commissioners, which interfered with Cemil Pasha's work, compelled him to resign

⁶⁶ FMA 20N1112 C/46 Dos1, September 28, 1921.

⁶⁷ Vedat Eldem, "Mütareke ve Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Ekonomisi," *Türk İktisat Tarihi Semineri Hacettepe Üniversitesi 8-10 Haziran 1973* (typewritten MS) (University of Ankara, Political Science Faculty Library).

⁶⁸ "Annual Financial and Commercial Review," *The Times*, January 1919, Suppl. p. 55c.

⁶⁹ Rakım Ziyaoğlu, *İstanbul Kadıları, Şehreminleri, Belediye Reisleri ve Partiler Tarihi 1453-1971* (İstanbul: İsmail Aygün Matbaası, 1971), pp. 248-255.

on February 28, 1920. Admiral Bristol had threatened to occupy the Çubuklu gas depots, on the Asian side, if municipal warehouse fees were not reduced for gas imported from the United States.⁷⁰

The Municipal Board elections were called on April 20, 1920, after Cemil Pasha became the Minister of Public Works. However, elections could not take place because non-Muslims boycotted them, although a government decree required their participation. Municipal functions were further handicapped by politics, when the municipality building was requisitioned by the French in December 1920.⁷¹ It was not until October 1922, that a representative municipal board was assigned according to proportional representation of ethnic communities. Accordingly, 25 Muslims, 4 Greeks, 1 Armenian, and 1 Jew made up the board.⁷²

Since finances and politics interfered with municipal functions, community organizations took care of civic welfare as best they could. A Sanitary Commission was established with one representative from each Allied Power, one Greek, and the medical officer from *USS St. Louis*. Later in 1920, this commission was divided into the Maritime Commission and the Urban Commission. The former quarantined ships and was under French control. The Urban Commission, under the presidency of the British director of medical services, controlled the town, and oversaw street cleaning, drainage, and prostitution.⁷³ There were no major epidemics throughout the Armistice. The Allies did not want to take any chances by leaving sanitary affairs in the hands of a bankrupt municipality.

⁷⁰ Topuzlu, *80 Yıllık Hatıralarım*, pp. 174-175.

⁷¹ Ziyaoğlu, *İstanbul Kadıları*, pp. 265-266.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 274-275.

⁷³ *Pathfinder Survey*, pp. 114-116.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION

At the turn of the century, the Young Turks, most of whom later became members of the CUP had begun to agitate for the return of a constitutional monarchy as established in 1876. The question foremost in their minds was "How can this State be saved?" The CUP members became self-proclaimed saviors of the state and affected the return of the constitution in 1908. Subsequently, they deposed Sultan Abdülhamid II (ruled 1876-1909).

Territorial losses in the 1911-1912 war with Italy over Tripolitania, and in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, convinced the CUP that it should assume absolute political power in order to strengthen the country as well as to induce reforms. The CUP came to power in 1913 following a coup d'état. It was not difficult for the CUP leaders to intimidate the gentle and elderly Sultan Mehmed Reşad V (ruled 1909-1918). As of 1913, the Empire was ruled by the CUP. Its leaders were well intentioned, and to a large extent, honest men; but their methods, at crucial times, lacked vision and wisdom. For example, they rigged elections, assassinated opponents, suppressed all forms of criticism in the press, and exiled many people. The public might have overlooked all these measures given that they were taken during a war, had it not been for the extremely heavy and unnecessary human losses during World War I. Enver Pasha was pressed by his German allies to open an eastern front in Anatolia to distract the Russians. This, he did in December 1914. Some 90-96,000 men froze to death in the mountains of northeastern Turkey, without even having had a chance to fight the Russians.¹ Many people in İstanbul felt that Turkey was fighting Germany's war thanks to the CUP triumvirate of Enver, Talât and Cemal Pashas.

During the war, the Greeks who lived in the Aegean coastal towns, and Armenians who lived in northeastern Anatolia were deported. The former were sent to Greece both as a deterrence against potential uprising and as a measure to promote a Muslim bourgeoisie. They were bitter about material losses. However, the Armenians, not

only had to sell property at low prices, but also suffered enormous human losses en route to the Syrian province. Local reprisals began to take place against Armenian guerrillas backed and armed by the Russian military against massacres in Turkish villages devoid of young manpower. The CUP government was fighting on the Galician, Dardanelles, and Mesopotamian fronts, having lost an army in the Caucasian front. İstanbul resorted to the traditional Ottoman policy of deporting a problematic population. The age-old Ottoman practice of forcible resettlement of rebellious populations, be it Muslim or non-Muslim, was enforced. On route to what was still considered to be internal exile/resettlement, Armenians donned with jewelry and money on their persons became live targets to marauders. Coupled with human losses to starvation and disease, the ensuing killings pointed to the fact that the Ottoman state forfeited its status as an Islamic state for having failed to protect a non-Muslim population for whose safety it was responsible by definition, regardless of circumstance.

It was the beginning of CUP's end both politically and diplomatically. The rising star of Turkish nationalism, Mustafa Kemal Paşa, rejected the CUP not only on account of its submissiveness to German command in war, but deliberately kept his reputation above any association with a government tainted by massacre. Western public opinion as well as many Turks turned against the CUP.

When the Armistice was signed the Ottoman Empire was at its lowest ebb. There was a new monarch on the throne, Sultan Mehmed Vahidettin (1861-1926), who believed in absolutism. As a result, the Young Turks had to start all over again in search of political identity. It had been a short but costly journey in time (1908-1918) until the surviving Young Turks adopted puritanical nationalism, as Mustafa Kemal defined it.

The Palace

During the CUP's rule, it was no secret that Prince Vahidettin, a favorite brother of Sultan Abdülhamid II, was a sympathizer, if not the honorary president, of the anti-Unionist FEP. His brother-in-law, Damad Ferid Pasha, had become the president of this party, after having been a member of the CUP. The CUP had not offered the Damad a position in the cabinet, upon which he became disillusioned with them and joined the opposition.

The CUP leaders neither liked nor trusted Vahidettin. Rumor had it that during Abdülhamid's reign, Vahidettin had spied on people

¹ Alptekin Müderrisoğlu, *Sarıkaş Dramı* 2 vols. (İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınları, 1988) 2: 590.

and reported suspects to his elder brother, the Sultan, in the dreaded form of *jurnals* (Abdülhamid's infamous spy system built on informants who denounced people arbitrarily.) There is no confirmation of this rumor. After Abdülhamid was deposed in 1909, the CUP assigned a delegation to read heaps of these *jurnals*, which Abdülhamid had kept. The delegation found *jurnals* signed by some Young Turks, upon which the CUP decided to destroy the collection instead of causing a scandal. If there were *jurnals* written by Vahidettin among these papers, they must have been burnt with the rest of them.

In 1916, Vahidettin persuaded Sultan Mehmed Reşad to appoint him as the Second Heir Apparent after Yusuf İzzettin Efendi, the lawful heir.² Vahidettin feared that the CUP and Yusuf İzzettin, once he became Sultan, might appoint an heir to the throne of their choice.³ However, Yusuf İzzettin Efendi committed suicide, because he suffered from acute depression.⁴ This opened the way for Vahidettin, who was girded with the Sword of Osman on September 13, 1918 upon Mehmed Reşad's death.⁵

The new Sultan and his FEP supporters were not devoid of humor, black though it may be. They called the CUP leaders, Enver, Tâlat and Cemal Pashas, "*Ekâanîm-i Selâse*" (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost).⁶ Vahidettin's first public defiance of the CUP was to declare himself Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Armies, leaving Enver Pasha with the titles of Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of War. Since the Sultan was Commander-in-Chief in name only and did not actively command the military, Enver Pasha's influence in the army was far from diminished. In addition, the young officers in the military were committed to a constitutional monarchy and had no reason to support Vahidettin who had absolutist tendencies.

Vahidettin dreaded the CUP, because he was fully aware that the party did not favor him. He was determined to marry off his daughters, Ulviye and Sabiha Sultans, to men "uncontaminated" by any relation to the CUP. Therefore, the ex-Vizier, Tevfik Pasha's son, Staff

² Halid Ziya Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi* (İstanbul: İnkılâp ve Aka Kitabevleri Koll. Şti., 1965), p. 54; Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Vahidüddin* (İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1968), pp. 53-60.

³ Morgenthau, *Secrets of the Bosphorus* 2nd ed. (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1918), pp. 258-259.

⁴ Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi*, p. 396; İsmail Baykal, "Velihaht Yusuf İzzeddin Efendi Nasıl İntihar Etti?" *Tarih Dünyası* 2: 12-16 (October-December 1950).

⁵ Başmabeyinci Lütfi Bey (Simavi), *Osmanlı Sarayının Son Günleri* (İstanbul: Hürriyet Yayınları, 1973), p. 339.

⁶ Ibid., p. 430.

Captain İsmail Hakkı Bey (Okday) was a safe choice as a spouse for Ulviye Sultan. İsmail Hakkı Bey was not a Unionist, but he was a Nationalist. This did not bother the Sultan, because he, too, was deeply concerned at the time with the Greek invasion and advance into Anatolia. However, the British did not see any difference between the CUP and the Nationalists.

It would appear that Captain Neshet Bey, the Government courier, is closely associated with Damad İsmail Hakkı Bey, in what is known as the "Palace Staff" which consists of four or five officers of the Sultan's entourage. The purpose of this staff is that of a liaison between the sovereign and the Ministry of War. Damad İsmail Hakkı Bey, however, is a Nationalist partisan and has always been a fervent Unionist. It is believed that he has always been in constant communication with Angora, and has on more than one occasion served as an intermediary for communications between the Sultan and the Nationalist leaders.⁷

İsmail Hakkı Bey resigned his post as aide-de-camp to the Sultan when he realized that Vahidettin began to side with Damad Ferid Pasha and adopted a pro-British attitude.⁸ There had been some communication between the Nationalists and the Sultan, in which they explained to him their point of view regarding the Treaty of Sèvres. They argued that it was impossible to accept the treaty as formulated. Further, they insisted that the inhabitants of Anatolia remained loyal to the sovereign in order to persuade him to block ratification of the treaty.⁹ Vahidettin may not have wanted the treaty ratified, but he also had no intention of being ruled by the Nationalists. Therefore, it is plausible that this was the only occasion when the Sultan and the Nationalists communicated.

The Sultan allowed himself to be ruled by his brother-in-law after Damad Ferid Pasha became Grand Vizier on March 4, 1919. Damad Ferid accused anyone who disagreed with him of being a Unionist.¹⁰ Before the second Damad Ferid cabinet was formed (April 5, 1920), the Sultan followed the course of French and Greek occupa-

⁷ FO 406/45, "Summary of Intelligence Reports for Week Ending December 2, 1920," p. 32.

⁸ İsmail Hakkı Okday, *Yanya'dan Ankara'ya* (İstanbul: Sebül Yayınevi, 1975), pp. 212-216. In 1921, İsmail Hakkı Bey was invited to Anatolia through the underground, because there was great need for staff officers. He did not inform his wife, the Imperial Princess, nor his father, Tevfik Pasha, of his intended trip. He found out, later, that Tevfik Pasha knew of his plan. İsmail Hakkı Bey had to divorce his wife when the dynasty was exiled. Their only daughter, Hümevra Hanım, is the proprietor of the Kısmet Hotels in İzmir today.

⁹ Şimşir, *BDOA*, 2: 499.

¹⁰ Simavi, *Osmanlı Sarayının Son Günleri*, p. 533.

tions and local resistance, and asked for briefings from the palace staff officers.¹¹ In 1918, Vahidettin had not objected to Imperial property being occupied by the Allied military officers, because, he said, "There is no difference between foreign soldiers occupying the poorest hut in my Empire and occupying Imperial property."¹² However, Vahidettin gradually lost interest and faith in the Nationalist cause, because Damad Ferid convinced him that Turkey's only hope to survive rested with the Allies, mainly the British.

Vahidettin was probably not any less or more patriotic than the other Ottoman sultans. He just happened to be the ruler at a time when Turkish nationalism was in the ascent and has been judged by nationalistic standards. Vahidettin's policy vis-à-vis the Allies, who had defeated the Ottomans, was the classical policy of all the previous Sultan-Caliphs. As long as Muslim provinces were left under his nominal suzerainty, the Sultan did not mind British supervision of administrative or financial matters.¹³ Thus, under British tutelage, he would be able to protect himself from CUP's nationalism, expel young officers and commanders who had been promoted by the CUP, and create an army whose loyalty would be foremost to his person. From the Nationalists' standpoint, Vahidettin's policy may be considered as treason, but, as monarch, the Sultan tried to restore absolutism and re-establish his spiritual rule over Muslim communities as Caliph. The British were not about to compromise in land or finances, but they did recognise the amorphous power of the Caliph, upon the urgings of Governor-General Montagu of India. Vahidettin was consoled when he found out that the Allies would not expel him from Istanbul.

Throughout the Armistice, Vahidettin's behaviour was full of contradictions. Therefore, later evaluations of the Sultan became very controversial. He would be condemned as a traitor as well as praised as a patriot who happened to rule at an unfortunate time in Turkey. The truth must lie somewhere between the two approaches. Vahidettin was extremely distrustful of everyone except Damad Ferid, whom he trusted uncritically and who was ill-equipped to steer the country through hard times.

¹¹ Okday, *Yanya'dan Ankara'ya*, p. 388; Kısakürek, *Vahidüddin*, p. 153.

¹² Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Görüp İşittiklerim* 3rd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1984), pp. 175-176.

¹³ Akşin, "Osmanlı Padişahlarının Toprak ve Hilafet Uğruna Verdikleri Ödünler," *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 29: (3/4) Reprint (Ankara: Yankı Matbaası, 1976), pp. 131-133.

Certain groups of people in Istanbul supported the FEP. These people included the majority of the clergy and the conservative factions, those who had suffered under the heavy-handed rule of the CUP, and people who simply had good intentions and disapproved of the CUP dictatorship.¹⁴ The anti-CUP clergy was grateful to Great Britain, who, according to them, had saved Turkey from the "godless" CUP freemasons. This view alone made Britain the "protector of Islam."¹⁵ But the FEP lost all credibility by declaring itself pro-British. The party did not stir nearly the same kind of excitement as the Nationalists did, even when they protested the Treaty of Sèvres.¹⁶

The Press

The CUP had kept the press under strict censorship and had not allowed any criticism. In fact, the CUP was held responsible for the murders of three opposition journalists.¹⁷ When censorship on the press was lifted with the advent of the Armistice, the anti-unionist press, *Sabah*, *Peyam* and *Alemdar* found fertile ground to vent hitherto suppressed animosities. In addition, the government declared a general amnesty on October 20, 1918 for political "criminals" who had been under domestic exile during the CUP's rule.¹⁸ A bitter and vengeful opposition was born in Istanbul. CUP and FEP partisanship ruled the media.¹⁹ The Allies were not interested in being an instrument of vengeance of the kind the FEP espoused. They wanted war criminals to be tried and punished, but they were not about to wreak vengeance against CUP members indiscriminately. The Allies were more interested in suppressing the Nationalist Movement. For example, they did not hesitate to exile to Malta, the anti-CUP, but pro-Nationalist, journalist Velid Ebüzziya, who was a member of the

¹⁴ Rey, "Gördüklerim, Yaptıklarım," *passim*.

¹⁵ Atay, *Baş Yılları*, p. 102.

¹⁶ *The Orient*, 7: 26 (May 26, 1920), p. 258.

¹⁷ Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987), p. 156.

¹⁸ Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Takan Tarihde Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim* 3 vols. (Istanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1970) 1: 312-313; İhsan Ilgar, *Mütarekede Yerli ve Yabancı Basın* (Istanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1973).

¹⁹ Ahmet Cevat Emre, *İki Neslin Tarihi* (Istanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1960), p. 223; Asım Us, *Gördüklerim, Duyduklarım, Duygularım* (Istanbul: Vakıf Matbaası, 1964), p. 20; Karay, *Minelbab İlmühırah*; Ziya Somar, "Mütareke Basını ve Fırkacılık Ruhu," *Barış Dünyası* 40 (September, 1965): 34-41; Turgut Çeviker, "Kurtuluş Savaşı Mizah Basınında Sansür," *İletişim* (May 1983): 27; Ercüment Ekrem Talu, "İstanbul'da Sansür Edilen Yazılar Anadolu'da Yayınlanıyordu," *Cumhuriyet*, June 4, 1971, p. 3, cs.1-2.

underground resistance. The majority of the people whom the British arrested and exiled were CUP members, but they were also activists of the underground.

While the FEP adherents led a press campaign maligning the CUP, the Ottoman government established a tribunal to investigate war crimes.²⁰ In January 1919, Admiral Calthorpe defined war criminals for the Ottoman government as those a) who defied and resisted the application of the Armistice terms, b) who had maltreated British prisoners of war, and c) who were responsible for Armenian deportations.²¹ The anti-Unionist press applauded.

There were approximately eleven Turkish newspapers published in İstanbul during the Armistice. It was a common practice to close down newspapers by an order of the government. Then, the same paper appeared under a different name or merged with another paper. The most influential papers were *Tevhid-i Efkâr*, *Vakit*, *İleri*, *İkdam*, and *Akşam*, which were Nationalistic.²² *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* was politically undecided and *Tanin* was anti-Kemalist but Nationalistic. There were three anti-Kemalist and anti-Nationalistic papers, namely *Peyam-ı Sabah*, *Alemdar* and *Serbesti*. *Takvim-i Vekâi* was the official state paper. Humor papers were *Karagöz*, *Zümrit*, *Ak-Baba* and *Diken*.

Political choice for the Turks, as it was reflected in the papers, was well defined during the Armistice. One was either Nationalistic or not. Gradually, Nationalism and Kemalism became mutually interchangeable. There was no room for subtle choices such as being anti-Kemalist and Nationalistic at the same time. For example, one could not support the Sultanate and Caliphate along with independence. The owner and editor of *Tanin*, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), an ardent patriot, was brought to trial in 1924 for allegedly supporting the Caliphate. He was acquitted, but the trial was a reminder to everyone that Nationalism and Kemalism were the same even after the Republic was established.

Six newspapers published in French showed a variety of trends, which ranged from Zionist to pro-Turkish, Bolshevik, anti-Kemal, Grecophile and pro-Kemal.²³ *La Turquie Nouvelle* was reportedly pro-Kemal; its editor was a Kemalist agent, Aleaddin Haydar.

Récemment Aleaddine Haidar, l'agent kémaliste connu à Constantinople, voulut faire de la propagande kémaliste dans les milieux Anglais de Constantinople. Il put trouver un Anglais bienveillant le Capitaine Walker,

²⁰ *Harp Kabinelerinin İsticvabı* (İstanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1933).

²¹ Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri*, p. 32.

²² FMA 20N1127 C/42 Dos1, February 17, 1923, "Revue de la Presse."

²³ FMA 20N1127 C/42 Dos1, February 17, 1923, ff.

Directeur de la Byzantine Co., association de mahonadjis turcs du port (*mavnacılar*, transport boats) et auquel il apporta des fonds d'Angora. C'est ainsi qu'avec ces fonds on put acheter de Mr. Sciuto l'Aurore, par suite de l'impossibilité d'obtenir l'autorisation de faire paraître un nouveau journal.²⁴

By 1923, the paper was supported by a German-Jewish officer, Heinrich Cohn. A Russian intelligence agent, Ratinoff, worked at the paper. Cohn cooperated with the Bolsheviks and received 600 LT/month to conduct Bolshevik propaganda.

There was only one paper in English, *The Orient News*. It was established in 1919 plausibly by the English occupation authorities, because it was the only paper British soldiers were allowed to read.

Minority newspapers in İstanbul reflected their particular community's attitude towards the Turks and political trends. There were five Armenian papers, four of which were moderate, the other, *Yerguir*, was the organ of the communist Hintchack Party. It is possible that the İstanbul Armenian press was discreet about greater Armenian ambitions to avoid attracting Turkish hostility. In addition, by 1921, there was not a single European power left that supported the Armenian cause. Therefore, leading Ottoman Armenians, including Zaven Efendi, the Armenian Patriarch, were resolved to forget past problems and to live in peace with the Turks.²⁵

Seven papers published in Greek reflected extreme hostility towards the Turks. Aside from having held jubilant demonstrations welcoming the Allied fleet (which included the Greek destroyers, *Averoff* and *Kilkis* in 1918, the Greeks began to work sedulously to influence the upcoming peace settlement in Paris. One of the arguments that the Greek Premier, Eleutherios Venizelos, put forth was that the number of Greeks in İstanbul, İzmir, and the Black Sea regions was higher than that of the Turks. In order to prove their point, the Greeks began to land groups of civilians on Ottoman soil, claiming that they were returning the Greeks who had been deported by the CUP.²⁶ In 1919, a secret Greek revolutionary society, "Kordus," was established in İstanbul under the guise of an immigration commission. In effect, the secret society brought over Greek officers in civilian clothes to train and arm native Anatolian Greeks. It followed, then, that the Greek press became the mouthpiece of the passionate hatred that was directed against the Turks.

²⁴ FMA 20N1106 C38/4 Dos1, September 23, 1921.

²⁵ Rahmi Çiçek, "Türk Basınında Azınlıklar (Rumlar ve Ermeniler) 1919-1922," (M.A. Thesis, University of Ankara, 1985), pp. 124-128.

²⁶ Ertuğrul Zekâi Ökte, "Yunanistan'ın İstanbul'da Kurduğu Gizli İhtilâl Cemiyeti 'Kordus,'" *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 7-8: 40 (January 1971), pp. 20-23.

Moreover, the Greek press reflected the Royalist-Venizelist split in the Greek military circles. The Royalists were against the continuance of the Greek occupation of Asia Minor. They felt that Greece's primary enemy was Bulgaria; Greek men and finances should not be dissipated on adventurism in Anatolia. Besides, the Greek troops had compromised their reputation by excesses. However, the Venizelist war hawks would not heed the Royalists. The majority of the Greek newspapers sided with the Venizelists.

The Jewish community in İstanbul had four newspapers, two of which were organs of the Grand Rabbinate. While the Greek press was avowedly anti-Turkish, the Jewish press remained loyal to the rights of the Turks. The Grand Rabbi, Naum Efendi, not only represented Ottoman Jewry, but also spoke favorably of the Nationalists to foreigners. Naum Efendi stated in an interview with *Le Matin* that the Nationalist Movement was not directed against the Allies, and that Mustafa Kemal was neither an adventurer nor a fanatic. He was loyal to the sovereign and his objective was to apply the Wilsonian formula—Turkish regions should remain Turkish.²⁷ The Jewish community had no grievances against the Turks. In addition, the persecution of Jews in Thrace under Greek occupation may have contributed to the positive outlook of Jews towards the Nationalist Movement.²⁸ However, a number of foreign Jews began to conduct Zionist propaganda in İstanbul. These people established a committee in order to replace Naum Efendi with another Grand Rabbi who would support Zionism. Further, the Greek High Commissioner in İstanbul, Kanelopoulos, tried to bring the Jews into the Greek-Armenian Federation that was formed in 1920, but the Jewish community remained uninterested. When all the other minorities protested against participation in the last Ottoman election (1919), the Jews did participate.²⁹

During the Armistice, both the Allies and the Ottoman government censored the newspapers. On October 1, 1920, the Allied High Commissioners sent a joint note to the Ottoman government regarding the Sultan's decree about press censorship. Article 1 of this decree, which involved punitive actions against journalists who defied the censor, could not possibly be applied to foreign journalists, the High Commissioners stated.

²⁷ *The New York Times*, November 10, 1919, p. 1, c. 2.

²⁸ Mark Lambert Bristol, "War Diary," (MS) (Washington, D.C.: The National Archives), May 25, 1919.

²⁹ Avram Galanti, *Türkler ve Yahudiler* 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1947), pp. 49-50.

In provisions concerning newspapers, the High Commissioners of France, Great Britain and Italy have the honour to remind the Sublime Porte that the Allied Commission on Press where the Ottoman Government is represented by delegates, is empowered to apply necessary sanctions against the newspapers which published articles banned by the Commission.³⁰

While they reiterated their position concerning censorship, the Allied High Commissioners took the occasion to tell the Sublime Porte that they would neither accept the application of the decree to their nationals, nor recognize any limitations on the powers of the Allied Commission on the Press. Hence, many articles and lines from articles were censored, but by the Allies, not the Ottoman government. In this period, political satire became very poignant and more sophisticated in the Turkish press because of censorship; humor and irony became subtle. Despite its obviously pro-Kemalist cartoons and mockery of the Greek army, the satirical paper, *Karagöz* had very few blank columns between 1920 and 1923. Perhaps the Allied censors thought that giving vent to public frustrations through cartoons was safer than discussing Nationalist ideas in editorials. Overall, cartoons entailed less risk for the occupiers and the occupied. News and commentaries which were censored included: articles pertaining to Greek atrocities in Bursa, İzmir and İzmit; Greeks recruiting volunteers from İstanbul; criticism of the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty; the secret conscription of Turkish youths in İstanbul; and the escape of some CUP members from Malta. News concerning the foreign relations of the Ankara government was also censored. This involved coverage of news regarding a diplomatic delegation's journey from Ankara to Washington, D.C.; that Ankara's representative in London was Prof. Dr. Nihad Reşad (Belger); the activities of Cami Bey in Paris and Cevad Abbas (Gürer) in Rome; that Bekir Sami Bey returned to Ankara carrying a draft of the Turkish-French agreement; that Ali Rıza Pasha was sent to Albania as the political and military representative of Ankara; and that Ankara was in the process of negotiating with a Persian delegation.³¹

Censorship was oppressive for publications in İstanbul, but not very effective in preventing the spread of information. In February 1922, a journalist from İstanbul reported,

³⁰ FO 371/5288, October 5, 1920. From de Robeck to Curzon.

³¹ On September 6, 1921, sixteen Malta exiles escaped to Italy. Ali İhsan Sabis, "Ali İhsan Paşa Siyasi Sürgünler Adası Malta'dan Ankara'ya Nasıl Kaçtı?" *Tarih Konuşuyor* 1: 3 (April 1964), pp. 193-200. FMA 20N1126 C/41 Dos1, "Censures Dans Le Presse," August 27, 1921; FMA 20N1127 C/42 Dos1, September 6, 1922.

La censure interalliée continue d'un autre côté ses services contre la presse qui en souffre d'une manière indescriptible. Le journalisme a perdu de ce fait tout son élan. C'est ainsi que les journaux nouvelles en morasses la veille à 7 heures du soir. C'est ainsi qu'à cause de cette censure arbitraire, l'actualité des faits perd 12 heures... Le plus ridicule en tout cela, c'est que tout ce qui est interdit ici est publié dans les journaux d'Anatolie, qui se vendent quelques jours plus tard, à grands cris dans les rues de Stamboul.³²

In Search of Identity

There were mainly three ideologies among the Turkish intellectuals during the war; Turkism, Westernization, and Islamization. Adherents of these trends embraced more than one of these ideals at various times. Defenders of Turkism gathered in the Turkish Hearth Associations, *Türk Ocakları*, under the guidance of Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, Dr. Hüseyinzade Ali and Halide Edip.³³ They published *Yeni Mecmua* and *Turan*. At first they were pan-Turkist. Pan-Turkist mentality was incorporated into education and it served the *cup* wartime politics well. Pan-Turkists succeeded in influencing many young people, who became enthusiastic to save other Turkic peoples from Russian rule. Just as ephemeral as its other pan counterpart, pan-Islam of the Hamidian era, directed against British colonialism, pan-Turkism served as an irritant against Russia.

³² Aleaddine Haidar, "Lettre De Constantinople," *Echos de L'Islam* 45 (February 15, 1922): 26.

³³ Ziya Gökalp (1875-1924) joined the Young Turks while a student at the Veterinary School and was exiled to Diyarbakır during Abdülhamid's reign. In 1908 he established the *cup* chapter there. He advocated Turkism in the journal, *Genç Kalemler*, starting with the purification of language. He was exiled to Malta in 1920 and served as a deputy in the National Assembly after his return. He is best known as a sociologist who tried to explain Turkish society on Durkheimian principles.

Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935) was a Pan-Turkist and a Young Turk. He had escaped to France during Abdülhamid's reign. Later, he became a professor in Istanbul University. See François Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri*, Yusuf Akçura (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986).

Hüseyinzade Ali (Turan, 1864-1941) was born in Azerbaijan and graduated from the Military Medical School in Istanbul. He fled to Caucasia in 1903 because he was a member of the illegal *cup*. In Baku, he published a daily, *Hayat*, and a weekly, *Füyuzat*. He returned to Turkey in 1909 and became a member of the *cup* Central Committee. He was a professor of dermatology, an activist, a poet, a painter, and a playwright.

Halide Edip (Adıvar, 1884-1964) graduated from the American College for Women in Istanbul. She wrote extensively for *Vakit*, *Akşam* and *Tanin*. She escaped to Ankara in 1920. After the war, she served as a professor of English Literature at Istanbul University.

Westernizers included Celal Nuri and Dr. Abdullah Cevdet.³⁴ Pan-Islamists were led by Mehmet Akif and Mehmet Murat, who wrote in *Sebilürreşat* which later became *Sırat-ı Müstakim*.³⁵

The identity crisis of the Turkish intellectuals continued until 1920, when the reality of the foreign occupation drove most of them to the Nationalist Movement. By 1920, there were two blocks: those who believed in armed resistance to foreign occupation, and sided with the Kemalists; and those who still believed in diplomacy, hoping that the terms of the peace agreement might be softened. At the early stages of the Armistice, there were three discernible trends among the intellectuals in Istanbul. Some people, who gathered around an association called the National Congress, wanted to lobby for Turkish rights. Among the lobbyists were those who advocated an American or a British mandate over Turkey. Yet others opposed any form of foreign tutelage.

The National Congress began its short-lived activities on November 29, 1918, under the leadership of Dr. Esat Pasha (Işık, 1864-1936).³⁶ The National Congress was composed of fifty-two local associations. Its purpose was to provide a non-partisan platform to political parties and associations, and unify Turkish efforts to survive mainly by cultural and political publications. They sent delegations abroad to lobby for Turkish rights. Their publications sought to counteract anti-Turkish propaganda in Europe. These publications included, *The Occupation of İzmir*, *Turks in Iraq*, *The Turco-Armenian Problem*, and *Les Turcs d'après les Auteurs Célèbres*.³⁷ When trying to reconcile

³⁴ Celâl Nuri (İleri, 1877-1939) graduated from the Law School. He wrote for *İkdam*, *İleri*, *Le Courrier d'Orient* and *Jeune Turc*. He was exiled to Malta in 1920.

Dr. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) graduated from the Military Medical School and became a Young Turk. He was exiled to Tripolitania and then escaped to Europe in 1897. He wrote for *The Ottoman* in Geneva. In 1904, he published the journal, *İctihad*. See Şükrü Hanioglu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981).

³⁵ Mehmet Akif (Ersoy, 1873-1936) was a poet and the author of the Turkish National Anthem, which was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) in 1921. He served as a deputy in the Assembly, but went to Cairo in 1925 because he could not reconcile Islam with the radical reforms that took place in Turkey.

Mizancı Mehmet Murat (1854-1917) was a journalist, professor of political science and a Young Turk. Later, he rejected the Young Turks and was exiled to Rhodes after March 31, 1909. He lived out his life in Egypt.

³⁶ Esat Pasha was involved with the underground resistance group, *Karakol*. He was the president of the Red Crescent Society as well as a professor of ophthalmology at the Medical School. Mithat Sertoğlu, "Tarihimizde İlk Milli Kongre," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 4: 21 (June 1969), pp. 3-8; Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, 2: 150-160.

³⁷ Tunaya, *Ibid.*, p. 151; Emre, *İki Neslin Tarihi*, p. 226.

the political parties in İstanbul and the Nationalist Representative Committee in Anatolia, the National Congress pleased neither side. The Ottoman government pressed the National Congress to send a letter to the Representative Committee objecting to the Committee's candidates for the election of 1919. The Ottoman government feared that candidates from Anatolia and Thrace belonged to the CUP. This intervention offended the Nationalists, who then severed ties with the Congress.³⁸ In fact, everyone who had joined the Nationalists in Sivas was made to take an oath of loyalty to the effect that he no longer was bound to the Unionists and that he would not work for the revival of the party.³⁹

Early in 1920, French intelligence officers approached Esat Pasha, whom they considered to be Mustafa Kemal's representative, to ask on what terms the Nationalists in Anatolia would fight the Bolsheviks. On the one hand, the idea was unrealistic, if it was even posed seriously. On the other hand, the French might have intended simply to sound out the exact terms of the Nationalists for a potential agreement. Esat Pasha maintained that the terms on which the Nationalists would consider the scheme would be that İstanbul remained Turkish, and Aydın, İzmir and Cilicia had to be returned to the Turks, as well as the southeastern provinces.⁴⁰ Esat Pasha did not speak in any official capacity, but the message he gave the French was that if they expected any cooperation from the Nationalists, the Allies would have to revise the peace treaty radically.

Meanwhile, the issue of an American mandate over Turkey came up. On January 8, 1918, President Wilson made a speech to the American Congress, the gist of which was that all countries should agree to prevent the disruption of world peace which might be instigated by anti-democratic and oppressive regimes. Wilson's speech included a declaration of his principles, the "Fourteen Points," which were intended to lay the basis for a stable world peace. The twelfth point involved Turkey, implying that the new European map, built on the principle of the rights of nationalities, would recognize the right to self-determination.

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unre-

³⁸ "Mustafa Kemal'den Esat Paşa'ya," *Yakan Tarihimiz* 3: 39 (November 22, 1962), p. 399.

³⁹ Kansu, *Erzurum'dan Ölümine Kadar*, 1: 219-220.

⁴⁰ U.S. Records 867.00/1099, January 28, 1920. From Bristol to Secretary of State.

stricted opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.⁴¹

Some Turkish intellectuals interpreted this point as meaning that Anatolia would remain Turkish. The United States of America became very popular instantly. On January 14, 1919, The Wilsonian Principles League was officially established in İstanbul by Halide Edip, Ali Kemal, Refik Halit, Celâl Nuri and Ahmet Emin.⁴²

The same group had sent a letter to President Wilson on December 5, 1918, requesting that the United States help Turkey to reform its institutions and educate its administration in self-government under the following conditions:

The sovereignty of the Sultan and a constitutional form of government shall be preserved; proportional representation in all elections shall protect the rights of the minorities; an American will be appointed advisor-in-chief with a staff of expert assistants to each of the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture, Industries and Commerce, Public Works and Public Instruction. These advisers together shall form an American Commission; reform of the judiciary will also be under an American adviser in-chief and a board of legal experts selected from countries deemed advisable; supervision of the gendarmerie and police to be given to an American Inspector General; local government reform will be carried out under an American Inspector-in-chief; the period of guidance and instruction by Americans will be for a minimum of 15 or a maximum of 25 years; the borders of the Empire will be fixed at the Peace Conference.⁴³

On March 13, 1919, Yunus Nadi Bey (Abaloğlu, 1880-1945), a renowned journalist and a member of the Board of Directors of the Wilsonian Principles League, announced that Wilson's principles could not be interpreted to mean that every minority should be given territorial autonomy, because as far as Turkey was concerned, no minority group was numerically superior to the Turks within Anatolia.⁴⁴

On April 28, 1919, the American Commissioner in İstanbul, Lewis Heack, informed the United States Secretary of State that Ahmet Rıza Bey, the President of the Senate, and President (sic) of the newly

⁴¹ Albert Howe Lybyer, "Turkey Under the Armistice," *The Journal of International Relations* 12: 4 (April 1922), p. 449.

⁴² Somar, "Wilson Prensipleri Cemiyeti," *Tarih Konuşuyor* 3: 16 (May 1965), pp. 1275-1279; and 3: 18 (July 1965), pp. 1453-1456.

⁴³ Mine Sümer, "Wilson Prensipleri Cemiyetinin Amerikan Cumhurbaşkanı Wilson'a Gönderdiği Bir Muhtıra," *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3: 4/5 (1965), pp. 237-245.

⁴⁴ "Yunus Nadi Bey ile Mülakat," *Büyük Mecmua* (March 13, 1919), p. 21.

established league to support Ottoman Unity, commonly known as the "Block Nationale" (the National Congress) had visited Admiral Bristol and himself.

Ahmed Rıza Bey said that in the present international situation his group and the men representing the best elements in Turkey realized that their only hope for the future was a strong and disinterested foreign control for a fixed period... Although great hopes had been placed in the new Sultan, experience has shown that Mehmed VI is not a sufficiently strong character to alone bring about the regeneration of Turkey. Such being the case, he and the men working with him desire to make a public appeal for American control... He also stated that although Great Britain in such countries like Egypt had given good administration to the people and vastly increased their material prosperity, nevertheless, all sentiments of national independence were suppressed by the British, while in the Philippines the American Government had brought about a similar degree of material progress without attempting to suppress the national aspirations... In spite of many articles in the British press favourable to the idea of an American mandatory in Turkey I learn from various sources here that locally the British officials are now trying to discourage the idea, and to induce the Turks to believe that their main hope lies in Great Britain.⁴⁵

Kara Vasıf Bey, the Nationalist representative in İstanbul, informed the Representative Committee in Sivas that politicians, officers, journalists, the National Congress, and diplomats were all amenable to an American mandate. Mustafa Kemal rejected the idea of a mandate, but did not discount technical and economic aid.⁴⁶

When separate mandates over Turkey and Armenia were offered to the United States at the Paris Peace Conference, the Americans sent a mission under General James G. Harbord to Turkey. General Harbord met with Mustafa Kemal in Sivas on September 20, 1919, and with leading citizens. General Harbord would be the first person to publicize the Kemalist Movement in the United States as well as to provide first hand information to the State Department.⁴⁷ The United States High Commissioner, Admiral Bristol, already viewed the Nationalist Movement positively. He recommended to Washington that

⁴⁵ U.S. Records 867.00/867, April 28, 1919.

⁴⁶ Fahrettin Kırzioğlu, "Amerikan Mandasını Kimler İstiyordu ve Nasıl Öneriyorlardı?" Reprint from *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* (İstanbul: Menteş Matbaası, 1973), pp. 18-23; "Amerikan Mandası Üzerine Düşünceler," *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi* 27: 77 (September 1978), n.p.

⁴⁷ Peter F. Sugar, "A Reinterpretation of the Significance of General James G. Harbord's Mission," in *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Uluslararası Atatürk Konferansı 10-11 November 1980* 2 vols. (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1981) 2: 433-452.

there should be only one mandate over Turkey, both because the Greeks had showed signs of imperialistic aims and because they had proven themselves unfit to handle other nationalities when they persecuted Jews in Thrace. Ethnic antagonism, according to Bristol, was made up of religious, political and personal differences which ran very deep; therefore, the Greeks should not be granted territory either in Thrace or in Asia Minor.⁴⁸

He (Bristol) held the view, which is safe to assume reflected that of his Government, that the policy of the Allied Powers in the Near East was merely one of reciprocal intrigue, and that in this respect there was nothing to choose between Great Britain, France and Italy... Nor was he alone in these opinions. In October 1919, Mr. Henry Morgenthau, the former United States Ambassador to Turkey, published an appeal to his countrymen to take over Constantinople, Armenia and Asia Minor for a generation. Mr. Morgenthau qualified his proposal by suggesting that Great Britain should in turn associate the United States with her in the control of the Straits of Gibraltar. Only by some such means, he suggested, were Americans were likely to be convinced that there was no ulterior motive concealed in Mr. Lloyd George's appeal to the United States to help in the reconstruction of Turkey.⁴⁹

However, public opinion in the United States did not favor acquiring a mandate in the Near East.

In September 1919, there were rumors that a secret treaty had been signed between the Sultan and three British agents and that the former had accepted a British mandate over Turkey. The Nationalists issued a protest; the British government officially denied the existence of such an agreement; and Damad Ferid Pasha asked permission from Ryan to publish a denial.⁵⁰ The authenticity of this agreement has not been established to this day. Even if a treaty had not been signed, Damad Ferid had proposed to the British High Commissioner, Admiral Calthorpe, that if there were to be a mandate over Turkey, "it was the ardent desire of all Turkey, from the Sultan to the last peasant, that this mandate should be given to Great Britain."⁵¹

In reality, all unbiased observers are of opinion that if there be one solution which would be acceptable to all creeds and nationalities it is that which would accord to Great Britain a mandate for the whole coun-

⁴⁸ Bristol, "War Diary," May 25, 1919.

⁴⁹ Luke, *Cities and Men*, p. 70.

⁵⁰ Ryan Papers, undated note from Damad Ferid to Ryan.

⁵¹ Sonyel, "The Secret Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1919 in the Light of British Foreign Office Documents," *Belleken* 34 (July 1970): 456.

try. Especially is this the opinion of Moslems, who insist that the political advantages which would thus accrue to Great Britain are no less than the material advantages which would be derived therefrom for themselves. It is seriously maintained by those who claim to speak with authority that the predominant position in the world of Islam which would be conferred upon Great Britain by the exercise of a mandate, would assure to her the loyalty of her Indian and Egyptian Moslem subjects, both in the spiritual and secular spheres.⁵²

The Muslim "authority" Calthorpe referred to in this case was Said Molla, the editor of the pro-British *Serbesti* newspaper. Upon the Nationalist protest against a potential British mandate, *The Times* reacted self-righteously; the rebels would not hear of a British mandate. *The Times* blamed the rejection on the Nationalists, who, it claimed, were the same as the CUP and everyone knew that the CUP was anti-British.⁵³

Meanwhile in İstanbul, Ahmet Selâhattin Bey, Professor of International Law and Dean of the Law School, defended the idea of total independence instead of either a protectorate or a mandate.⁵⁴ He wrote,

Independence is a totality. It is either there or not. A state has no identity if there is no independence. At a time when Turkey has lost one-fifth or one-sixth of its land mass and population, the Turkish nation cannot possibly declare that it is unable to govern what country there is left... Now there is a Turkish nation and nationalism, and this nation shall protect its political identity... Among the community of world nations, Turkey can only accept cooperation, not subordination.⁵⁵

Ahmet Selâhattin Bey further drew attention to the fact that mandate became an issue only for those who lost the war, not for underdeveloped countries for the sake of humanity, who had stayed out of the war. In 1922, an American scholar was to analyze mandates with a similar approach.

Allowing elasticity of interpretation, the mandatory plan could readily be made a cover for the practical execution of the secret agreements for the partition of Turkey. The issue of mandates had come up because of the 22nd Article of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which involved a

⁵² FO 406/41, May 6, 1919, p. 95. From Calthorpe to Curzon.

⁵³ *The Times*, November 4, 1919, p. 3, c. 2.

⁵⁴ Uluğ İğdemir, "Ahmet Selâhattin Bey," Reprint from *Belleten* 38: 149 (January 1974), pp. 123-128 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1974); Seha L. Meray, *Lozan'ın Bir Öncüsü, Profesör Ahmet Selâhattin Bey 1878-1920* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1976).

⁵⁵ Ahmet Selâhattin, "Himaye ve Vekâlet Cereyanları," in Meray, *Ibid.*, pp. 11-15.

proposal for mandates over 'certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire' and that these communities should select their mandatory power. This proposal did not involve Turkey, nor was a mandate on Anatolia was implicated in Wilson's 12th point.⁵⁶

After having talked to those who espoused an American mandate, Ahmet Selâhattin Bey concluded that these people viewed the mandate as the only way to gain independence in the future. He did not share their views. When Ahmet Selâhattin died in 1920 at forty-two years of age, Vahidettin unexpectedly honored him by ordering that he be buried in the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Complex among the Imperial family.⁵⁷ This was yet another paradoxical gesture from the Sultan.

To other opponents, a mandatory regime meant an admission that Turks were incapable of self-government:

Even when there are divergences in domestic politics, there is usually a unity in matters regarding the future of one's country. People, not even the Bulgarians, who lost the war, have publicly declared that they were incapable of self-government. The reason why we hear cries for foreign protection and mandate in Turkey is that we do not have an established national standard.⁵⁸

While ideas for or against mandates competed in İstanbul, there was another group of intellectuals who feared that the Nationalist Movement would do more harm than good. Among these were the patriotic journalist-poet, Süleyman Nazif (1870-1927). He had become disillusioned and bitter in Malta where he lived in exile. He did not think that a small group of Nationalists could defy the Allied Powers. Another journalist, Refik Halit (Karay, 1888-1965) was biting sarcasm about Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists; he considered the movement an outright madness.⁵⁹ University professors Rıza Tevfik (Bölükbaşı, 1868-1949), Cenab Şehabettin (1870-1934), and Ali Kemal (1869-1922) did not see any difference between the CUP and the Nationalists and considered the latter illegitimate.⁶⁰

Ankara's Independence Tribunals (which were established to try soldiers who ran away from service and punish rebels who were on Damad Ferid's pay and killed Nationalists) and the excesses of some

⁵⁶ Lybyer, "Turkey Under the Armistice," pp. 464-465.

⁵⁷ Meray, *Lozan'ın Bir Öncüsü*, pp. 82-83.

⁵⁸ "Manda, Himaye, İstiklâl," *Büyük Mecmua* (June 29, 1919), pp. 134-135.

⁵⁹ "Millî Mücadeleye İnanmayanlar," *Dün ve Bugün* 1 (November 4, 1955): 24-25; *Ibid.*, 3 (November 18, 1955): 24; Nurşen Mazıcı, *Belgelerle Atatürk Döneminde Muhalefet* (1919-1926) (İstanbul: Dİlmen Yayınevi, 1984), pp. 110-115.

⁶⁰ *Dün ve Bugün* 4 (November 25, 1955): 20-21; *Ibid.*, 5 (December 2, 1955): 14.

Nationalist guerrillas prior to 1921, before an orderly army was formed, gave the opponents the impression that the Nationalists were power-hungry relics of the CUP. The opponents of the Nationalists did not necessarily believe in the FEP, but they had faith in diplomacy, in the dynasty and legitimate government. Ankara considered them to be defeatists and punished Rıza Tevfik and Refik Halit by exiling them abroad among 150 personae non gratae, after the Lausanne Treaty was signed. (Atatürk pardoned them before his death in 1938 and they were allowed to return to the country.) Among the opposition journalists, Ali Kemal, who wrote for *Peyam-ı Sabah*, was the most impassioned. He worried about Turkey's image abroad, but following the decisive Nationalist victory over the Greeks on August 26, 1922, he applauded them and admitted that he had been wrong.⁶¹

An unprecedented form of resistance to the pro-British attitude came from University students in İstanbul. They went on a strike which lasted from April 12 to August 25, 1922. The students protested the pro-British stand of professors Ali Kemal (Ottoman-European Relations), Cenap Şahabettin (History of Turkish Literature), Rıza Tevfik (Metaphysics), Hüseyin Daniş (Persian Literature), and Bersamian Efendi (English Literature). Students asked the University administration to remove these professors from their posts because they were anti-Nationalist. When the Council of Professors refused to grant their wish, the Humanities students went on strike. They were soon joined by Medicine, Science, Law, Agriculture, Veterinary, Pharmacology, Political Science, and Merchant Marine students.⁶²

The Ministry of Education decided to re-open the University on May 20th, threatening the striking students with failure and expulsion. On May 20, fighting broke out between students who wanted to begin classes and those who were opposed. Many professors, in support of the striking students, did not enter classes. By the end of July, the University administration announced that the five professors in question had gone on a permanent leave of absence. On August 25, students returned to school.

The ferocity of the Turkish-Greek war and the Nationalist success cured many sceptics among the İstanbul intelligentsia. However, the public supported the Nationalist cause in deed and thought all along. There had been only a few instances of betrayal of the underground

⁶¹ Mazıcı, *Belgelerle Atatürk Döneminde Muhalefet*, pp. 103-110; Zeki Kuneralp, ed. *Ömrüm* (İstanbul: ISIS Yayıncılık Ltd., n.d.), pp. 182-189.

⁶² Kâzım İsmail Gürkan, *Darülfünun Grevi* (İstanbul: Garanti Matbaası, 1971), pp. 43-48.

resistance.⁶³ Police had alerted people whose names were on the wanted list. Friends sheltered those who were at large. The Ottoman bureaucracy, in its time-honored fashion, delayed carrying out the terms of the Armistice, but this time it was covert resistance, not sheer incompetence. The Sultan remained an enigma. His personal fears, suspicions, distrust of people, and perhaps more importantly, his condemning to death the leaders of the Nationalist Movement made his position untenable.

⁶³ Hasan İzzettin Dinamo, *Türk Kelebeği* (İstanbul: Yalçın Yayınları, 1981). This book is based on the memories of a Turkish man who was involved in smuggling arms for the underground. He was betrayed by an acquaintance for the sake of monetary reward from the occupation forces. Since he murdered two French soldiers while trying to escape, the man, Mehmet, served in the French Guiana some years before he escaped and made his way back to Turkey through the United States.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ALLIED ADMINISTRATION

Almost immediately after İstanbul was occupied on November 13, 1918, the issue of Allied military command became a problem between France and Britain. This was but a small reflection of the rivalry between the two countries in the Near East. The Turkish peace was not concluded as rapidly as the Allied administrators in İstanbul expected or desired. During the five and a half years of Allied occupation, there was not only dissension among them, but also increasing suspicion about one another.

The Allies established a complex bureaucracy after 1920. There were inherent weaknesses in the administrative machinery, which the Turkish underground readily exploited. For example, Üsküdar, the door to Anatolia on the Asian side of İstanbul, was the Italian zone, and controls were less strict. It was relatively easy to smuggle people from Üsküdar to Ankara. The Old City and western suburbs were in the French zone. As of 1920, French attitude towards Turkish resistance became favorable. In addition, the French had the advantage of being able to communicate with the Turks, because many educated Turks had French as their second language. The British zone was in the cosmopolitan areas of Pera, Galata and Şişli. They were clearly there to punish, not to communicate with the Turks.

Almost everyone who witnessed those times agreed that the Italians were the "gentlemen occupiers," the French were "harmless," except for the Senegalese soldiers who accosted women, the Americans were "pleasant," but the British were "the enemy."¹

In November 1918, the Allied representatives in İstanbul were Britain's Sir Somerset Arthur Gough Calthorpe, Italy's Count Carlo Sforza, and France's Admiral Amet. The United States Consul and Commissioner was G. Bie Ravndal. Not until 1919 did the Supreme Council in Paris decide to establish High Commissioners in addition to military commanders. Meanwhile, the British and French competed to uphold the prestige of their respective countries in İstanbul.²

¹ Interviews with Mrs. Sârâ Okçu, Beylerbeyi, İstanbul, October 14, 1987; Mrs. Ferzane Erçetin, Moda, İstanbul, October 17, 1987; Mr. Kemalettin Tuğcu, Şişli, İstanbul, May 12, 1986; Mr. Kemal Türkömer, Bebek, İstanbul, May 10, 1986.

² Paul Azan, *Franchet d'Espèrey* (Paris: n.p., 1949), p. 220.

For France, it seemed only natural that General Franchet d'Espèrey (1856-1942), Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the Orient, assume the military command in İstanbul. However, the British commanders did not want to accept French leadership.

After the Armistice was signed in Europe on November 11, 1918, General d'Espèrey waited in Sofia for orders from his government to go to Budapest to see to Hungary's submission. Instead, Paris ordered him to proceed to İstanbul to coordinate affairs there. General d'Espèrey did not trust the British. During his meetings with British commanders in 1917, regarding the partitioning of the Near East, he felt that the British were about to short change the French by controlling Asia Minor.³ The French general paid a brief visit to İstanbul in November 1918 and returned to the Balkans. He came back to İstanbul on January 8, 1919, and was received with ostentatious ceremony by his Allied colleagues and the İstanbul minorities. Turkish public opinion never forgave the general for parading down the Grand Rue de Pera on horseback as if he were a conqueror. Franchet d'Espèrey viewed the Turks with similar distaste, "Les seuls qui avaient de l'énergie, étaient Union et Progrès; le reste n'est qu'une collection d'eunuques que je voudrais bien galvaniser."⁴

The French government had assigned General d'Espèrey to control more than just İstanbul. Their armies were rapidly demobilizing. France had to protect the Adriatic, keep peace between the Serbians and Hungarians in Hungary, oversee the relations between Hungary and Romania, fight the Bolsheviks, and protect French rights in the Near East. Franchet d'Espèrey was responsible for all these missions.

France undertook a bigger task in Russia than it had the means to fulfil, with only 1,200 soldiers in Odessa and 400 in the Crimea. On March 15, 1919, the French government informed d'Espèrey that the French troops in western Russia were now under his command. After a short trip to Sevastapol and Odessa, he returned to İstanbul on March 24, convinced that a successful mission in Russia could only be accomplished with 500,000 French soldiers and one billion French francs. Meanwhile, the High Commissioners had been established in İstanbul. D'Espèrey did not approve of adding another echelon of authority, but his relationship with Albert Defrance (1860-1936), a career diplomat, who had arrived there on March 30, 1919, was cordial. Admiral Calthorpe and Count Sforza each assumed the title of High Commissioners. Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, Com-

³ Ibid., p. 242.

⁴ Azan, *Franchet d'Espèrey*, pp. 244-245.

mander of the United States Naval Detachment in the Eastern Mediterranean, became the United States High Commissioner.

The military command of the Allied Forces of Occupation was based on the resolution that the Allied representatives in London had accepted on December 3, 1918. Accordingly,

The British, French and Italian Governments agreed that while the British troops garrisoning any part of European Turkey and the General in command of them should remain under General Franchet d'Espèrey, the rest of General Milne's army might be transferred to the Caucasus and elsewhere, and in that case should cease to be under command of General Franchet d'Espèrey.⁵

The "European Turkey" that the resolution referred to could have meant the Straits also, but the British Command in Turkey interpreted the resolution to mean that General d'Espèrey would command the Allied troops occupying portions of the various Balkan states other than Turkey. Thus, General Milne would have a corresponding authority over Allied troops at the Straits, on the southern shore of the Black Sea, and in Transcaucasia. "But, Franchet d'Espèrey had recently arrived at Constantinople and he was displaying a marked bent for acting as though he was in charge there."⁶ General d'Espèrey met with Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, the British Chief of the General Staff, on November 4, 1918, in Paris.

He (d'Espèrey) wants to eliminate Milne and deal direct with Fatty Wilson (Lieutenant General Sir H.F.M. Wilson) under Milne's command, which is the thing that I have fought against all the time. I told him that we were determined to bulk big at Constantinople and that I was withdrawing from Batoum to strengthen Constantinople. I reminded him that he went to Constantinople to be near the railway for Sofia, and to be near Varna and Constanza, and furthermore I reminded him that we had defeated the Turks and he the Bulgars.⁷

The British insisted that their forces were under the command of General Milne, and that the French and Italian forces were under the supreme command of General d'Espèrey.⁸ The British looked at the problem not only from the angle of national pride and prestige, but also of efficiency. The British were assigned to supervise the military terms of the Ottoman Armistice. And, except for the Gallipoli cam-

⁵ FO 406/41 February 2, 1919, p. 15. From War Office to Foreign Office.

⁶ C.E. Calwell, *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson* 2 vols. (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1927) 1: 226.

⁷ Calwell, *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson*, p. 227.

⁸ FO 406/43, December 10, 1919, p. 1. From the Foreign Office to the Law Offices of the Crown.

paign, where French forces were used along with the British imperial forces, it was the British who fought against the Turks. Moreover, the British had a larger number of troops in Turkey than the French. Franchet d'Espèrey's position remained unsettled. The problem of supreme command flared up once again during the military occupation of Istanbul in March 1920.

When the Supreme Council decided that Istanbul should be formally occupied, this presented an opportunity for Lord Curzon to force General d'Espèrey out and replace him with a British general. Lord Curzon justified his approach:

Constantinople had been especially reserved as a sphere of British military command. In the proceedings at Constantinople which culminated in the military occupation of the city yesterday, by far the greater part of the occupying force had been supplied, not by the French, but by the British. Indeed, my information was that the French and Italians had afforded as little assistance as they could, and had done their best to throw the entire onus and responsibility upon the British... General Franchet d'Espèrey is usually elsewhere than in Constantinople, and it was intolerable that, at critical moments, he had descended upon the city, where the burden of military responsibility and military action had rested almost exclusively in British hands, and should oust a British commander from the post of authority.⁹

The reason why Lord Curzon had refrained from asking for the French general's removal was that d'Espèrey was already the commander of the Allied Army of the Orient, which might have been used in a land attack on Istanbul if the Allies encountered armed resistance during the occupation.

Once the three Allied High Commissioners agreed to proceed with the *de jure* occupation, General d'Espèrey suggested that the occupation be carried out by an Allied Commission which consisted of military officers. However, General George Milne, Commander of the Army of the Black Sea, argued that the command of the forces of occupation in Turkey fell to the British. Therefore, the occupation took place under the command of the British. General Milne had British soldiers occupy the Ottoman Ministry of War and the postal and telegraph administration. General d'Espèrey persuaded the French High Commissioner, DeFrance, to protest this action and to remind the British High Commissioner that according to the December 3, 1918 agreement between the Allies, the Command of the Allied forces on Ottoman European territory belonged to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, who was none other than Gen-

⁹ FO 406/43, March 17, 1920, p. 17. From Curzon to Derby in Paris.

eral d'Espèrey. The French general realized that the Allied command was slipping into British authority, and that the French were being used to carry out British policy without any gain to themselves.¹⁰

The British had grievances against General d'Espèrey since the beginning of March 1920. The general had removed the 122nd French Division and two other battalions from the Allied Corps under the command of General Wilson, and had placed them under his command. He clearly did not want the French soldiers under the control of a foreign commander even though he may be an ally. D'Espèrey instructed all French troops that in case of a crisis, they were to take orders only from him. Further, he published a statement in Turkish newspapers that the Supreme Council had "adopted the French point of view and had decided to allow the Turks to remain in Constantinople."¹¹ Admiral Calthorpe did not appreciate the French attitude: "The French are anxious to create an impression that they alone amongst the Entente Powers are standing out for the defence of Moslem interests, and are striving for the retention of Constantinople in the hands of the Turks and for the non-partition of the Ottoman Empire."¹²

General d'Espèrey was recalled on April 5, and his post was assumed by General Nayral de Bourgon (1862-1949). D'Espèrey was officially relieved of the Command of the Allied Forces in the East in December 1920. Concomitantly, General Milne was replaced by General Charles Harington (1872-1940), who took over the Command of the British Army of the Black Sea. Marshal Wilson promised the French, on behalf of General Harington, that there would be no friction between the British and French commands during General Harington's tenure.¹³ The British, despite these problems, were keen on maintaining an image of Allied solidarity.

British officials, however, retorted (sic) to the line, there is no truth whatsoever in British-French dissensions, the two countries are absolutely in accord in their aims and acts in Turkey. Such stories are the result of Turkish lying and intrigue. Remember always that as a matter of principle, the aim of the Turks is to cause trouble between the Allies, to make up to you, and then let you down. It is thus that they have escaped deserved retribution in the past, and they hope in the same way to lighten

¹⁰ Azan, *Franchet d'Espèrey*, pp. 256-257.

¹¹ FO 371/5202, March 5, 1920. Dispatch entitled, "Points of irritation between English and French as communicated to the French Ambassador in London by the Foreign Office."

¹² FO 406/41, May 6, 1919, p. 13. From Calthorpe to Curzon.

¹³ FMA 20N1110 C41/1 Dos1, Telegramme Chiffre, Secret, September 27, 1920.

the sentence to be given to them in their Peace Treaty, by profiting through European jealousies. An official at the French Embassy recently admitted to a Turk who acts as an information agent for the writer that, "all is not well between the British and the French in Turkey, even outside of Syria."... Practically every British Control and Intelligence Officer in the interior of Anatolia tells you confidentially the same tale: Throughout Turkey the French are working against us. Anti-British propaganda is universal. The French are openly courting the Nationalist movement which aims at preserving the political and territorial integrity of Turkey, and which we silently oppose. They have declared a policy, and we have not. They are friendly to the Turks and are favoured by them; we are not. Their officials stationed in our control areas-where the French have no right to be- dine with and are entertained socially by Nationalist officers. We are not.¹⁴

On the evening of March 16, 1920, the British Intelligence Officer, Captain John G. Bennett went to the Parliament and arrested deputies Rauf Bey and Kara Vasif Bey. On March 18, the Parliament dissolved itself in protest, which was followed by an exodus of Nationalist deputies to Ankara. The Sublime Porte could do nothing but protest the occupation and the conduct of British soldiers. The Ottoman government protested the shooting of Turkish soldiers and the arrest of Prince Tevfik and his wife, the Imperial Princess, because this impinged upon the sovereignty of the Sultan and his family. The government protested the arrest of deputies Rauf and Kara Vasif and Çürüksulu Mahmut Pasha (1865-1930), because members of the Parliament enjoyed immunity.¹⁵ When asked why Mahmut Pasha was arrested, General Milne explained to the British High Commissioner that he "was engaged in the organization of resistance to the terms of peace and it was desired to destroy the organization in question... I do not admit that action of this kind, while a state of war exists, is a political question."¹⁶

A French resident in İstanbul described the arrests:

Les officiers anglais, escortés d'Indiens baïonnette au canon, ont violé de nuit le domicile d'honnêtes gens qui n'avaient commis d'autre crime pour la plupart que d'aimer leurs pays et de témoigner leur sympathie à la France, leur seconde patrie... Ils n'ont épargné ni le Prince Impérial

¹⁴ U.S. Records 867.00/1073, December 20, 1919. From Force Commander, USS Chattanooga Flagship to Secretary of State.

¹⁵ "İstanbul'un Kara Günü," *Dün ve Bugün* 20 (March 16, 1956): 21-22; Ertan Ünal, "İstanbul'un Tarihinden Kara Bir Yaprak, 16 Mart Vakası," *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 1: 2 (March 1, 1969), pp. 18-25.

¹⁶ FO 371/5090, April 20, 1920.

Ibrahim Tewfik Effendi et sa femme, ni les généraux, ni les hommes de lettres, ni les députés et les sénateurs, pas même les femmes.¹⁷

Furthermore, İstanbul's streets were full of Greeks and Armenians in British uniform. They were employed by the British Command as police in charge of public security and intelligence.¹⁸

The United States High Commissioner, Admiral Bristol, commented on the severity of British actions,

The arrests made by the British troops were carried out in rather an unusual way, though the circumstances may have justified it. As an instance, in the case of the Turkish General, ex-Chief of General Staff, Djavad Pasha, he was taken in his night clothes and his hands were bound.¹⁹

Dr. Esat Pasha of the National Congress and member of the underground resistance, *Karakol*, was also dragged out of his house in his pajamas and was beaten en route. Admiral Bristol was informed that many Nationalists in İstanbul had taken refuge in Italian battleships and would be transported to Anatolia through the Italian zone.²⁰ The household of the former Minister of War, Cemal Pasha (Mersinli, 1873-1941), had offered resistance when British soldiers came to arrest him; two British and five Turkish soldiers were wounded.

While High Commissioners express satisfaction at occupation it is known to me that the wisdom of it is doubted in some Allied quarters... It seems generally believed here that the main initiative for the move came from London and Paris and was not based chiefly on intelligence from here.²¹

The Indian Caliphate Delegation (a society formed by Indian Muslims which worked to gain independence from British rule) sent a telegram from London to President Wilson, protesting the "forcible Allied occupation of the seat of Khilafat and the use of Muslim troops against the Commander of the Faithful."²²

The Grand Vizier, Salih Hulûsi Pasha (1864-1939), was forced to resign on April 2, 1920, because he and his cabinet did not accept

¹⁷ Pierre Loti, *La Mort de Notre Chère France en Orient* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, Editeurs, 1920), p. 223.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 224; "Terreur britannique à Constantinople," from *Echo de Turquie* in *Echo de l'Islam* 11 (July 25, 1920).

¹⁹ U.S. Records, 867.00/1258, April 10, 1920. From Bristol to Secretary of State.

²⁰ U.S. Records, 867.00/1176, March 19, 1920.

²¹ U.S. Records, 867.00/1168, March 16, 1920. From Bristol to Secretary of State.

²² U.S. Records, 867.00/1173, March 19, 1920; Abdul Kalam Azad, "La Paix avec la Turquie et le Monde Musulman," *Echo de l'Islam* 3 (March 20, 1920): 4.

British pressure to condemn the Nationalist Movement publicly.²³ Subsequently, when Damad Ferid came to power, pressure on the Nationalists returned in full force. He accepted the British "suggestion" that the Nationalists should be disavowed. One of the ways that Damad Ferid chose to assert his authority was to punish people who were held in custody for alleged atrocities against the Armenian population. In an effort to prove his efficiency to the British, Ferid Pasha had the district administrator of Urfa (southeast Turkey), Nusret Bey (b. 1875), executed by hanging. Nusret Bey was held responsible for the scale of Armenian deportations.²⁴

Between November 1918 and March 1920, the main functions of the Allied Forces of Occupation were to establish control over the police, passports, the press, and to impose mixed tribunals. The proposal to establish a provisional tribunal for civil and commercial suits between foreigners and Ottoman subjects came from the Italians in June 1919. Lord Curzon replied,

The relation between any provisional arrangement which might now be made and the permanent judicial system to be provided for in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey must necessarily be so intimate that this question should more properly be dealt with by the Peace Delegations in Paris.²⁵

A potential judicial system to be imposed by the Allies brought into question the legality (or illegality) of their presence in the city at that time. International law stated that only a legally sanctioned occupying force in enemy territory may establish a judicial system. Further, if tribunals were formed and passed judgment not only on foreign subjects, but also on Ottomans, the High Commissioners would have to enforce the decrees by force if the Ottomans declined to be bound by them.²⁶ At the same time, the High Commissioners,

refused to admit jurisdiction of Turkish courts over subjects of Allied Powers... French proposal is for court composed of four judges, one for each of the three allies, and one Turkish to administer local law, their judgments to be final, their jurisdiction to extend to all civil and commercial matters between foreigners and Ottomans, and their sentences to be enforced by Inter-Allied police forces.²⁷

²³ İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar* 3rd ed. 4 vols. (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1982) 4: 2124-2125.

²⁴ "Darağacında Sallanan Şehit," *Dün ve Bugün* 15 (February 10, 1956): 5-6; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyetler*, 2: 379-387.

²⁵ FO 406/42, July 2, 1919. From Curzon to Italian Chargé d'Affaires, p. 44.

²⁶ Ibid., July 4, 1919. From Balfour to Calthorpe, p. 45.

²⁷ FO 406/42, July 26, 1919. From Balfour to Calthorpe, p. 47.

By August 1919, the British agreed to set up mixed tribunals.²⁸ The British High Commissioner stipulated that the Ottoman government had to consent to the creation of Inter-Allied tribunals. The Turks rejected the proposal. Even if they had agreed, it would still have been inadequate, because this court would deal with only civil and commercial disputes. Criminal cases were to be under the jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied police, who lacked the legal procedures to sentence offenders. In addition, there was no mechanism to deal with profiteering, passport fraud, and speculation under the existing system.²⁹

The legality of the Inter-Allied tribunals remained unclear. There was no provision in the Armistice terms which entitled the Allies to occupy Istanbul. Article VII of the convention had stated that the Allies had the right to occupy any strategic point in the event that their security was threatened. (This rule did not hold for areas occupied by the Greek army.) There was no justifiable threat to the security of the Allies in Istanbul.

The dilemma was twofold. The Allies could not legally establish tribunals, because their status as occupiers was not a formal one. The only other alternative judicial system, the consular courts, had ceased to function, because of the unilateral abrogation of capitulations by the Turks. Although there was an armistice, the British could not accept the jurisdiction of Ottoman courts over British subjects because a state of war between Turkey and Britain still existed. Moreover, according to international law, civilians could not be tried by martial law unless there was a state of occupation. The legal offices of the Crown advised the Foreign Office that the only acceptable course of action was to pressure the Ottoman government to consent to the establishment of Inter-Allied tribunals, which would cover both civil and criminal matters. The pro-Nationalist cabinet of Ali Rıza Pasha continued to oppose this pressure. The need for a judicial system may have been another reason for the *de jure* occupation of Istanbul. *Echo de l'Islam*, organ of the Islamic Information Bureau in Paris, fuelled French displeasure with the occupation. On April 20, 1920, it editorialized,

Après Le Dîner Constantinobraltar? Constantinople est déjà sous la coupe britannique. L'armée du général Milne l'occupe militairement. Quelle figure fait là-bas le général Franchet d'Espèrey, commandant "en

²⁸ Ibid., August 8, 1919. From Balfour to Curzon, p. 52. FO 406/43, December 10, 1919. From Foreign Office to Law Offices of the Crown, p. 1.

²⁹ *Echo de l'Islam*, April 20, 1920, p. 1.

Chef" des armées alliées en Orient, qui a eu le général Milne sous ses ordres? Les journaux anglais jettent de la poudre aux yeux de la presse française par des notes dont la moindre vice est d'être ridicules. L'un d'eux assure que "les alliées ont décidé d'assurer l'application du traité de paix par l'occupation de Constantinople, étant donné que les nationalistes ont continué une politique de résistance et d'outrage. Le Daily Telegraph ajoute: "L'occupation sera provisoire et ne sera pas en opposition avec l'autorité du sultan..." Provisoire. Comme au Caire? Nous persistons à dire que la Grande-Bretagne se moque de l'Europe entière, en cette affaire, et de la France en particulier. Serons-nous assez aveugles pour consentir à ce que les Dardanelles deviennent un nouveau Gibraltar?³⁰

The Allies had to face new problems with the establishment of an administrative machinery. These problems ranged from choosing the president of the Control Commissions to the military commander of Istanbul. General Milne wanted to appoint a British officer as president of each of the Control Commissions. The French and Italians objected. Not only did they require that the respective national members of these commissions to have an equal voice, but also they refused to be ruled by a British officer. The High Commissioners agreed that control of the Ottoman War Ministry, Admiralty, and Postal and Telegraph Offices should be Inter-Allied.³¹ Still, the leading officer in the Inter-Allied group of control officers was British. Colonel Shuttleworth (1876-1948) was placed in charge of the Ottoman War Ministry and given the imposing title of "Colonel Commandant." Two other colonels represented the French and Italian forces in the control office. Major Charles Taylor was assigned as Control Officer to the Ottoman General Staff.³² Two British warships lay off the Golden Horn, threatening to take action against armed resistance to the occupation. The British yielded in sharing the presidency of the Control Commissions with their allies as long as the War Ministry Commission was under British presidency.

From the beginning, there were differences of opinion between the French and British governments regarding the lines of authority between the High Commissioners and Military Commanders. The French government wanted to restrict the High Commissioners' powers to the supervision of the Armistice terms, while the Military Com-

³⁰ FO 406/43, March 24, 1920, p. 253. From Vice-Admiral Sir John de Robeck to Lord Curzon.

³¹ Charles C. Taylor, "Many Happy Returns," (typewritten MS) (Oxford: Oxford University, St. Antony's College, Middle East Centre Library, n.d.), pp. 106-107.

³² FO 406/43, June 14, 1920, pp. 413-416.

mander would maintain direct communication with the Ottoman government. The British government maintained that the Military Commander should be concerned exclusively with military matters and should not exercise any political authority. But they contradicted themselves by arguing that all power should be vested in military command because the occupation of İstanbul was a military affair.

Once the French agreed to recall General d'Espèrey, the British felt obliged to make some concessions to the French. The latter preferred that the supreme command be abolished and a local command of the Allied forces take charge. Furthermore, the French wanted the administration of İstanbul to be in civilian hands. The military command was to be under the general control of the High Commissioners. Marshal Wilson agreed that as long as the general commanding officer in İstanbul was British, it did not matter what his command was called, and that outside of routine military measures for the safety of the Allied soldiers, the military commander's actions would have to be authorized by the High Commissioners. General Milne was not about to accept civilian authority over himself and opposed his Chief of Staff.³³

General Milne has himself furnished proofs of his intention to act independently of the High Commissioners, and his assumption of the roll (sic) of Military Dictator cannot fail to confirm the prevalent suspicions as to our ultimate designs on Constantinople.³⁴

The French government recognized the need for a unified command over the Greek army (100,000 men),³⁵ the British troops (30,000 men), the French troops (18,000 men), and Italian troops (2,000 men). By June 1920, the French government was ready to accept British dominance in İstanbul, but under certain conditions. If command was to belong to the British on land, command on the sea should be French.

³³ FO 406/43, June 14, 1920, p. 414.

³⁴ The Greek army in Anatolia never came under Allied command. If there were any Allied advisers to the Greek army, they did not accompany the troops. In May 1919, the Supreme Council decided to confine Greek occupation to the province of İzmir and the town of Ayvalık. Yet the Greek army advanced further east. In October 1919, General Milne drew a line which recognized the territory acquired by the Greeks until then. The Greeks were not to stop at this line either. See M. Murat Hatipoğlu, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin 101 Yılı (1821-1922)* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1988), p. 92.

³⁵ FO 406/43, June 27, 1920, p. 435. From Derby to Curzon.

If this proposal is deemed unpractical, then under the supreme command of a British general, command of the city of Constantinople should be given to a French general. The French Government further insisted that the presidency of the three commissions of control should be equally divided between the Allies.³⁶

On November 7, 1920, the Allied Command of the Eastern armies was abolished and became the Command of the Forces of Occupation, Constantinople. Finally, the French government agreed that the presidency of the Military Commission should be occupied for two years terms on a rotating basis, and that General Harington should assume that command immediately. The French also agreed that the police force should be under whichever power held the military command.³⁷ Thus, when in the summer of 1920, the presidency of the Military Commission and the Command of the Allied Forces were combined, the Italians proposed that the incumbent's tenure be extended to six years. It is plausible that the Italians supported the British because they expected concessions about Fiume and Dalmatia at the Peace Conference. The Italians considered civil police (i.e. Special Elements) to be under the power which held the military command.³⁸ Following the bulky correspondence which took place between Paris, London, İstanbul and Rome, a complicated mechanism of control and organization was established by the Fall of 1920. (See Administrative Charts and Legend, pp. 72-75.)


One of the main reasons the Allies occupied İstanbul was to compel the Turks to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres. By November 1920, Sir Horace Rumbold (1869-1941), the British High Commissioner, asked London that his letters of credence be prepared, because he expected to become the doyen of the diplomatic corps in İstanbul after the treaty was ratified and the High Commissioners would become ambassadors. Rumbold wanted to act faster than his Italian colleague, Marquise Eugenio Camillo Garroni, whose credentials, he believed, were ready for presentation.³⁹

³⁶ FO 371/5274, November 7, 1920. From Derby to Curzon.


³⁷ Ibid., November 22, 1920. From Sir John Buchanan to the Foreign Office.

³⁸ Rumbold Papers, Nos. 9-11, November 22, 1920.


³⁹ Rumbold Papers, Nos. 206-209, August 9, 1921. From Sir Horace to King George V.

The Allied Organization in Istanbul

* Allies had an equal voice in the Commission unless a President is indicated

*The Allied Organization in Istanbul**Allied High Commissioners*

The Allied Organization in Istanbul
Sub-Commissions of Control and Organization



Legend to Administrative Charts

The difficulties that the Financial, Disarmament, Gendarmerie and Censorship Commissions faced in trying to carry out their task of control are taken up throughout this study. The Allied administrative mechanism appeared efficient, in general. There were, however, certain weaknesses in the organization, namely, the passport bureaus, special elements and police control. The French and Italian passport bureaus were responsible only to their respective High Commissions, while the British passport control was accountable to the Commander of the Army of the Black Sea, i.e. General Harington. Since there was no central control, it became relatively easy to obtain false papers and passports from the French and Italian authorities when their policies became favorable to the Turks. The French and Italians overtly helped many Turks escape to Anatolia either by looking the other way or by providing them with false passports.

The Special Elements section presented another problem. Its mission was intelligence gathering, and the Commission was under the Military Commander of the Allied Occupation Forces. The British had neither the time nor the desire to train the people whom they employed for this purpose. In addition, shortage of their own personnel compelled them to engage native Greeks and Armenians in the Special Elements Section. This had an adverse effect on healthy intelligence gathering, because most of these minority informants acted vindictively against the Turks and reported them indiscriminately. In contrast, the respective Allied military intelligence sections were more professional. The Special Elements Section, nonetheless, remained a separate portion of Allied bureaucracy. In 1921, an agent of the Special Elements was to cause embarrassment to General Harington by having discovered an unfounded assassination plot against him.

The Inter-Allied Police Commission was another weak point of the administration. The Commission was supposed to control the native police. But they only received cooperation from the Turkish Police Director when Damad Ferid Pasha was in power. The Damad always assigned a cooperative Chief of Police to the job. At other times, cooperation from the Turkish police was minimal.

It follows, then, that the only efficient work that the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control and Organization performed was in civic administration. Food supply, sanitary and medical services, quarantine control and refugee care were very proficient. Otherwise, given the refugee situation and a bankrupt municipality, both the city and the Allies would have had to suffer epidemics.

Even after structural and personnel changes took place, administrative friction continued.

One of the most difficult questions at the moment is that of the relations of General Harington to the three High Commissioners now that he has assumed supreme command over the Allied Forces at Constantinople. The French and Italian High Commissioners are obviously jealous of what they consider his preponderant position in this place. Their jealousy takes the form of suggesting that General Harington may try to curtail the prerogatives of the Allied High Commissioners and they object to his considering himself the Military Governor of Constantinople.⁴⁰

In contrast to the relationship between the High Commissioners and the Military Commander, the esprit de corps among the Allied generals was well established as the minutes of their meetings show. One of the first acts of the Allied generals was to declare psychological warfare on the Turkish military.

On September 6, 1921, the Directing Committee of Generals decided to inform the Ottoman government that Turkish military officers and soldiers from then on had to salute the Allied military.⁴¹ The question of reciprocal salutes posed a problem because it might be difficult to persuade Allied soldiers and officers to salute their Turkish counterparts. Therefore, it was decided that the Allies, being in occupied enemy territory, had the right to be saluted, but were not obligated to salute Turkish officers.⁴² Saluting became an issue of real concern, and a sub-commission on saluting was created. It was bad enough for the Turks to have to salute the occupation forces regardless of rank, but the presence of Greek officers in the city added insult to injury. Many Turkish officers stopped wearing their uniforms in public to avoid saluting. Since no punishments were mandated in case of failure to salute, the Allied officers' response was limited to insults. This humiliated Turkish officers, which was probably meant to be part of psychological warfare.

The Allied administration had jurisdiction over various aspects of life in the city, such as requisitioning and sanitation. Forced requisitioning of property by the Allies was another dimension of psychological pressure as well as a matter of expediency. Until October 1921, the separate Allied military contingents carried out requisitions according to their individual needs. Once an administrative system

⁴⁰ FMA 20N1091 C/27 Dos1, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Directing Committee of Generals of the Military Commission of Control and Organisation, September 6, 1921.

⁴¹ FMA 20N1091 C/27 Dos1, September 20, 1921.

⁴² Ibid., October 4, 1921.

was established, requisitions had to be uniform. The initial approach caused complications because one army sometimes attempted to requisition a property that was already partially or totally occupied by an officer of another army. Therefore, a sub-commission, consisting of three Allied representatives was created to ensure that everybody had proper accommodations according to rank and position.⁴³

On November 18, 1921, the Inter-Allied Requisitioning Office made the following decisions:

1. In principle, all requisitions to be strictly confined to the property of Ottoman subjects.
2. Ottoman subjects, who changed their nationality subsequent to the Armistice November 11th, 1918, not to be exempt from requisition.
3. If the OWNER of a property is an Allied subject and such property is TENANTED by an Ottoman subject, the premises not to be requisitioned without the consent of the OWNED.
4. If the TENANT of a property is an Allied subject, and such property is OWNER by an Ottoman subject, the premises not to be requisitioned.
5. Subjects of the three Allied Powers in occupation (TURKEY) whether OWNERS or TENANTS to be exempt from requisition, unless for reasons of urgent military necessity, which must be decided by the Inter-Allied Requisition Office.⁴⁴

In December, the second provision which said that Ottoman subjects who became Allied subjects were not exempt from requisitioning, was modified when the Requisitioning Office agreed that Turkish houses should be taken in preference to the properties of all Allied subjects.⁴⁵

While we do not know how many Turkish houses the Allies requisitioned, it would be safe to assume that they occupied a significant number of well-to-do houses. There was another dimension to forced requisitions besides material loss for the Turks; it was a daily reminder that they were the vanquished party.

Overcrowding in the city also affected sanitation. The Inter-Allied Urban Sanitary Commission took preventive measures against the spread of microbes. The Commission prevented meat from being sold in the open. In addition, a special hospital was established to treat victims of venereal disease. The Commission was supported by the Turkish and Inter-Allied police in controlling houses of ill-repute.⁴⁶ Venereal disease must have been widespread among the soldiers, because the French Ministry of War was compelled to issue an order to its soldiers in Istanbul that they should use a certain protec-

⁴³ FMA 20N1091 C/27 Dos1, November 18, 1921.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ FMA 20N1091 C/27 Dos1, December 8, 1921.

⁴⁶ FMA 20N1183 C/113 Dos6, June 28, 1922, "Prophylaxie Anti-venerienne Individuelle."

tive device (which was distributed by the local command) before visiting such houses.⁴⁷

Thousands of Allied soldiers who crowded the cafés and the red light districts did not bother İstanbul's Turkish citizens. These places were located in Pera, which was off-limits to the majority of the Muslims, because it was considered to be the vice sector as well as being very expensive. However, the Turks were disturbed when some Senegalese soldiers harassed women on the streets. As a result, Turkish women did not go out on the streets unless they absolutely had to.

Saluting, requisitioning, and sanitary affairs were but samples of the issues the Allied administration addressed. Its major function, that of controlling disarmament, will be taken up in Chapters VI and VII.

There was a subtle side to the Allied occupation, in the form of propaganda. Both the Turks and the Allies tried to win over the other by propaganda. Allied propaganda involved military parades, celebration of the King's birthday, celebration of the French Independence Day, Harington Cup football games, and promotion of French culture. In 1920, a French culture salon was established near the St. Sophia Mosque where lectures, discussions and debates took place, films were shown, and readings in French literature were held; admission was free.⁴⁸

In an effort to promote Turkish-French friendship, the Pierre Loti Association was formed by Turks on January 10, 1920. Its aim was to popularize the books of the Turcophile French author.⁴⁹ On July 18, 1920, the İstanbul municipality placed commemorative plaques on the houses where Pierre Loti resided. Further, Loti was bestowed honorary citizenship of İstanbul.⁵⁰ In 1922, two avenues in Cağaloğlu in the Old City were dedicated to Pierre Loti and Claude Farrère in gratitude for their support of the Turkish cause.⁵¹

Sports was the only medium which brought the Turks and British together in public, but not until 1923. In March 1923, the Fenerbahçe football team played with a British team composed of players from the Irish and Grenadier Guards; and the Harington Cup went to the Turkish team.⁵²

⁴⁷ "Fransız İstihbarat Salonu," *Alemdar*, June 17, 1920, p. 3, c. 3.

⁴⁸ "Piyer Loti Cemiyeti," *Alemdar*, January 11, 1920, p. 1, c. 2.

⁴⁹ "La Maison de Pierre Loti à Stamboul," *L'Illustration* (July 29, 1920): 25.

⁵⁰ "Les Avenues Pierre Loti et Claude Farrère," *Echos de l'Islam* 45 (February 15, 1922): 24-25.

⁵¹ Ergun Hıçılmaz, *Türk Spor Tarihi* (İstanbul: n.p., 1974), p. 61.

⁵² Rumbold Papers, Nos. 111-112, February 28, 1922. From Rumbold to Oliphant.

Until 1922, the Allied relief agencies concentrated specifically on helping the Russian, Greek and Armenian refugees and the needy. At that time, the plight of Turkish refugees had become a propaganda issue for the Allies. Sir Horace Rumbold noted how refugee relief had become a point of competition among the Allies,

Talking of propaganda, there is rather an amusing state of affairs at present. The British community have put their backs into the work of relieving as many Turkish refugees as possible. Block has collected quite a considerable sum, the Haringtons have opened a subscription and organized a ball last night which must have brought in many hundreds of pounds of sterling. The Sultan has subscribed Ltq. 500 to the Harington's fund and altogether some 3,500 pounds have been collected, which I think you will agree is a good effort for a community which has already had to put its hand into its pocket freely for the Russians. The wily Turk has not been slow to improve the occasion. He has boomed our efforts in order to stimulate the French and to a lesser extent the Italians to go one better than ourselves. This they are incapable of doing. The result is that whilst the French can say nothing, they are by no means pleased. I am told that the Turkish papers say that Pellé considers our efforts on behalf of the Turkish refugees in the nature of British propaganda.⁵³

By March 20, Sir Horace reported that the British were feeding some 4,000 Muslim refugees and the French 1,800. The British community in İstanbul formed a committee to aid Turkish refugees. An appeal to the British community stated that 25,000 war victims lacked shelter and food. The French Red Cross built a shelter for 1,800 refugees. In Paris, 25,000 francs were raised and transferred through the French Red Cross to help the destitute Turks.⁵⁴

A French journalist who visited İstanbul in July 1922, described the city and its inhabitants:

Il est (sic) deux Constantinople bien distinctes: celle qu'on pourrait baptiser Constantinopolis, Tzarigrad, Gibraltar, -et Stamboul qui est resté, autravers des âges, la Stamboul de Suleiman. La première Constantinople, c'est Péra et Galata, tout à fait européenne avec une foule grouillante de Levantines, de Grecs, d'Arméniens et de Juifs. Péra, c'est le tumulte continuel: le jour comme la nuit, cris, trépidation intense, cornes et sirènes d'automobiles. Galata, c'est la Bourse, le refuge des petits changeurs, le repaire de toute la spéculation malhonnête, c'est le quartier des marins, des altercations et des bouges. Péra et Galata sont occupées par les troupes anglaises: l'état de siège renforcé y rend souverains le marin et le

⁵³ *Ibid.*, March 20, 1922.

⁵⁴ "La Grande Pitié Des Réfugiés à Constantinople," *Echos de l'Islam* 46 (March 15, 1922): 42.

soldat anglais, ivres-morts le jour comme le nuit. Stamboul est occupé par les troupes français. Elles y déploient une grande aménité et fraternisent avec les Turcs... C'est à Stamboul qu'on voit les bannières rouges étoilées, prohibées à Galata et à Péra; c'est à Stamboul qu'on voit les effigies de Moustapha Kemal à la devanture de la plupart des boutiques; c'est à Stamboul qu'on sent la force considérable du mouvement nationaliste. Sur la rive asiatique, Skutari est aux mains des Italiens qui, semblant se désintéresser de leur mission, s'abandonnent aux charmes de l'Orient.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Jacques Kayser, "Impressions de Constantinople," *Echos de L'Orient* 53-54 (1, 15 July, 1922): 187-188.

CHAPTER FIVE

AN ALLIED DILEMMA

While the Italians enjoyed the charms of the East, the French had the responsibility of dealing with the Russian refugees. As a consequence of the Russian influx into İstanbul, the Allies had to control another problem—that of Bolshevik propaganda, for there were Bolshevik agents among the refugees as well as agents who entered İstanbul freely after the British-Soviet Trade Agreement was signed in 1921.

The red scare that was sweeping Europe at the time forced the Allies to direct their attention to the Turkish left as well. Among the leftist parties in İstanbul the Turkish Socialist Party (henceforth, TSP) had the largest following. Therefore, the Allied administration focused on this party.

Genuine leftists found İstanbul to be a convenient location to organize. Ankara's short-lived experiment with a Turkish Communist Party was less than convincing to the true left. Mustafa Kemal had assigned his close friends and army commanders to the Turkish Communist Party that he had established. When another group tried to organize a communist party, Mustafa Kemal broke up their organization and had the members put on trial. Therefore, the "independent" communist/socialist parties that were formed in İstanbul represented the true believers in leftism of various shades. Among the parties with socialist and communist leanings in İstanbul were the Social Democratic Party, the Turkish Workers' and Farmers' Socialist Party, and the Armenian Socialist Party (the Hintchacks).¹

The Turkish Workers' and Farmers' Socialist Party (Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Partisi) had been established by some Turkish students in Germany in 1918. Some of its members supported the German Social Democrats and others joined the Spartakists. When these students returned to Turkey, the Spartakists among them, having become communists just like their German counterparts, re-established the party. But by 1920, the party lost its revolutionary character "because a number of bourgeois infiltrated the party and changed the principle of revolution into the principle of admitting workers and

¹ Fethi Tevetoğlu, *Türkiye'de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler (1910-1960)* (Ankara: n.p. 1967), p. 82.

soldat anglais, ivres-morts le jour comme le nuit. Stamboul est occupé par les troupes français. Elles y déploient une grande aménité et fraternisent avec les Turcs... C'est à Stamboul qu'on voit les bannières rouges étoilées, prohibées à Galata et à Péra; c'est à Stamboul qu'on voit les effigies de Moustapha Kemal à la devanture de la plupart des boutiques; c'est à Stamboul qu'on sent la force considérable du mouvement nationaliste. Sur la rive asiatique, Skutari est aux mains des Italiens qui, semblant se désintéresser de leur mission, s'abandonnent aux charmes de l'Orient.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Jacques Kayser, "Impressions de Constantinople," *Echos de L'Orient* 53-54 (1, 15 July, 1922): 187-188.

CHAPTER FIVE

AN ALLIED DILEMMA

While the Italians enjoyed the charms of the East, the French had the responsibility of dealing with the Russian refugees. As a consequence of the Russian influx into İstanbul, the Allies had to control another problem—that of Bolshevik propaganda, for there were Bolshevik agents among the refugees as well as agents who entered İstanbul freely after the British-Soviet Trade Agreement was signed in 1921.

The red scare that was sweeping Europe at the time forced the Allies to direct their attention to the Turkish left as well. Among the leftist parties in İstanbul the Turkish Socialist Party (henceforth, TSP) had the largest following. Therefore, the Allied administration focused on this party.

Genuine leftists found İstanbul to be a convenient location to organize. Ankara's short-lived experiment with a Turkish Communist Party was less than convincing to the true left. Mustafa Kemal had assigned his close friends and army commanders to the Turkish Communist Party that he had established. When another group tried to organize a communist party, Mustafa Kemal broke up their organization and had the members put on trial. Therefore, the "independent" communist/socialist parties that were formed in İstanbul represented the true believers in leftism of various shades. Among the parties with socialist and communist leanings in İstanbul were the Social Democratic Party, the Turkish Workers' and Farmers' Socialist Party, and the Armenian Socialist Party (the Hintchacks).¹

The Turkish Workers' and Farmers' Socialist Party (Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Partisi) had been established by some Turkish students in Germany in 1918. Some of its members supported the German Social Democrats and others joined the Spartakists. When these students returned to Turkey, the Spartakists among them, having become communists just like their German counterparts, re-established the party. But by 1920, the party lost its revolutionary character "because a number of bourgeois infiltrated the party and changed the principle of revolution into the principle of admitting workers and

¹ Fethi Tevetoglu, *Türkiye'de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler (1910-1960)* (Ankara: n.p. 1967), p. 82.

peasants into government through elections."² Shortly afterwards, the party ceased its activity perhaps because its leaders suspected that the Allies might dissolve it as a measure against potential communist agitation in the city. From then on, the members supported the Turkish Communist Party.³ This party was legal for only a short period of time and then went underground.⁴

The Prospect of Bolshevik Subversion

Early in 1920, the positions of Admiral Alexander Vasilevich Kolchak (d. 1920) (in Siberia) and General Anton Ivanovich Denikin (1872-1947) (in Ukraine) became untenable vis-à-vis the Bolsheviks. General Denikin had surrounded himself with bad advisers and underpaid his men. Hence, they plundered the territories they occupied. Moreover, his political ineptitude proved disastrous. Instead of collaborating with the other enemies of Bolshevism such as Romania, Poland and the Caucasian states, he tried to restore Russia's 1914 frontiers. He alienated potential allies by fighting them as well as the Bolsheviks. By the time General Peter Nicolaevich Wrangel (1878-1928) succeeded Denikin, it was too late to save the situation.⁵ Shortly afterwards, an exodus from southern Russia was to begin. On January 21, 1920, 450 sick and wounded soldiers from Denikin's army arrived in Malta, but were refused permission to disembark there, because of typhus on board. In addition, the Allies made preparations to evacuate 25,000 refugees from the Crimea. Admiral de Robeck and General Milne wanted to ship 50,000 wounded Russians, women and children from southern Russia, but did not know where to ship them.⁶

On November 5, 1920, General Wrangel informed General Broussaud, Chief of the French Military Mission in the Crimea, that he was planning to evacuate. Admiral de Bon, Commander of the French Naval Forces in Istanbul, reported to the War Ministry that the French forces would aid Wrangel's army on humanitarian

² Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar 3rd ed.* (Ankara: Bilgi Yaymevi, 1978), pp. 306-307. After the Turkish victory, the Turkish Workers' and Farmers' Socialist Party began to work again, but the Ankara government arrested twenty of its leading members, because the party brochure allegedly encouraged the forceful take-over of government.

³ The Turkish Communist Party regained its revolutionary character perhaps because it survived underground and abroad.

⁴ Luke, *Cities and Men*, pp. 88-90; Taylor, "Many Happy Returns," p. 58.

⁵ Calwell, *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson*, 1: 225.

⁶ Jean Bernachot, *Les Armées Françaises en Orient Après l'Armistice de 1918* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1970), pp. 51-52.

grounds.⁷ The French government did not agree with Wrangel's proposal to be transferred to Romania, from where he could launch an attack on the Bolsheviks in Ukraine, or to be transferred to Georgia and Armenia, from where he could fight both the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists.⁸

On November 16, forty-five French and Russian ships brought approximately 70,000 Russian soldiers and civilians to Istanbul. Another 40,000 awaited transportation from the Crimea. The British and Italians declared neutrality and did not participate in the evacuation. "Our Government," wrote General Harington, "had said that the responsibility had rested entirely on the French and that we were not to assist, but I defy anyone who witnessed that scene to have refused help."⁹ Boats which normally accommodated 2,500 people, were filled with 8 to 10,000. Naval ships, torpedo boats, submarines, and auxiliary, merchant, and cargo ships brought 148,678 Whites to Istanbul by November 24, 1920. The French had to organize quickly. By November 27, 62,000 Russian military refugees were sent to camps in Çatalca, Thrace (Don Cossacks), Gallipoli (the regular army), and Mudros (Kuban Cossacks). A Council of Immigration was formed to help the refugees emigrate elsewhere, but only 35,000 were accepted by the Balkan states and Tunisia.¹⁰ This still left 100,000 under French care, which became burdensome and expensive.

All the while, General Wrangel refused to disperse his army. General Harington empathized with the French who tried to manage the Russian refugees on their own. He supported General Charpy in the effort to convince Wrangel that the army should be dispersed. Since there were no competing interests between Britain and France regarding the Russian refugees, General Harington was free to demonstrate his solidarity to his French colleague. In March 1921, he made another gesture of support.

I enclose a copy of a paragraph which I've caused to be deleted from the Poldhu Press of today's date on the ground that its appearance would be objectionable to you. Copy reads, "Constantinople reports French Government informed General Wrangel that it is unable to incur further expense on account of his army. The French offer to repatriate his men to Russia after securing an amnesty or to help them to emigrate to South America or they would accept his services and those of men in the French Foreign Legion. Wrangel issued a strong protest appealing for a postponement of the dissolution of the last anti-Bolshevist Army."¹¹

⁷ Bernachot, *Les Armées Françaises*, p. 55.

⁸ Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back*, p. 101.

⁹ Bernachot, *Les Armées Françaises*, p. 75.

¹⁰ FMA 20N1104 C38/2 n.n., March 22, 1921.

¹¹ FMA 20N1184 C/114 Dos2, August 20, 1921.

General Charpy thanked the British general for preventing French government plans for the Russians from being publicized. Occasions like these were rare when the Allies showed goodwill towards each other.

It was not until February 1922 that General Wrangel left for Belgium. Meanwhile Bolshevik propaganda among the refugees posed a threat to the Allies. In July 1921, a French intelligence report warned of Bolshevik agents who had infiltrated into Istanbul pretending to be genuine refugees.

Mais, il existe actuellement à Constantinople une classe formée de réfugiés débarqués clandestinement des bateaux, enfuis des camps où venus de l'étranger en fraude. Les individus qui la composent, ayant trompé la vigilance des Autorités Alliées en se soustrayant au contrôle des passeports, constituent à présent un milieu interlope propice à la propagande bolcheviste, capable de fomenter des troubles et de susciter des difficultés aux troupes alliées, au cas d'intervention. Ce genre spécial de réfugiés se livre à la vente de cocaïne et autres stupéfiants, fréquente les bars suspects et les boîtes de nuits équivoques, vit de la traite des blanches et de la prostitution publique, s'adonne au trafic des faux passeports et mène toutes sortes d'intrigues, nuisibles à l'heure actuelle, où les esprits sont très excités en raison des événements, pourraient donner lieu à des faits regrettables (sic).¹²

The intelligence officer recommended that all unemployed refugees in the city and criminals should be identified and deported, either to other countries or back to Russia. Soviet and Armenian Bolshevik agents had supposedly infiltrated the unemployed, which the Allied authorities feared would lead to anarchy and the spread of communism in Istanbul. Such reports were taken seriously enough to prompt crackdowns on suspected Bolshevik agents, whom General Harington deported to Russia.¹³ It is not possible to say whether the deportees were genuine Bolshevik agents or not. However, the activity indicates how prevalent red scare was among the Allies. On January 2, 1921, the British arrested Russians, Greeks, Germans and Muslims believed to be Bolshevik agents.¹⁴ On June 29, approximately 100 Russian officers and soldiers were arrested as suspected Bolsheviks.¹⁵

The United States Vice-Consul, Robert Imbrie, reported that Bolshevik activity in Istanbul was less "energetic" than it was in Europe. Imbrie explained this on the grounds that the Russian colony in

¹² FMA 20N1112 C/48 Dos3, July 15, 1921. From Harington to Charpy.

¹³ TITE 39D/1423, January 2, 1921.

¹⁴ Ibid., 39D/14626, n.d.

¹⁵ U.S. Records 867.00/1073, February 25, 1921.

Istanbul consisted mostly of the members of the intelligentsia, who were extremely hostile to Bolshevism. In addition, the national and religious feelings of the Turks undermined the potential attraction of Bolshevism. Although Bolsheviks may have been less active in Istanbul than in Europe, Imbrie's premises for discounting a potential danger were far too optimistic. Bolshevik leaders were also *intelligently* and there was a group of genuine Turkish communists, regardless of nationalistic or religious feelings. However, the United States Vice-Consul thought that Bolshevik threat was far less serious than the British and French officials thought it was.

Bolshevik literature for propaganda does not appear unless the appeals, "Address to the Soldiers of Wrangel's Army" can be so considered. No Bolshevik newspaper is printed. Local Bolsheviks are not disposing of any great sums of money. No Highly organized propaganda has appeared, though from time to time agitators appear in small restaurants, cafes and clubs and places frequented by the most destitute of the Russian refugees. With the exception of the camp at Chatalja, there has been no indication of sympathy towards bolshevism among either the soldiers or the civil refugees. In the Chatalja camp, occupied by the Don Cossacks, there has been a certain amount of sympathy towards the bolsheviks, this having been related to the propaganda of Col. Gniloriboff, a member of the (?) backed by the Bolshevik agent Kousnetzoff, Pera Palace Hotel.¹⁶

The head of the Bolshevik espionage service in Istanbul, according to Imbrie, was a former colonel of the Tsar's army, a certain Vinogradov. He reported to a sailor named Lobanov. Both men were working with a Jewish lawyer, Aisenberg, who at the time was under arrest.¹⁷ It appeared that the Bolsheviks' mission in Istanbul was mainly to gather intelligence from major European countries and transmit it to Moscow. Given the state of occupation, the Bolsheviks could not have hoped to foment an armed uprising in the city. However, their presence was a constant source of irritation to the Allies, who kept a close watch over Bolshevik liaisons.

Le parti communiste russe de Constantinople est en liaison avec tous les groupes qui sont en opposition avec les autorités légalement constituées, ainsi il est en relations avec les comités kémalistes, sionistes, balcaniques et vénizelistes; ces derniers seuls ont une directions (sic) d'un caractère particulier qui leur permet d'échapper à l'influence du communisme. Le comité national turc ou kémaliste reçoit ses directives d'Angora. Toute une série de moyens sont employés en vue d'une liaison efficace et rapide

¹⁶ U.S. Records 867.00/1073, February 25, 1921.

¹⁷ FMA 20N1106 C38/4 Dos1, November 17, 1921. "Aperçu sur le Comité Communiste de Constantinople et sur ses liaisons."

avec Constantinople et principalement par: La Mission Soviétiste à Angora, les voiliers lazes, la Mission Soviétiste de Constantinople. Les principaux groupements communistes kémalistes à Constantinople sont: Le groupe des lazes; d° d'Ali Bey à Beicos; d° de Kara Mehmed; d° de Hassan (batelier à Beicos).¹⁸

The official Turkish Communist Party in Ankara as well as communist organizations such as the "Green Army" and the People's Socialist Party (Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası) were closed early in 1921. However, the communist Kemalist groups mentioned in the French intelligence report of November 1921, may have continued to perform intelligence work among the foreign communists in İstanbul. Mustafa Kemal had closed the legal Turkish Communist Party and the other leftist organizations in Anatolia because their liaisons went beyond his control. Moreover, he could not afford any more factions in the National Assembly than already existed; especially on the eve of a final battle with the Greeks. While Mustafa Kemal maintained an intelligence cell in İstanbul which the French interpreted as being communist, he also supported anti-Bolshevik activity.

Une comité islamique contre les principes bolchevistes vient d'être créé à Constantinople par le nommé Kémal TAGHIB Bey, colonel en retraite, qui fut pendant la guerre la favori des unionistes et se fit, de ce fait, une fortune assez ronde en se livrant à des opérations commerciales plus ou moins honnêtes, sous la protection du fameux Topal ISMAIL Pacha, président de la commission du ravitaillement... Ayant trouvé le moyen d'entrer en correspondance avec le gouvernement d'Angora, par des émissaires envoyé en cette ville, il finit par se mettre dans les bonnes grâces de Moustafa Kemal et se fit nommer à Constantinople, il y a deux mois environ, agent-représentant du gouvernement Kémaliste en remplacement du colonel Kara MOUSTAFA Bey, inculpé d'avoir commis un d'tournement de 72.000 Ltqs. au détriment du trésor nationaliste... D'après les renseignements recueillis, Kémal RAGHIB agirait actuellement ici pour compte des bolchevistes et son but serait de réunir et de grouper les personnalités musulmanes ayant une certaine influence en Turquie et dans les différentes pays islamiques.¹⁹

The İstanbul Bolshevik center used Russian firms and commercial representatives to conduct their business. The commercial delegation of Russian and Ukrainian Cooperatives in İstanbul was particularly suspect.

S'occupe en apparence uniquement de questions commerciaux. Résultats commerciaux à peu près nuls, obligeant les soviets à envoyer des

¹⁸ FMA 20N1106 C38/4 Dos1, August 26, 1921. "Comité Islamique Anti-Bolcheviste."

¹⁹ FMA 20N1104 C38/1 Dos2, June 28, 1921.

délégués spéciaux pour toute affaire commerciale importante (Ex: SEREBROWSKY, KOUSNIETSOFF, etc.) Le surveillance exercée prouve les relations de cette organisation avec le S.R. bolchévique et autres organisations communistes à Constantinople. Subsidés des petits cafés, restaurants, hôtels borgnes de quartiers populeux, fréquentées par les troupes alliés.²⁰

The Allies first arrested suspects and then sat down to discuss the problem with the president of the commercial mission. On June 29, eighteen members of the Russian commercial delegation were arrested and General Harington deported half of them. The British government spokesman explained the incident away in connection with an assassination plot that was discovered against General Harington.²¹ Later, the Allied High Commissioners communicated to the mission's president their disapproval of the number of Russians who entered İstanbul in the guise of commercial delegates. The High Commissioners accepted the Soviet official's response, that only those who could obtain a visa from the British representative in Moscow should be allowed in İstanbul.²² However, the High Commissioners had to refer this problem to their respective governments, because getting a visa from a British representative to enter Ottoman-Turkish territory was not only awkward, but also could have been inapplicable. Subsequently, Bolshevik groups in İstanbul dwindled as financing from Russian commercial representatives stopped.

While most of the French intelligence reports regarding illegal Bolshevik groups in İstanbul may be exaggerated, and many refugees may have been labelled "Bolshevik" and arrested simply because they were Russian or Jewish, the issue sheds light on how fearful the Allies were of communism. They were particularly concerned with communist propaganda among their own soldiers. The French intelligence service had established that Bolshevik agents were in contact with British and French soldiers in the cafés and stores of Galata. Further, a number of French soldiers had been sympathizers of the October Revolution.²³ Allied surveillance of Bolshevik activity and the deportation of suspected agents proved effective. The problem, however, took up much time and caused the preparation of endless reports.

²⁰ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "İngiliz Parlamentosunda Türkiye Üzerine Tartışmalar (1919-1923)," in *Seha L. Meray'a Armağan*, 2: 463.

²¹ FMA 20N1104 C38/1 Dos2, June 28, 1921.

²² Paul Dumont, "Les Organisations Socialistes et la Propagande Communiste A İstanbul Pendant L'Occupation Alliée—1918-1922," *Etudes Balkaniques* (Bulgaria) 4 (1979): 48.

²³ Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar*, pp. 70-83; Kemal Sülker, *Türkiye'de İşçi Hareketleri* 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1973), pp. 23-25.

The influx of Russian refugees distracted the occupiers from monitoring Nationalist activity in Istanbul; by 1921, it was impossible for the Allies to make a concentrated effort to quell it.

The Turkish Labor Force, Leftist Movements and Strikes

The Allies had to watch the Turkish left as well for two reasons. First, they did not want public order in Istanbul to be disturbed by strikes that the Turkish Socialist Party led. Second, they had to ascertain whether or not there were Bolsheviks among the Turkish leftists.

It was generally accepted that leftist movements in Turkey began after the 1908 Constitutional Revolution, but remained insignificant until 1918. The CUP did not allow any form of political opposition between 1913 and 1919. Among the CUP's many political exiles from Istanbul were the socialists. The President of the Socialist Party, Hüseyin Hilmi, returned to Istanbul and re-established his party as soon as a general amnesty was declared after the Armistice. While in exile, Hilmi had become friends with Mustafa Sabri Efendi, of the FEP, and benefitted from the protection of this party when his friend became Sheikhulislam in the Damad Ferid Pasha cabinets. By declaring himself the permanent leader of the TSP, Hilmi established a dictatorship over his followers as of July 20, 1919. The TSP led the successful strike of the shipbuilding yards and docks in October 1919. During 1920, the TSP supported the tanners', shipyard and trolley strikes.²⁴ May 1, 1921 was celebrated as Labor Day under the auspices of the TSP.²⁵ The Ottoman Chief of Police, who equated socialist activity with Bolshevism (hence, anarchy), suggested to the Inter-Allied Police that some measures should be taken to control Bolshevism:

Even though the Socialist Party today is anti-Bolshevik, in the event that they insist on strikes and if the labor leaders cannot control these strikes, the TSP may present serious difficulties for the country. Although the Socialist Party is made up of respectable people, we do not know that they will always remain so. Therefore, we should win them over as a contingency measure.²⁶

In fact, there was no need to worry about Bolshevism in the TSP. The party was severely criticized in Russia. Moscow accused Hilmi of

²⁴ Tunçay, *Ibid.*

²⁵ FMA 20N1101 C/37 Dos3, June 8, 1921.

²⁶ "The Socialist Party in Turkey," Narodnyi komissariat po inostrannym delam, *Biulleten* 92 (September 1920), p. 81.

being a British agent and claimed that his party had no principles any more than it had anything to do with scientific socialism, because it adhered to the "revisionist" German school of socialism.²⁷ But the French intelligence thought otherwise. "De son côté, Hilmi, chef du parti socialiste, est affilié au Bolchevisme plus encore qu'au nationalisme. Il dispose de 18,000 socialistes plus ou moins armés dont 15,000 environ sont nationalistes-bolchévistes."²⁸

It is questionable how these socialists were armed in an occupied city where the possession of even small knives, let alone guns and munitions, was a crime. However, it is significant that the TSP had 18,000 members out of a labor force approximately 40,000 strong. Whatever may be said about Hilmi, he was definitely not a Bolshevik or a Nationalist in the sense that Ankara defined Nationalism. According to the memoirs of an old socialist, Hilmi had refused to distribute leaflets which were brought from Russia. Leaflets written in English, French and Italian encouraged the soldiers of the Allied occupation force to rebel against their officers. Leaflets written in Turkish called on the people to support the Anatolian resistance. Hilmi claimed that it would be too dangerous to distribute the leaflets; therefore, the Turkish underground distributed them.²⁹ It is plausible that a copy of a leaflet in Turkish might have found its way to Admiral Bristol, who erroneously assumed that it was written by Mustafa Kemal since it had been distributed among Turkish soldiers. The text read as follows:

Brothers of this land, communists and comrades. Some unscrupulous and dishonest statesman decided around the green cloth to smash and divide the unfortunate nation bequeathed to us by our forefathers. Not contented with this they pronounced our death sentence. They want us to sign the verdict with our own hands. The Turkish people and Turkish hospitality have never been smirched by such a disgrace. Turkish hands will revolt to fixing the Mussulman seal to such a disgraceful document. Our country is dragged into war. They have hurled against us the most hated race, a race which has torn from us our beloved Smyrna, and is now trying to do the same with Thrace, the cradle of Turkism... President Wilson's 12th principle which grants us the right of existence has been trampled upon... Brothers of this land, communists and comrades, an abominable

²⁷ FMA 20N1104 C38/1 Dos2, n.d. "Rapport du Capitaine Amalric, Chef du S.R. Sur l'état Actuel Des Esprits et des Milieux Perturbateurs dans la Ville de Constantinople."

²⁸ Tunçay, "Kurtuluş Savaşında Solcularla Mim Mimcilerin İlişkisi," *Milliyet Sanat Dergisi* 260: 25 (January 16, 1978), p. 25.

²⁹ U.S. Records 867.00/1329, July 19, 1920. From Bristol to Secretary of State.

³⁰ *The New York Times*, August 19, 1920, p. 3, c. 2.

crime is about to be perpetrated. Great Powers have decided to exterminate us. A new victory will be scored by the capitalists and a new military victory is agonising. We will die with weapons in hand in defense of the sacred portions of our country...³⁰

It is not likely that Mustafa Kemal addressed his own rank and file as "brothers," or "comrades." However, in August 1920, *The New York Times* reported that Mustafa Kemal had declared Bolshevism and Islam compatible. He said, "Turkey could not possibly suffer a worse fate than the destruction planned for her in the Peace Treaty."³¹ If the report was true, Mustafa Kemal must have spoken in this manner either to challenge the Allies or out of desperation, or both. Nonetheless, such reports must have influenced the Allied intelligence, which at times, equated the Nationalists and Bolsheviks. Hilmi had nothing to do with any of these, but he was suspect by inference.

Hilmi's popularity among the workers began to diminish when he led an unsuccessful strike of trolley workers against a French-owned company. Hilmi tried unsuccessfully to attract the workers of the Electric Company to join the strike.³² According to an Imperial decree, workers could not begin a strike before they exhausted every possible means of reconciliation with the employer. Based on this principle, Hilmi tried, but failed, to get a hearing from the Turkish authorities. On October 20, 1921, Hilmi complained to an intermediary, the Italian General Mombelli, who informed the Allied High Commissioners,

It was understood from HILMI, who spoke with considerable emotion though without heat, that the men were still dissatisfied with the treatment which they were obtaining from the Company, and that they had given him 48 hours in which to take definite steps for redress, failing which he asked permission to the strike to proceed.³³

Since a trolley workers' strike would be a major inconvenience in this overcrowded city, General Mombelli urged the High Commissioners to press the Ottoman government to mediate between the Trolley Company and the workers.³⁴ Nonetheless, a two-day strike took place on October 29 and 30. Even after the two-day strike, the Company still did not satisfy the grievances of the workers. By December 1921, another strike loomed and the High Commissioners feared one that might spread to a general strike. Hilmi showed General Mombelli written agreements between the management and the workers which

³¹ FMA 20N1104 C38/1 Dos2, May 19, 1921.

³² FMA 20N106 C38/4 Dos1, October 20, 1921.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ FMA 20N1091 C/27 Dos1, December 13, 1921.

the former failed to honor. General Mombelli advised Hilmi to apply to the Ottoman government, but Hilmi pointed out that the Trolley Company was in a position to bribe officials. General Pellé intervened and put pressure on the French-owned company.³⁵ General Harington proposed to set up an independent arbitration board to look into the matter, but at the same time he stated that he would not intervene in the event of a strike.³⁶ On January 28, 1922, Hilmi encouraged the workers to impede work as much as possible. A French gendarmery officer and a Turkish policeman rode those trolley cars that remained in service and invited the individual strikers to return to work. By February 6, Hilmi was still unable to persuade all the workers to join the strike, despite his call for solidarity, published in the *İstanbul papers*.³⁷

Hilmi had a reputation as a person who could be bought. Once before, he had been rewarded with a limousine from an unknown source for stopping a certain strike. This time, French intelligence reported that he received money to encourage the trolley strike. A confidential French report stated that on January 9, 1922, two British officers visited the TSP Headquarters and paid Hilmi a sum of money which was to be used during the next strike. On January 18, the same officers came again and were told that the strike was ready. On January 26, the strike began.³⁸ Yet, we know from Hilmi's appeal to the workers in February that this was not a general strike. It is plausible that the British might have paid him off to stop the strike, not to encourage it. There does not seem to be any reason why the British, especially at the level of military officers, would desire disruption of the public order in *İstanbul*. The French report only serves to show how suspicious they were of the British.

In the end, the Trolley Company fired sixty of the strikers and broke the strike. On November 15, 1922, Hilmi was murdered mysteriously.³⁹ Şakir Rasim, Hilmi's assistant, was elected president of the TSP. Through the summer of 1922, Şakir Rasim had worked hard to explain his party's stance to the Allied High Commissioners. On May 16, 1922, he wrote,

J'ai l'honneur de venir par la présente vous communiquer ci-inclus une copie des Résolutions adoptées le 1⁰ Mai 1922 au grand mee-

³⁵ Ibid., December 20, 1921.

³⁶ FMA 20N1106 C38/4 Dos1, February 7, 1922.

³⁷ FMA 20N1106 C38/4 Dos1, February 12, 1922. Cf. Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar*, p. 82.

³⁸ Tevetoğlu, *Türkiye'de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler*, pp. 70-81.

³⁹ FMA 20N1105 C38/3 n.n. May 16, 1922.

ting ouvrier de Kiat-Hané ainsi qu'une note y relative, Le Parti Socialiste de Turquie affilié à la 2^e Internationale (Londres) et non à la 3^e (Moscou) accepte toutes les décisions inscrites dans la résolution en-jointe, sauf la 1^o qui touche aux questions des principes, étant d'une portée internationale, et sur laquelle il ne peut donner son accord sans avoir été autorisé par le bureau de la 2^e Internationale situé actuellement à Londres. En espérant que Leurs Excellences voudront bien prendre en sérieuse considération les autres décisions des masses ouvrières de notre ville vu que ces décisions sont d'un caractère l'assurance de notre parfaite considération (sic).⁴⁰

Şakir Rasim had found it expedient to leave out the first provision of the TSP's resolution, which had been endorsed by the Second International. The provision opposed all laws based on the recognition of private property. The rest of the resolution requested that an eight-hour work day be initiated for all workers; that the Russian refugees be removed from İstanbul because they contributed to unemployment and took jobs away from Turkish workers by accepting jobs at lower pay; that the war in Anatolia be ended so that workers and peasants would not further suffer financial hardship; that public work projects in İstanbul be developed; that the Electric and Trolley Companies be publicly condemned; that trade unions be established; and that elementary education should be free.⁴¹

Şakir Rasim wrote to General Charpy complaining that twenty-two of the workers fired from the Trolley Company happened to be registered with the TSP, although only one of them was accused of participating in the strike. Şakir took the occasion to remind the French general that the TSP's socialism was of the non-violent, European variety.

Les plupart des ouvriers de notre ville sont adhérents à notre Parti qui est affilié à la 2^e Internationale; la 3^e cellé de Moscou est extrémiste-communiste. Notre Parti, est modéré pacifique et raisonnable et tâche d'inspirer les mêmes idées aux masses ouvrières sur lesquelles il damine (sic).⁴²

Şakir asked General Charpy to help him extract retirement benefits and life insurance for the workers from "exploiting" companies.⁴³

The majority of the Turkish leftists were not Bolshevik. However, some had studied in Russian universities, others became communists while they were prisoners of war in Russia, yet others embraced socialism or communism as students in Germany. The Allies watched all Turkish leftists. It is significant that the Turkish Workers' and

Farmers' Socialist Party, which was the prototype of the Turkish Communist Party, was closed after March 16, 1920. The party could not have functioned in an occupied city. The Turkish Socialist Party never presented a real challenge to Allied authority, because it did not harbor radicals. But the party managed to keep the Allies busy by the strikes it inspired. At the same time, the Allies were constantly on alert for potential radicalism in the TSP. The Turkish left and labor movements were additional diversions that kept the occupiers occupied; the underground resistance became the beneficiary of such distractions.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ FMA 20N1104 C38/2 n.n. n.d.

⁴² Ibid.

CHAPTER SIX

RESISTANCE AND UNDERGROUND
ORGANIZATIONS IN İSTANBUL (1918-1920):
CUP INTELLIGENCE AND KARAKOL

The History of active resistance to occupation in İstanbul is an account of the organizational continuity between the CUP and the Nationalist Movement. The leading actors in most of the institutions changed, but systems that served the Nationalist cause remained intact.

Members of the CUP's intelligence organization, *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa* (Special Organization, henceforth TM), transferred their activities to the resistance. While TM functioned clandestinely from the Ministry of War during the first years of the Armistice, the CUP also founded another group, *Karakol* (Black Arm/Police).

The ultimate defense strategy of the CUP was to continue to fight from a base in Anatolia if the war was lost. It is in this spirit that *Karakol* smuggled arms and men to Anatolia. Once Mustafa Kemal took up the leadership of the Nationalist Movement, he tried to curb any CUP activity, including that of *Karakol*. At the same time, he inherited a ready-made organizational base in İstanbul from which he derived intelligence, aid, and supportive propaganda. These organizations were specifically the TM, the guilds, the Ottoman Red Crescent Society (Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti), businessmen, women's associations and the Ottoman Ministry of War.

After the *de jure* occupation of İstanbul, most of the Nationalist activists were exiled to Malta by the British. Therefore, new resistance cells were established under Ankara's control. These groups functioned in the same boroughs as *Karakol* had previously, under the guidance of the remaining, less well-known Nationalists.

Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization)

Before the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, intelligence in the Ottoman Empire was gathered in the classical fashion through diplomatic missions abroad. At home, Sultan Abdülhamid II had devised a network of informants who spied on and denounced people who opposed absolutism.¹ This type of intelligence work was confined to

¹ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam* (İstanbul: Ahmed Saki Bey Matbaası, 1325). I am indebted to Dr. Selçuk Esenbel and Dr. Selim Deringil of the Bosphorus Univer-

the Ottoman subjects who might entertain ideas of freedom and a constitutional monarchy. Whether Abdülhamid had any intelligence agents on his pay abroad for any purpose other than to follow the activities of the Young Turks or to find out whether the Japanese were ready to accept Islam, is not clear.²

The Young Turk Revolution encouraged the development of a certain degree of modernization and professionalism in government.³ One of the most proficient components of the CUP was its intelligence organization, the TM. As with any secret organization, definitive information about its history is difficult to gather.⁴

For the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire, the CUP leadership formed an official intelligence agency, probably as early as 1911.⁵ Even before the outbreak of World War I, the TM had con-

sidered this information. They are working on Abdürreşid İbrahim's biography, who might have been a Hamidian agent. It is plausible that Abdürreşid later became a TM agent, because he was not one of those who harmed Young Turk activity; he had been active in Japan. Abdülhamid also sent members of his retinue to various Islamic countries such as Yemen and Tripolitania to gather information and promote Islamic solidarity; *La Police Secrète en Turquie* (Paris: Imprimerie Noizette, 1892). This booklet claims that upon the urgings of Sir Stratford Canning, the British envoy to the Ottoman Empire (1808-1812; 1824-1826; 1832-1852; 1853-1858), a secret police was established in the Balkans to watch for potential insurrections.

² Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, *İnkılâp Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler* (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945); Ernest E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957); Kâzım Nami Duru, *İttihat ve Terakki Hatıralarım* (İstanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1957); Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Mustafa Ragıp Esath, *İttihat ve Terakki* (İstanbul: Hürriyet Yayınları, 1975); Mithat Şükrü Bleda, *İmparatorluğun Çöküşü* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1979); Kâzım Karabekir, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (İstanbul: TÜRDAV, 1982); Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*; Bülent Demirtaş, ed. *İbrahim Temo'nun Anıları* (Ankara: Arba Ltd.Şti., 1987); Idem, *Meclis-i Mebusan ve Ayan Reisi Ahmed Rıza Bey'in Anıları* (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1988).

³ Kutay, "Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa," *Tarih Konuşuyor* 1 (March 1964): 91-96; Idem, "Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa," *Sohbetler* (September 10, 1969): 63-76; Idem, *Lavrens'e Karşı Kuşçubaşı ve Özel Örgütün Kurulması* (İstanbul: Posta Kutusu Yayınları, 1978); Hiçyılmaz, *Belgelerle Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa* (İstanbul: Ünsal Yayınları, 1979); Philip Stoddard, "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs 1911 to 1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa," (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1963); Celâl Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım* 8 vols. (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1967) 5: 1569-1575.

⁴ Interview with Retired Air Force General Fahri Özdilek, MP (1898-1990), TBMM, Ankara, February 16, 1987. The exact date when TM was established is variously reported according to which part of the Empire its agents served. General Özdilek served as aide to Fuat Balkan, a TM guerrilla in Western Thrace in 1913. According to Özdilek, Mahmut Şevket Pasha (1856-1913), the Minister of War from 1909 to 1912, was also a member of TM. Cf. Stoddard, "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs," p. 52; Kuşçubaşı told Stoddard that TM was organized sometime between 1911 and 1913; Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, p. 59, places the date of TM's formal establishment as August 14, 1914.

⁵ Interview with Mrs. Kıymet Tesal (1917-1988), Nuri Conker's daughter, December 18, 1987, Mebusevleri, Ankara.

ducted guerrilla operations against foreign attempts to seize Ottoman territory. Participants in these operations included men who became heroes of the Turkish War of Independence against the Greek and Allied occupation forces. TM had a special budget, *Tahsisat-ı Mesture*, which was controlled by the Minister of War, Enver Pasha. The organization functioned through military officers who acted as *fedai's* (guerrillas). Hence, Mustafa Kemal, Rauf, Ali Fethi, and Nuri (Conker, 1881-1937) Beys were assigned to Cyrenaica and Tripolitania by TM to help local tribes defend the country against the Italian invasion of 1911.⁶

TM agents went to Western Thrace when the Bulgarians entered that province in the Balkan War (1912). TM fighters resisted by declaring an autonomous Turkish Republic of Western Thrace.⁷ During World War I, TM activity in the Balkans continued in cooperation with a now friendly Bulgaria. Eşref Sencer (Kuşçubaşı, 1871-1964), the TM leader in the Arab-speaking provinces, recruited a number of Arabs in Iraq, who were set against the British forces; and he also tried to control separatist movements in Syria and Lebanon during the war.⁸

Civilians in the TM also played an important role in the post-war resistance. While TM's military intelligence division was responsible to the Minister of War, its civilian section was accountable to the Minister of the Interior, Talât Pasha. Before and during the war, TM concentrated on CUP party propaganda against anti-Unionists, using journalists, writers, orators and the clergy. For example, the newspaper *Tanin* became the mouthpiece of the CUP government. Writers such as Süleyman Nazif, orator-poet Mehmet Âkif, orator Ömer Naci (1880-1916), and Sheikh Âta (1883-1936) were but a few of the civilians in TM.⁹ The civilian elements of TM constituted the *Telkin ve İrsad Kolu* (Communication and Enlightenment Branch, i.e. propaganda branch).

The internal structure of the CUP encouraged organizational loyalty as well as loyalty to the individual patrons. The post-war underground resistance was to benefit from both kinds of ties. The CUP had been organized on a patronage system, which resulted in the formation of a number of cliques in its hierarchy. Accordingly, Enver, Talât

⁶ "Fuat Balkan'ın Hatıraları," *Tanin Tarihimiz* 2 (October 16, 1964): 3-7.

⁷ Stoddard, "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs," *passim*.

⁸ Interview with Cemal Kutay, Historian, Moda, İstanbul, June 25, 1987; Faruk K. Timurtaş, "Ölümsüz Şair Mehmed Âkif," *Hayal Tarih Mecmuası* 2: 12 (January 1967), p. 11.

⁹ Interviews with Prof.Dr. Ahmet Esendal, Ankara, September 12, 1986 and Nihat Akçan, Yeşilköy, İstanbul, June 28, 1987. Both gentlemen verified the patronage networks in the CUP. Their fathers were in Kara Kemal Bey's clique.

and Cemal Pashas each had their own followers whose primary loyalty was to the pasha who employed and promoted them. These followers, in turn, had their own patronage networks. Thus, Kara Kemal (d. 1926), Minister of the Commissaries and the patron of the *esnaf* (manufacturers' and artisans') guilds, was Talât Pasha's man. Kara Kemal had recruited Ferit Bey (Hamal, 1877-?) as head of the porters' guild, Yunus Fettah Bey (Akçan, 1879-1955) as head of the artisans' guild, and Memduh Şevket Bey (Esendal, 1884-1952) to manage the revitalization of these guilds as modern business associations to promote Turkish businesses.¹⁰ Members of these associations were to provide invaluable help to the underground in smuggling and transportation operations of war matériel.

When the Mudros Armistice was signed on October 30, 1918, the Ottoman Empire was reduced to its Anatolian territory alone, and even those borders were still disputed. Prior to the signing of the armistice, the CUP government resigned and the Ahmet İzzet Pasha (Furgaç, 1864-1937) cabinet was formed on October 14, 1918. İzzet Pasha was also the Minister of Defense. He immediately instructed the TM Directorate (euphemistically called the Office of Eastern Affairs at the Ministry of War) to cease its work, liquidate its archives and turn over its accounts to the Ministry.¹¹

On the evening of November 2, 1918, the CUP leaders, Enver, Talât and Cemal Pashas, with four other members of the CUP Central Committee, left Turkey on board a German submarine. Shortly before their departure, Talât Pasha ordered Kara Kemal to establish an underground group.¹² This organization was meant to defend the CUP members against an anti-Unionist government and the Allies, who would begin arrests for war crimes. Furthermore, the fighting spirit of the CUP was not dead. As far as they were concerned the war was not over.

İstanbul was in a chaotic state, the guns were being laid down, but, we, the CUP people were determined not to lay our guns down. CUP members

¹⁰ Hüsamettin Ertürk, "Milli Mücadele Senelerinde Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa," (Type-written MS) ed. Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, translit. General Tevfik Apay (Ankara: Institute for Strategic Research and Military History, n.d.), p. 14.

¹¹ Gotthard Jaeschke, *Türk İnkilâbı Tarihi Kronolojisi 1918-1923*, trans. Niyazi Recep Aksu (İstanbul: Milli Mecmua Basımevi, 1939), p. 22; Kutay, ed. *Fethi Okyar: Üç Devirde Bir Adam* (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1980), p. 251; Cf. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa* 3 vols. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1978) 3: 468; S. Kâni İrtem, "Talât Paşa ve İttihat ve Terakki Erkânı Memleketten Ayrılıyor," *Akşam*, March 2, 1943, p. 2, c. 1; Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, comp. Samih Nafiz Tansu (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınevi, 1964), p. 217.

¹² M. Taylan Sorgun, ed. *İttihat Terakki'den Cumhuriyet'e Bitmeyen Savaş: Halil Paşa'nın Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Yedigün Yayınları, 1972), p. 251.

¹³ Ertürk, "MMSTM," pp. 14-19.

who congregated in İstanbul decided that the war was not over. The Armistice was just another phase of the war. We decided to begin our fight in Eastern Anatolia.¹³

Lieutenant Colonel Hüsamettin (Ertürk), who was the Director of the Office of Eastern Affairs, was instructed by Enver Pasha that TM was now to be called the "Islamic Revolutionary Committee." Accordingly, Hüsamettin Bey was to help the Islamic resistance fighters from India, Morocco, Algiers and Egypt who were residing in İstanbul to escape to Germany. He was also to send Libya's Sheikh Sanussi back to northern Africa and give him 100,000 LT to keep on fighting the Italians and the British. Closer to home, he was to ensure that local guerrilla leaders were not disarmed and supply resistance fighters with weapons from secret TM depots.¹⁴

Hüsamettin Bey appeared on the surface to have halted TM activity, but clandestinely continued intelligence work and refused to reveal or surrender the arms in TM depots. This stance had the support of the General Staff and the Ministry of War.¹⁵ Hence, the Nationalist resistance groups found willing support among TM members. TM operations continued throughout the Armistice. For instance, in 1920, Hüsamettin Bey collaborated with Bolshevik organizations for the purpose of disseminating communist propaganda, stimulating unrest among the lower ranks of the Allied troops. He helped Bolshevik agents infiltrate into Greece to conduct propaganda within the Greek army.¹⁶ We do not know to what extent these attempts were successful, but what is clear is that TM was still involved in psychological warfare during those years. Further, this meant that the Allied military intelligence had good reason to be sensitive about Bolshevik propaganda among the troops. (See Chapter V)

Karakol (Black Arm / Police)

The first resistance group of the Armistice period, *Karakol*, was founded when the Allied occupation drove home to Turks the reality of partitioning what was left of Turkish territory. When the Armistice was signed, the people in İstanbul had been relieved, because eight years of continuous warfare ended. No one expected that İstanbul

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 320.

¹⁶ Collinson, H. Owen, "Constantinople Occupied," *The New York Times Current History* 9 (January-March 1919): 92.

¹⁷ Himmetoğlu, *KSTT*, 1: 67-68.

would be occupied. However, on November 13, 1918, a flotilla of Allied warships entered the İstanbul harbor.¹⁷ Allied forces numbering 2,616 British, 540 French, and 470 Italian soldiers landed immediately and occupied military barracks, hotels, Italian and French schools, and hospitals.¹⁸ These soldiers remained there until the Allied administrative machine was set up and the requisitioning of private homes began.

Karakol was established in late November 1918.¹⁹ The line between TM and *Karakol* is not clear-cut. Many *Karakol* activists such as Baha Sait (1882-1939), Yenibahçeli Nail (d. 1926), and Yenibahçeli Şükrü (1881-1932) had worked for TM during the war in Iran, the Caucasus, or Western Thrace.²⁰ Hüsamettin Bey is assumed to have been a member of *Karakol* since he worked with them,²¹ but according to a later account of his, he was not a member. "It was a good thing I did not work with them at all, because it turned out that British intelligence had found out about them."²² Yet Hüsamettin Bey did make war matériel available to *Karakol* from TM depots, for those had been the exact orders of Enver Pasha.

Eşref Bey (Kuşçubaşı) of TM, who had been a prisoner of war in Malta, returned to İstanbul because of a prisoner exchange. He contacted Kara Vasıf, one of the founders of *Karakol*, and helped organize the group.²³ On May 16, 1920, the British High Commissioner, Admiral de Robeck, provided the Foreign Office with a list of people whose surrender should be demanded from the Ottoman government. Number 137 on the list was "Eshreff Kushjibashi Zadé (sic). (He) was released in error from Malta as an ordinary prisoner of war on 2.1.20; a most dangerous and criminal propagandist."²⁴ But, it was too late, Kuşçubaşı had already gone underground. Subsequently, he joined the Nationalist militia in the Aegean provinces.

¹⁸ Cf. İhsan İdikut, *Türk Lawrensleri* (İstanbul: Öztürk Matbaası, 1953), pp. 14-15. İdikut says that *Karakol* was established on February 5, 1919, but other sources point to *Karakol* activity before this date; Demirtaş, ed. *Miralay Mehmet Arif Bey: Anadolu İnkılabı*, pp. 70-72.

¹⁹ Ertürk, "MMSTM," p. 65.

²⁰ Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, p. 80.

²¹ Ertürk, "MMSTM," p. 66. These memoirs were written at a later date. Since some CUP members who belonged to *Karakol* were implicated in an assassination plot on Mustafa Kemal Pasha and were sentenced to death in 1926, Hüsamettin Bey may have felt the need to detach himself from any CUP related activity. Many parts of the manuscript which are full of self promotion were neutralized by Marshal Çakmak's editing.

²² Idem, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, pp. 190-191.

²³ FO 371/5090.

²⁴ Tevetoğlu, *Millî Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), pp. 4-6.

The first Central Committee of Karakol consisted of Kara Kemal, the ex-cup Minister of the Commissaries, Staff Colonel Kara Vasif, Colonel Galatalı Şevket (Commander of the Straits), Staff Colonel Kemalettin Sami (Gökçe, 1884-1934), Commander of the Caucasian Troops, lawyer Refik İsmail, Staff Colonel Edip Servet (Tör, 1880-1960), Baha Sait, former member of the cup Central Committee, and Major Sevkiyatçı Ali Rıza (Bebe, 1881-?).²⁵ They developed a program and a seal. A declaration was sent to selected people which announced *Karakol's* existence and goals. Although the tone of the declaration was moderate overall, Article 4 proclaimed defiantly that,

The activities of Karakol inside the country are confined to protect and, where non-existent, establish national unity and territorial integrity by legitimate means, behind the scenes. When faced with oppressors of freedom and justice, however, we shall resort to revolutionary ways. We shall fight and die as free men rather than live as prisoners in shame.²⁶

The group was organized on the basis of a cell system; its members were assigned numbers instead of being identified by name. Baha Sait was assigned to recruit the clergy, Kemalettin Sami was to contact university students and intellectuals, and Galatalı Şevket was to draft journalists.²⁷ The latter's main contact was Süleyman Nazif. As a reaction to the ceremonial entry to İstanbul of General Franchet d'Espèrey on January 8, 1919, Süleyman Nazif published a fiery and sarcastic article in *Hadisat* against the French. He was arrested the following day and barely averted execution.²⁸ The paper was closed down but Süleyman Nazif remained on the Allies' blacklist. He was exiled to Malta after the *de jure* occupation of İstanbul.

Based on the cup's previous defense plans of Anatolia, Kara Kemal argued that the place to organize the resistance was Anatolia.²⁹ *Karakol* began to search for a leader. At first, they considered Halil Pasha (Kut, 1881-1957), Enver's uncle, and then Yeni-

²⁵ Fahri Can, "Karakol Cemiyeti Nasıl Kurulmuştu?" *Yakın Tarihimiz* 4: 48 (January 24, 1963), pp. 257-260.

²⁶ Can, "I. Dünya Harbinden Sonra İlk Milli Kuvvet Nasıl Kuruldu?" *Yakın Tarihimiz* 1: 10 (May 3, 1962), pp. 334-335; Muharrem Giray, "İstanbul'un İşgalinde Gizli Bir Teşkilat, Karakol Cemiyeti," *Yakın Tarihimiz* 1: 11 (May 10, 1962), pp. 345-347; İdikut, *Türk Lawrensleri*, pp. 13-25.

²⁷ İdikut, *Ibid.*, p. 17; "Fransız Desperesi ve Süleyman Nazif'in Kara Günü," *Tarih Konuşuyor* 2: 10 (November 1964), pp. 760-764; Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe, "Süleyman Nazif Kurşuna Diziliyordu," *Dün ve Bugün* 1: 15 (February 10, 1956), pp. 25-26.

²⁸ Şeref Çavuşoğlu, "İttihat ve Terakki'nin Gizli Planı," *Yakın Tarihimiz* 1: 9 (April 26, 1962), pp. 263-264.

²⁹ Nail and Yenibahçeli Şükrü were brothers. Nail and Hilmi were involved in the assassination plot against Mustafa Kemal Pasha in 1926, and were both sentenced to death.

bahçeli Nail Bey and Hilmi Bey.³⁰ The Grand Vizier, İzzet Pasha, promised to assign these officers to Anatolia, but instead Halil Pasha was assigned as the Ottoman representative to Erivan. On his way to the Caucasus, he was recalled because the Grand vizier had heard that Enver Pasha was also in the Caucasus and did not want the two pashas to join forces.³¹ The patron of *Karakol* behind-the-scenes was still Enver Pasha, but the organization needed a leader close by.

After discussing the problem of leadership among its members, *Karakol* contacted Mustafa Kemal Pasha through his aide-de-camp Cevat Abbas (Gürer, 1887-1943) to take over the leadership. At the time, Mustafa Kemal was living in the fashionable neighborhood of Şişli, where he had moved by December 16, 1918.³² This confirms that the formation date of *Karakol* was late in November 1918.

Mustafa Kemal, since he had been in touch with Sevkiyatçı Ali Rıza and İsmail (Canbulat, 1880-1926) of *Karakol*, must have heard of Halil Pasha's impending trip to Anatolia. According to Halil Pasha's memoirs, Mustafa Kemal invited him to lunch in the Pera Palace Hotel and told him that he, (Mustafa Kemal) would be assigned to Anatolia as inspector-general where he would start a resistance movement. Mustafa Kemal added that this movement had a better chance to succeed than anything that Halil Pasha might attempt.³³ Halil Pasha was not insulted, because this was a realistic assessment that the cup was no longer favored by the Turkish people.³⁴ This might have prompted Halil Pasha not to follow through with *Karakol's* offer. However, the conversation could not have occurred exactly as Halil Pasha described it, because the issue of Mustafa Kemal's inspector-generalship did not arise until after April 21, 1919.³⁵ Therefore, this conversation between the two pashas could not have referred to an

³⁰ Yenibahçeli Şükrü, "Memoirs," (handwritten MS) (İstanbul: Taha Toros Archives, n.d.).

³¹ Sadi Borak, *Ata ve İstanbul* (İstanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Yayınları, 1983), p. 92.

³² Sorgun, ed. *İttihat Terakki'den Cumhuriyet'e*, p. 258.

³³ Halil Pasha had great respect for Mustafa Kemal. In 1909, Mustafa Kemal had openly criticized the cup and argued that the military should not be involved in politics. The cup did not tolerate any criticism. Therefore, Enver Pasha decided to eliminate Mustafa Kemal. Halil Pasha volunteered to act as his assassin. However, Halil Pasha did not perform the act. Since he was Enver's uncle, the latter overlooked this "failure." Subsequently, Enver Pasha assigned Mustafa Kemal to Tripolitania to fight the Italians. This was an exile in disguise. Later, Mustafa Kemal was to acknowledge that he owed his life to Halil Pasha. See Aydemir, "Son Osmanlı Paşası Halil Paşa'nın Hatıraları," *Akşam*, October 10 - December 29, 1967.

³⁴ Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele*, p. 281, ff.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 189-194.

inspectorship. Still, it must have taken place before April 2, 1919, when Halil Pasha was arrested. At the time, Mustafa Kemal might only have said that he intended to go to Anatolia, because by February 1919, he was entertaining the idea, since all other routes for him to participate in an Ottoman cabinet had been closed.³⁶

Mustafa Kemal clearly did not want to get involved with the CUP elements because he knew where their loyalties lay. Although he had been a registered member of the CUP, Mustafa Kemal had always remained on the periphery. It was not Mustafa Kemal, but Enver Pasha, who was the undisputed leader of the CUP's military faction. When Refik İsmail of *Karakol* asked Mustafa Kemal directly to assume a leadership role, he did not commit himself. Instead, he asked that the Minister of War, Şakir Pasha, be persuaded that he was not a CUP man. There were other reasons why it was important for him not to be identified with the CUP. Mustafa Kemal had been very critical of the CUP's ties to Germany during the war and of the war strategies of German commanders in the Ottoman army. Therefore, he did not wish to be among those held responsible for losing the war. Moreover, he perceived the CUP as tainted because of its dictatorship and handling of the Armenian deportations. Hence, it was essential that Mustafa Kemal disassociate himself from the CUP. His future career and freedom of movement depended on it. Although he did not commit himself to *Karakol*, the organization lobbied for him in the hope that he might take over the resistance movement. *Karakol* convinced the Chief of the General Staff, Cevat Pasha, who persuaded the Sheikhulislam, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, that Mustafa Kemal did not belong to the CUP.³⁷ The subtle promotion of Mustafa Kemal at the level of the Council of Ministers must have smoothed the way for his assignment to Anatolia.

Izzet Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had also been asked to lead *Karakol*. However, according to Yenibahçeli Şükrü, Commander of the Storm

³⁶ Yenibahçeli Şükrü, "Memoirs,"; For a detailed discussion about Mustafa Kemal's relationship with the CUP, see Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, pp. 112-144.

³⁷ In 1916, General von Hindenburg and General Ludendorff designed a new offensive infantry tactic and trained brigades called the Storm Troopers. Surprise was essential to gain new territory. Therefore, after an attack of gas and shells on enemy artillery, storm battalions, specially trained men, infiltrated into the enemy lines and destroyed the artillery, while a second wave of tanks, airplanes and heavy artillery followed. This tactic proved to be very effective because the Allied commanders were used to trench warfare. See Robert H. Ferrell, *Woodrow Wilson and World War I* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1985), p. 68. There was only one such battalion in the Ottoman army and Yenibahçeli Şükrü Bey was its commander.

Troopers during the war,³⁸ and an ardent *Karakol* member, he turned them down because he thought that any action in Anatolia would be doomed to failure under the current conditions.

As local Nationalist groups began to form outside İstanbul, *Karakol* organized a line of communications with Anatolia, the *Menzil Hattı* (Line of Transport), under the command of Yenibahçeli Şükrü.³⁹ The smuggling of arms and men was conducted through the *Menzil Hattı* via Dudullu and Geyve on the Anatolian side. During 1919 and 1920, officers and civilians who escaped to Anatolia carried identification which bore *Karakol's* stamp. Mustafa Kemal, once he was in Anatolia, requested certain officers by name. *Karakol* then contacted the Personnel Office of the War Ministry, and assigned these officers to Anatolia.

The relationship between Mustafa Kemal and *Karakol* is rather puzzling. During the Sivas Congress (September 4-11, 1919), he declined any knowledge of *Karakol's* existence. Further, he criticized *Karakol*, plausibly because it was an offspring of the CUP and might pose a challenge to his authority.⁴⁰ However, Mustafa Kemal did not question the organization while it served his purposes well. When the Allies began to prohibit the War Ministry's assignment of officers to Anatolia, *Karakol* and TM provided officers with discharge papers and smuggled them into Anatolia in civilian clothes, preferably religious attire. The first stop of the escapees was the *Özbekler Tekkesi* in Üsküdar, a dervish lodge.⁴¹ The *Tekke* was well stocked with weapons and various clothes. Its leader, Sheikh Âta, had been a member of TM's propaganda branch. During the Armistice he transferred his activities to the underground. In the daytime, Sheikh Âta's mission kept morale high by preaching hope. At night, he and his dervishes smuggled weapons from the *tekke* to Dr. Esat Pasha's home in

³⁸ Interview with Burhan Oğuz, Yenibahçeli Şükrü Bey's stepson, Nişantaşı, İstanbul, June 25, 1988.

³⁹ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk* 2 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1981) 1: 545.

⁴⁰ Cengiz Bektaş, "Özbekler Tekkesi," *Tarih ve Toplum* 2: 8 (August 1984), pp. 40-45. Özbekler Tekkesi was built in the eighteenth century. Traditionally, Uzbek pilgrims stopped in İstanbul on their way to Mecca to obtain a symbolic permission from the Caliph. A lodge was built where the pilgrims used to be hosted in tents until then.

⁴¹ Kutay, *Kurtuluşun ve Cumhuriyet'in Mânevî Mimarları* (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1973), pp. 30-31; Kadir Mısıroğlu, *Kurtuluş Savaşında Sarıklı Mücahitler* 6th ed. (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınları, 1980), pp. 276-287; Razi Yalkın, "Rahmetli Şeyh Âta," *Tarih Hazinesi* 5 (January 15, 1951): 217-218; Mustafa Kara, *Tekke ve Zaviyeler* (İstanbul: n.p. 1977), p. 154; Vahide Alev, "Özbekler Tekkesi," *Tarih ve Toplum* 2: 9 (September 1984), pp. 38-43.

Çamlıca on the Asian side, from where the arms were sent to Anatolia.⁴² (Esat Pasha was the president of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society.) Many prominent figures of the Turkish War of Independence escaped to Anatolia through the *Özbekler Tekkesi*. Halide Edip, Dr. Adnan (Adivar, 1882-1955), Mehmet Âkif, General Fevzi (Çakmak, 1876-1950), and Colonel İsmet (İnönü, 1884-1973) are but a few of those who used this route.⁴³

TM and *Karakol* cooperated in their efforts to disseminate Nationalist propaganda as well as in taking measures to defend the Turkish population in occupied territories. The poet Mehmet Âkif traveled throughout Anatolia addressing the faithful in mosques to win them over to the Nationalist cause.⁴⁴

Back in İstanbul, while Hüsemettin Bey was busy carrying out Enver Pasha's orders and trying to prolong his tenure at the War Ministry, *Karakol* set up organizations in the predominantly Muslim boroughs of İstanbul. Selected people in Topkapı, Şehremini, Kasımpaşa, Eyüp, Bakırköy, Çengelköy and Kadıköy boroughs were given weapons and many were recruited to conduct intelligence work. The acting British High Commissioner, Richard Webb, in a despatch, dated November 29, 1918, commented on CUP-related activity.

The Committee of Union and Progress does not cease to exist, only it happens to have fallen into quite other hands, and to be in the process of becoming merely the nucleus around which a fairly rational Turkish national feeling is collected... The Greek press keeps asserting that arms are being distributed amongst the Mussulman population, and many, especially the Greeks, are coming to believe this in all seriousness, and to feel correspondingly alarmed... In view of the Allied forces in and around the city, it is hardly likely that the Turks would be so ill-advised as to attempt anything in the nature of an armed rising.⁴⁵

The Turkish population harbored identical fears of the Greeks. A number of Turkish families moved in with relatives or rented homes on the Asian side.⁴⁶ *Karakol* took other contingency measures. For

⁴² Halide Edip Adivar, *Türk'ün Ateşle İmtihanı* 8th ed. (İstanbul: Atlas Kitabevi, 1985), pp. 55-69; Idem, "The Rising Star of Mustafa Kemal," *Asia* 27/28 (1928): 570-590; Feridun Kandemir, "İsmet Paşa Anadolu'ya Nasıl Geçti?" *Tarih Hazinesi* 2 (April 1952): 788-791; Vaka'nüvis (pseud.), "İsmet Bey Anadolu'ya Nasıl Gönderildi?" *Tarih Hazinesi* 1 (July 1951): 586-589.

⁴³ Mehmet Âkif, *İstiklâl Savaşı Hüveleri, Vazlar* (İstanbul: Bahar Yayınevi, 1983); Eşref Edip, "Mehmet Âkif Ersoy, Safahat Şairi," *Bugün*, March 14-28, 1971.

⁴⁴ FO 406/40, p. 82.

⁴⁵ Interview with Ekrem Berkmen, İstanbul resident, Moda, İstanbul, August 22, 1988.

⁴⁶ Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, pp. 223-224.

example, Algerian detachments of the French forces were housed in Rami barracks near Eyüp. When the soldiers came to the Eyüpsultan Mosque for Friday prayers, the preacher, Kemal Efendi, tried to convince them that their first loyalty was to their Muslim brethren in case the latter were attacked. A French speaking officer was always present to translate the preacher's words. The Algerians promised help in case there was an attack on the Turks.⁴⁷

On June 28, 1919, a fire broke out in the ammunition stores of the Rami barracks. The stores were completely destroyed when bombs exploded.⁴⁸ This may have been sabotage by the underground since none of the Algerian soldiers was hurt.

One of the major aims of *Karakol* was to revitalize the provincial branches of the CUP. Kara Kemal, on his own initiative, formed another secret cell, called *Beşler* (The Five) which translated into a renewed, but illegal, CUP Central Committee. Membership consisted of Beylerbeyli Ali İhsan, Vehbi (a businessman), Çolak Selâhattin (a retired officer), Memduh Şevket Bey, and Dr. Dağıstanlı Hüseyinzade Ali Bey.⁴⁹ *Beşler* and *Karakol* were drawn together by their commitment to resistance. Their activities, as well as those of TM, overlapped. For instance, Memduh Şevket Bey, who had been the Inspector of the İstanbul CUP Central Committee before the war, was very active in 1918 and 1919. During the early days of the Armistice, Memduh Şevket Bey managed to reactivate the manufacturers' and workers' guilds that he had previously organized by instilling a spirit of resistance in the members. He ensured that the customs and harbor workers were loyal CUP men such as Salih Kâhya, the head of the porters' guild. This is another example of how friends and family networks functioned in the resistance. Salih Kâhya's brother, Ferit Bey (Hamal), had been the head of that guild during the war. Opposition papers complained that there was CUP complicity in Salih Kâhya's election to that post.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ "Dünkü Yangın," *Alemdar*, June 29, 1919, p. 2, c. 3.

⁴⁸ Ertürk, "MMSTM," pp. 140-142; Interview with Prof. Dr. Ahmet Esendal, Ankara, September 12, 1988. He corroborated that the four gentlemen had been close friends of his father in the CUP. Information on the first three members of *Beşler* was not available. Memduh Şevket (Esendal, 1883-1952) was a well known man of letters and a politician, but is less known as an activist. He served in Baku as Mustafa Kemal's representative to Azerbaijan from 1920 to 1924; and ambassador to Tehran from 1925 to 1930 and Kabul from 1936 to 1938. He was the General Secretary of the Republican People's Party from 1941 to 1945.

Hüseyinzade Ali Bey (Turan, 1864-1841), supra p. 50 n. 33.

⁴⁹ Çukurova, "Kurtuluş Savaşında İstanbul Gizli Grupları," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 2 (March 1986): 519-526.

⁵⁰ Interview with Mrs. Azize Yenel, wife of Gözlüklü Mithat Bey of the CUP, Nişantaşı, İstanbul, June 14, 1987.

Memduh Şevket Bey also smuggled hidden arms and munitions. Beginning in early 1919, the British began to arrest those members of the CUP who were still active. Memduh Şevket Bey went into hiding in other CUP homes. He and two other associates escaped to Italy hidden on board an Italian ship, the *Tadla*.⁵¹ Kara Kemal caught up with them in Italy after his escape from Malta in 1920, and, with Italian help, they returned to Turkey.

The year 1920 was a turning point for the Nationalists. Loyalty to the CUP gradually dropped into the background as Mustafa Kemal established himself as the leader of the Nationalist Movement.⁵² In the Sivas Congress of September 1919, the participants unanimously voted to unite the Anatolian and Rumelian Defense of Rights Committees and work in unison for the salvation of the whole country. Local resistance was to be coordinated. A Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye) was elected for this purpose. Thus, the Nationalist Movement became an entity with which to be reckoned. The CUP-based *Karakol* could not have remained outside this trend. There seem to be at least two other reasons why *Karakol*'s leaders became convinced that there was no other alternative but to join Mustafa Kemal's Nationalist Movement. In order to sound out the Allies, *Karakol* had Alfred Rüstem (Blinsky, 1862-1935) of the CUP, write to the French and British headquarters, stating that the only cohesive group in İstanbul was still the CUP. Therefore, sooner or later the Allies would have to reach an agreement with it. The reaction from both headquarters was negative. Hüsamettin Bey maintained that the Allies' reaction caused *Karakol* to give up its clandestine CUP identity for the time being and support Mustafa Kemal. Another factor in this decision was a letter from Talât Pasha in Berlin, urging *Karakol* to follow Mustafa Kemal.⁵³ Talât Pasha was a realist when compared with Enver Pasha. He realized that the CUP could no longer fight the enemy because it had lost credibility. Further, he was a civilian (the honorary rank of Pasha had been bestowed on him when he became the Grand Vizier), and had no reason to feel professional competition between himself and Mustafa Kemal.

As soon as Mustafa Kemal established himself among the Nationalists, he looked for a justifiable reason to eliminate *Karakol*. An opportunity presented itself in August 1919. Prior to the Sivas Congress, the Nationalists received information from the Third Army Corps

⁵¹ Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Millî Mücadele Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1954), p. 75.

⁵² Ertürk, "MMSTM," pp. 146-147.

⁵³ Kansu, *Erzurum'dan Ölümine Kadar Atatürk'le Beraber* 1: 136-141.

about the existence of *Karakol*.⁵⁴ Although Mustafa Kemal knew about *Karakol*'s existence, he could not identify the members of this group, because they were sworn to secrecy on pain of death. During the Congress, Kara Vakıf revealed to Mustafa Kemal that he was one of the founders of the group, and that their objective was to organize a resistance and prevent lethargy in İstanbul. Mustafa Kemal took a very hostile attitude to the idea of a secret organization beyond his control. He was ready to establish his own intelligence and resistance networks now that the Nationalists had united. Therefore, he ordered Kara Vasıf to cease all activity. *Karakol* did not cease its activities immediately, but it dwindled because of other reasons. For example, *Karakol* was embarrassed when Dr. Esat Pasha unwittingly revealed its objectives to an Indian major of the British army who had gained the Pasha's confidence.⁵⁵ Although this may not have been the only means by which British intelligence became aware of a CUP underground, Esat Pasha had implicated himself and his associates. When İstanbul was occupied in 1920, *Karakol*'s first Central Committee dissolved after many of its members were arrested.

By February 1919, the names of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, his aide-de-camp, Cevat Abbas, Lieutenant Colonel Ali (Çetinkaya), Major Ali Rıza of the Army Transport, Kâzım Pasha (Karabekir), and Colonel İsmet (İnönü) had found their way onto a British blacklist.⁵⁶ None of the people on this list fit into any category of war criminals. However, two of them, Ali (Çetinkaya) and Ali Rıza were members of *Karakol*. The others were known to associate with CUP elements and therefore were highly suspect. This particular list was submitted to the Director of Intelligence in İstanbul, but was not relayed to London before April 12, 1919. By the time the list was evaluated, Mustafa Kemal had already left for Anatolia.

In 1919, *Karakol* was involved in organizing public demonstrations on a number of occasions. Although the Grand Vizier, Tevfik Pasha, had complied with the British High Commissioner's wishes and had

⁵⁴ Ertürk, "MMSTM," pp. 66-67; Çavuşoğlu, "Esat Paşa Neler Yaptı?" *Takım Tarihimiz* 1: 8 (April 1962), pp. 227-228; Kandemir, "Büyük İdealist Esat Paşa'nın Parolası—Yenilmeyeceksin," *Takım Tarihimiz* 2: 24 (August 1972), pp. 321-322; Necmettin R. Yazar and A. Süheyl Ünver, *Esad "Işık" Paşa* (İstanbul: Tabibler Odası, 1972); "Esat Işık Paşa Dosyası," (İstanbul: Cerrahpaşa Medical School, Institute of Medical History archive); Nejat Ayberk, "Müderris Dr. Esat Işık Paşa," in *50 Yıl Önce Olan Şekiz Büyük Türk Hekimi Ekrem Kadri Unat*, ed. (İstanbul Üniversitesi: Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi ve Tıp Tarihi Kurumu, 1986): 42-48; Âkil Muhtar Özden, "Prof. Dr. Esad Işık Paşa," *Tedavi Kliniği ve Laboratuvarı* 6: 24, Reprint 1936.

⁵⁵ Şimşir, *BDOA*, 1: 394.

⁵⁶ Salih and Cemil S. Bozok, *Hep Atatürk'ün Yanında* (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1985), pp. 48-62.

many people arrested, the trials were prolonged and no sentences were given.⁵⁷ When the cabinet of the pro-British Damad Ferid Pasha came to power in March 1919, trials were accelerated. Damad Ferid's policy was to appease the British in every way he could. On April 8, (Nemrut) Mustafa Pasha's dreaded tribunal sentenced to death Mehmet Kemal Bey (b. 1884), the former district administrator of Boğazlıyan, Yozgat (east of Ankara).⁵⁸ Kemal Bey was blamed for Armenian massacres. The sentence was carried out on April 10 in Bayezit Square. His funeral service in Kadıköy turned into an emotional public demonstration against the British, led by the students of the Faculty of Medicine. Kemal Bey was lauded as an innocent victim and a hero. A British intelligence officer reported that there were many "Young Turks" present at the funeral and that "close to 1000 invitations were sent out to attend the ceremony".⁵⁹ Since a member of *Karakol* had been assigned to recruit university students, it is plausible that *Karakol* was behind this demonstration; notices of the funeral were distributed very quickly, which required an organized attempt. In addition, *Karakol* was the only underground organization that existed in the city at the time. In reaction to the Greek invasion of İzmir on May 15, 1919, *Karakol* undertook to organize a huge protest demonstration in Fatih (west of the Old City) on May 19, followed by others in Üsküdar on May 20, in Kadıköy on May 22, and Sultanahmet on May 23 and 30.⁶⁰

Frequently, the activities of *Karakol* and *TM* overlapped because similar activities took place in the same neighborhoods. When Hüsamettin Bey received information that the Greek Patriarchate was involved in a conspiracy to start fires in the Turkish sectors of the city to force the population out, he set up armed militia units in Topkapı, Şehremini and Eyüp to prevent acts of arson.⁶¹

The Greek Patriarchate had fallen into the hands of radical clergy who supported the "Megali idea," a dream which involved the resurrection of a Hellenic Empire on the ancient Byzantine territories of the Aegean and the Black Sea shores of Turkey. Vociferous clergy-

⁵⁷ Ali Mücellitoğlu Çankaya, *Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler* 8 vols. (Ankara: Örnek Matbaası, 1954) 2: 601-614; Türkgeldi, *Görüş İhtiklerim*, pp. 202-206.

⁵⁸ Şimşir, *BDOA*, pp. 77-78.

⁵⁹ Adivar, *Türk'ün Ateşle İmtihani*, pp. 29-36; Kemal Arıburnu, *Milli Mücadelede İstanbul Mitingleri* 2nd ed. (Ankara: Yeni Desen Matbaası, 1975).

⁶⁰ Ertürk, "MMSTM," pp. 129-130.

⁶¹ Alexios Alexandris, "The Constantinopolitan Greek Factor During the Greco-Turkish Confrontation of 1919-1922," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 8 (1982-1983): 142-143.

men who arrived from Greece forced Patriarch Germanos V (1866-?) to resign on October 25, 1918, because he was "accused of having compromised with the Young Turks on such matters as education and marriage."⁶² Under the leadership of the new acting Patriarch, Dorotheos Mammelis, the Patriarchal Council resolved to unite with Greece on May 16, 1919, the day after the Greek troops landed in İzmir. "Thus, the Ottoman Greeks were released from their civic responsibilities as Ottoman citizens and the Patriarchate assumed, unilaterally, complete sovereignty over the community."⁶³

In an effort to prove numeric superiority over the Turks in İstanbul, it is possible that the Greeks may have engaged in terrorist activity to drive the Turks out of the area by arson. An incident which supported *TM*'s intelligence of arson planned by the Greeks was the 1919 fire in Üsküdar (a quarter which had a mixed Turkish-Greek population). There were explosions in the Greek neighborhoods when hidden fire bombs and ammunition in Greek houses caught fire.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, in an effort to counteract the domestic opposition in İstanbul, *Karakol* stole, copied and distributed to foreign missions some private correspondence which belonged to Sait Molla (d. 1930), the editor of the *Türkçe İstanbul* newspaper and president of the Friends of England Society. The Nationalists wished to prove to the Americans, French and Italians that domestic opponents, like Sait Molla, were involved in a conspiracy with the British to dismember Turkey. The Friends of England Society had been established on May 20, 1919, and opened branches in Ankara, Edirne and Bursa. The Society distributed large amounts of meat daily to the Turkish population in the poorest boroughs. A United States intelligence report found *Karakol*'s accusations credible,

The enclosed letters are given out by sympathizers of the Turkish Nationalist Movement headed by Moustapha Kemal with the purpose of showing that Englishmen, in close touch with the British High Commission, Constantinople, are trying by bribery and other means to destroy the Nationalist Movement in various ways; prevent the current elections to be held; return the Entente-Liberal Party to power; make secret agreements with the Sultan regarding the future of Turkey that are to be sprung on the Peace Conference... The likelihood that the enclosed

⁶² Ibid., p. 145; Süreyya Şahin, *Fener Patrikhanesi ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1980), pp. 162-184.

⁶³ Ertürk, "MMSTM," p. 131.

⁶⁴ U.S. Records, 867.00/1052, December 2, 1919; Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım* 7: 2194-2217.

documents are genuine is by no means weak. In that case their importance in confirming the wide extent of British intrigue in Turkey and the unscrupulous role which that country is playing here as unanimously charged by all nationalist partisans, can hardly be overestimated.⁶⁵

The letters were written by Sait Molla to an English clergyman, the Reverend Dr. Robert Frew, a long-time resident in Turkey.

This gentleman is generally credited in Constantinople as the chief confidential, "underground" agent of the Foreign Office element at the British High Commission... Dr. Frew is by no means "above" the charge which the professed enemies of British domination in Turkey (The Nationalist Party) make... of being the chief go-between and distributor of bribes for the British.⁶⁶

Dr. Frew had been to Konya to attract the Mevlevi sheikh to the anti-Nationalist camp and then to Syria to study French activity there. On November 27, Kara Vasif reported to Mustafa Kemal in Sivas that the United States High Commissioner, Admiral Bristol, had asked for documentary evidence to prove that the Friends of England Society was trying to prevent the upcoming elections from taking place.⁶⁷

Sait Molla had advocated a British mandate over Turkey in the press and to British officials since the beginning of 1919. He argued that this mandate would give Britain dominance in the world of Islam; that in turn would assure the loyalty of its Muslim subjects in Egypt and India.⁶⁸ *Karakol* burned Sait Molla's house down to dissuade him from pro-British propaganda, but to no avail.⁶⁹

In addition to his efforts to promote the Friends of England Society, Sait Molla formed another society, *Teâl-i İslam* (The Elevation of Islam) the same year. This society was instrumental in planning uprisings in Anatolia against the Nationalists. Members of the society collaborated with the *Kürt Teâlî Cemiyeti* (Society for the Elevation of Kurds) in planning uprisings.⁷⁰ *Karakol* was unable to pacify Sait Molla, for it had other, higher, priorities. It had to concentrate on protecting those CUP members who had not yet been arrested and

⁶⁵ U.S. Records, 867.00/1072, November 30, 1919.

⁶⁶ Uluğ İğdemir, ed. *Heyet-i Temsiliye Tutanakları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1975), p. 135.

⁶⁷ FO 406/41, p. 95, May 6, 1919. From Calthorpe to Curzon; Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele*, p. 238.

⁶⁸ Ertürk, "MMSTM," p. 215.

⁶⁹ Tevetoglu, *Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar*, pp. 55-141; Üftade Çukurova, "Kurtuluş Savaşı Yıllarında İngiliz Muhipler Cemiyeti ve İngiliz İstihbaratının Çalışmaları," (Master's Thesis, Ankara University, 1989).

⁷⁰ Yalçın, "Mütareke Günlerinin Feci Tarihi, Cavid Bey'in Hatıraları," *Tanin*, August 11, 1945 - December 22, 1946.

helping others escape from prison. On May 28, 1919, the first group of 67 CUP members was exiled to Malta, followed by another group of 41 on June 2. Mehmet Cavit Bey (1875-1926), the former CUP Minister of Finance, went into hiding when a warrant for his arrest appeared in newspapers. After five months of hiding, he escaped to France with the help of *Karakol* and the French.⁷¹ On August 8, 1919, Yahya Kaptan (1890-1919) of *Karakol* helped Halil Pasha and Küçük Talât Bey (Muşkara) escape from prison in İstanbul, and Nuri Pasha (Kıllıgil), Enver Pasha's brother, escaped from prison in Batum (which was under British occupation), also with *Karakol's* help.

Karakol also helped the Nationalists stage a bold raid on an armory under French protection. On the evening of January 26, 1920, a Nationalist group, led by Köprülü Hamdi Bey (1886-1920, an ex-district officer who had resigned from his post to join the Nationalist militia), raided the Akbaş depot in Gallipoli. With the collaboration of *Karakol's* Galata Şevket, Commander of the Straits, the Nationalists seized majority of the guns, ammunition and communication equipment and smuggled them to the Nationalist forces.⁷²

On March 7, 1920, the British High Commissioner, Admiral de Robeck, requested that the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs turn over the officers involved in the raid, including Galata Şevket, Major Mehmet Bahri, the Ottoman Commandant of the Akbaş depot, Reşadeddin Bey, the District Officer of Burgaz, and Major Dramalı Rıza, the Gendarmery Commander of Çanakkale, to the Allied authorities for trial.⁷³

Although the British knew the identity of these conspirators, they did not know that their leader was Köprülü Hamdi Bey. The only person who was finally arrested and exiled to Malta was Galata Şevket. Yet British prestige suffered a major blow when they demanded that the stolen weapons be returned. To enforce the return, 200 British soldiers landed in Bandırma, on the eastern shore of the Sea of Marmara. The Nationalists refused to surrender the arms and, moreover, threatened to attack a small British force, which then withdrew. The British "bluff," as the United States High Commissioner,

⁷¹ Kâmil Su, *Köprülü Hamdi Bey ve Akbaş Olayı* (Ankara: Kurtuluş Ofset Basımevi, 1984), p. 137; Nurettin Oflaz, "Şerif Efe," *Tarih Dünyası* 3: 32 (August 26, 1952), pp. 1263-1265.

⁷² FO 371/5043.

⁷³ U.S. Records, 867.00/1173, March 4, 1920, Intelligence Report; Kâzım Özalp, *Milli Mücadele (1919-1922)* 2 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1985) 1: 88-94.

Admiral Bristol termed it, "did not work, prestige—and not for once lately—did not perform the usual miracle."⁷⁴

The renewed Allied occupation of İstanbul in 1920 led to the collapse of *Karakol*. It was not by mere coincidence that the British forces began the formal occupation of İstanbul on March 16, 1920, by raiding first the barracks of the 10th Division, the "Caucasian" troops in Şehzadebaşı, in the early morning hours. The division and their commander, Kemalettin Sami Bey, belonged to the *Karakol* group.⁷⁵ Kemalettin Sami Bey went into hiding and later escaped to Anatolia on November 22, 1920.

In May 1920, Nationalists in Bursa wrote to *Karakol*, urging the assassination of Damad Ferid Pasha. The bearer of the letter was Major Dramalı Rıza, a participant in the Akbaş raid. TM mistrusted Dramalı Rıza. Once in İstanbul, Dramalı proved himself once again unworthy of TM's confidence. He informed the Chief of Police, Kalkandereli Hasan Tahsin of the plot, who, in turn, informed the British. Dramalı's contact with *Karakol* was through one agent. Upon TM's notice, that agent escaped to Anatolia, but Dramalı Rıza and ten others were arrested.⁷⁶ *Alemdar* wrote that the secret organization which had been established by the Nationalists was uncovered. Accordingly, the organization had ten branches in the city and many of its agents were arrested in this sweep. In reality, *Karakol* was not organized in branches, but in cells, which had no more than six people, each of whom were identified by a number. Although there is no information available about how many cells *Karakol* consisted of, it could not have been the "ten branches" *Alemdar* mentioned. Again, according to *Alemdar*, among the arrested were the organizers of Mehmet Kemal Bey's funeral demonstration,⁷⁷ (who were actually of *Karakol*).

On June 22nd, three death sentences were carried out, including one on Dramalı Rıza. He had been acquitted of the assassination charge, because he had notified the authorities, but was hanged for his complicity in the Akbaş raid.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ İdikut, *Türk Lavrensları*, pp. 22-24; "Kemalettin Sami Paşa İstanbul'un İşgali Günü Nasıl Kaçtığını Anlatıyor," *Dün ve Bugün* 9 (December 30, 1955), pp. 8-9.

⁷⁵ Ertürk, "MMSTM," pp. 282-285.

⁷⁶ "Suikastçılar Derdest Edildi," *Alemdar*, June 1, 1920, p. 1, cs. 1-2.

⁷⁷ "Nemrut Mustafa'nın Astığı Kuvay-ı Milliyeciler," *Dün ve Bugün* (January 1956): 12-13.

⁷⁸ Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri*, pp. 171-175; Ağaoğlu, *Bir Ömür Böyle Geçti*, pp. 14-17; Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1976), pp. 257-262; Yalman, *Turkey In My Time* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), pp. 92-101; Bleda, *İmparatorluğun Çöküşü*, pp. 126-130; Taha Toros, "Eski Nafia Nazırı Ali Münif Yeğena'nın Hatıraları," *Akşam*, October 26 - December 21, 1955.

By the end of May 1920, many "nationalist undesirables" in İstanbul had been arrested and exiled to Malta. Among them were deputies, leading members of *Karakol*, professors, journalists, and ex-cup men.⁷⁹ With Kara Kemal, Kara Vasıf, and Galatalı Şevket in exile, and Baha Sait abroad in Baku, the first central committee of *Karakol* was dispersed.

The Decline of Karakol

Staff Lieutenant Colonel Mıralı Mustafa (General Mustafa Muğlalı, 1882-1951)⁸⁰ tried to organize a new central committee of *Karakol*. However, these efforts were undermined by *Karakol*'s association with an Indian, Mustafa Sagir, who worked for British intelligence. Sagir posed as a delegate of the Indian Caliphate Organization and managed to infiltrate a particular *Karakol* cell. Consequently, a number of *Karakol* agents were arrested.⁸¹

Afterwards, Sagir went to Ankara with the intention to assassinate Mustafa Kemal Pasha. He pretended that he was running away from British surveillance in İstanbul. He first went to Greece and Bulgaria from where he arrived on the Black Sea shore of Turkey on his way to Ankara. Sagir had obtained *Karakol*'s seal of approval from agents who were at large in Bulgaria. Once in Ankara, he claimed that he was going to transfer 2.5 million pounds sterling which had been raised by the Muslims of India.

Moustafa Shagir était entré en relations à Constantinople avec différentes personnes ayant des relations avec les nationalistes et était présenté comme le représentant du Comité du Califat des Indes; il forma avec ceux-ci une société d'amitié turco-indienne. Ensuite il remit sous enveloppe non fermée, pour ne pas s'attirer des soupçons, au commissaire de l'Intérieur, certaines lettres devant être expédiées à Constantinople. Le commissaire finit par remarquer que ces lettres étaient écrites sur des grandes feuilles mais ne se composaient que de quelques phrases courtes et insignifiantes... plusieurs de ces lettres furent interceptées; leur examen révéla qu'elles contenaient des renseignements de toutes sortes écrites à l'encre invisible: renseignements sur la demeure de Moustapha Kemal

⁷⁹ Himmetoğlu, "General Merhum Muğlalı," in Kenan Esengin, *Orgeneral Muğlalı Olayı* (İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1974), pp. 18-19.

⁸⁰ Ertürk, "MMSTM," pp. 285-288.

⁸¹ "L'Exécution de Moustafa Shagir, Espion Anglais," *L'Echo d'Islam* (July 15, 1921), p. 3; Murad Sertoğlu, *Mustafa Sagir* (İstanbul: Güven Basım ve Yayınevi, 1955).

pacha, sur la vitesse et la marque de son automobile, sur les préparatifs militaires, sur les courants de divergences politiques a Angora. etc.⁸²

In spite of a British demand that Sagir's life be spared, which did not reach Ankara on time, the death sentence imposed by the Ankara Independence Tribunal was carried out on May 24, 1921.

The endorsement of Sagir's mission to Ankara by members of *Karakol* constituted an irredeemable mistake for an underground group to have made. Although *Karakol* continued to function under different names, its agents were gradually absorbed into other underground groups. On April 23, 1920, *Karakol* assumed the name *Zabitan* (Officers), which changed to *Yavuz* (Courageous) in October 1921. Devoid of energetic leadership and in Ankara's disfavor, *Karakol* no longer played an effective role in the resistance after 1920.⁸³

⁸² İhsan Eryavuz, "Milli Mücadelede Ankara İstiklâl Mahkemesinin Astığı İlk Yabancı Suikastçı," *Tarih Konuşuyor* 1: 2 (March 1964), pp. 122-127; Aksoley, "İstanbul'da Milli Mücadele," *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 2: 9 (October 1969), p. 79.

⁸³ Himmetoğlu, *KSIY*, 1: 86-87.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RESISTANCE AND UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATIONS IN İSTANBUL (1920-1923): M.M. FELÂH, AUXILIARY GROUPS

When the first Turkish National Assembly was formed on April 23, 1920, Ankara formally took over the intelligence work and underground activities in İstanbul. The Nationalists grew stronger, having inherited certain systems established by the *cuş*. There was continuity between *tm* and the subsequent underground organizations. As of April 1920, Hüsamettin Bey's (the director of *tm* in İstanbul), intelligence network began to function under direct orders from Ankara. By the end of 1920, Hüsamettin Bey defected to Ankara to head the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff.¹

The National Defense Group *Müdafaa-i Milliye (M.M.)*

In 1920, the military section of the National Defense Group (*Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*) was assigned to protect the Turkish population in İstanbul from potential attacks by non-Muslims. This cell was called the National Defense Group, *m.m.* for short. Leaders of *m.m.* had been members of *Karakol* and had already been active in their respective boroughs from where they could mobilize agents. Consecutively, *tm* was virtually transformed into *m.m.* The group smuggled war matériel and had the support of the Ottoman General Staff and the Ministry of War. Further, *m.m.* distinguished itself in intelligence work and counter propaganda. Through *m.m.*'s intelligence, Ankara was kept informed of anti-Nationalist intrigues, such as attempts to create uprisings in the east, and splits in the National Assembly. *m.m.* maintained surveillance over the anti-Kemalist associations in İstanbul as well as over any anti-Bolshevik activity.

m.m.'s first foothold in İstanbul was located in the Topkapı borough, where it established a chapter. The Şehremini chapter was organized by Topkapılı Canbaz Mehmet Bey (d. 1932), a *tm* member. Having served under Mustafa Kemal in Gallipoli, Topkapılı had

¹ TITE, 39k-n/16602 D. 1/11-12; Himmetoğlu, *KSIY*, 1: 95-124.

pacha, sur la vitesse et la marque de son automobile, sur les préparatifs militaires, sur les courants de divergences politiques a Angora. etc.⁸²

In spite of a British demand that Sagir's life be spared, which did not reach Ankara on time, the death sentence imposed by the Ankara Independence Tribunal was carried out on May 24, 1921.

The endorsement of Sagir's mission to Ankara by members of *Karakol* constituted an irredeemable mistake for an underground group to have made. Although *Karakol* continued to function under different names, its agents were gradually absorbed into other underground groups. On April 23, 1920, *Karakol* assumed the name *Zabitan* (Officers), which changed to *Yavuz* (Courageous) in October 1921. Devoid of energetic leadership and in Ankara's disfavor, *Karakol* no longer played an effective role in the resistance after 1920.⁸³

⁸² İhsan Eryavuz, "Milli Mücadelede Ankara İstiklâl Mahkemesinin Astığı İlk Yabancı Suikastçı," *Tarih Konuşuyor* 1: 2 (March 1964), pp. 122-127; Aksoley, "İstanbul'da Milli Mücadele," *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 2: 9 (October 1969), p. 79.

⁸³ Himmetoğlu, KSIY, 1: 86-87.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RESISTANCE AND UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATIONS IN İSTANBUL (1920-1923): M.M. FELÂH, AUXILIARY GROUPS

When the first Turkish National Assembly was formed on April 23, 1920, Ankara formally took over the intelligence work and underground activities in İstanbul. The Nationalists grew stronger, having inherited certain systems established by the *cup*. There was continuity between *TM* and the subsequent underground organizations. As of April 1920, Hüsamettin Bey's (the director of *TM* in İstanbul), intelligence network began to function under direct orders from Ankara. By the end of 1920, Hüsamettin Bey defected to Ankara to head the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff.¹

The National Defense Group Müdafaa-i Milliye (M.M.)

In 1920, the military section of the National Defense Group (*Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*) was assigned to protect the Turkish population in İstanbul from potential attacks by non-Muslims. This cell was called the National Defense Group, *M.M.* for short. Leaders of *M.M.* had been members of *Karakol* and had already been active in their respective boroughs from where they could mobilize agents. Consecutively, *TM* was virtually transformed into *M.M.* The group smuggled war matériel and had the support of the Ottoman General Staff and the Ministry of War. Further, *M.M.* distinguished itself in intelligence work and counter propaganda. Through *M.M.*'s intelligence, Ankara was kept informed of anti-Nationalist intrigues, such as attempts to create uprisings in the east, and splits in the National Assembly. *M.M.* maintained surveillance over the anti-Kemalist associations in İstanbul as well as over any anti-Bolshevik activity.

M.M.'s first foothold in İstanbul was located in the Topkapı borough, where it established a chapter. The Şehremini chapter was organized by Topkapılı Canbaz Mehmet Bey (d. 1932), a *TM* member. Having served under Mustafa Kemal in Gallipoli, Topkapılı had

¹ TITE, 39k-n/16602 D. 1/11-12; Himmetoğlu, KSIY, 1: 95-124.

provided protection to his pasha in İstanbul against a potential arrest before Mustafa Kemal departed for Anatolia. Topkapılı was familiar with many İstanbul thieves' and pickpockets' gangs, in addition with coachmen and porters. He used this manpower effectively in arsenal thefts and for the safe transportation of war matériel.²

The İstanbul Chief of Police, Colonel Esat, was a member of m.m.'s Central Committee. French intelligence sources described Esat Bey as an ardent Nationalist:

Le nouveau chef de la Police Essad Bey (frère d'Izzet Pacha) est un agent nationaliste puissant; il s'occupe actuellement à transformer la Police pour y faire entrer uniquement des nationalistes; il dispose ainsi, dans la ville de Constantinople d'une force de 3.000 policiers qui assistent en témoins bienveillants aux menées nationalistes dans la capitale.³

Ethem Pehlivan, the head of the coachmen's guild in Üsküdar, was a member of m.m. He and his men twice raided an arsenal in Erenköy (a suburb on the Asian side) which was under British guard. The British finally gathered the leftover war matériel and dumped it into the sea off the Princes' Islands on the Sea of Marmara.⁴

These raids were followed by another on the Kasımpaşa Navy arsenal and several others on the Zeytinburnu and Selimiye depots. The Ottoman police arrested Ethem Pehlivan and his associates, Naci Efendi and Nur Efendi of the clergy. (When the Damad Ferid Pasha cabinets were in power, an anti-Nationalist chief of police held that job.) An Ottoman tribunal sentenced to death one of Pehlivan's collaborators, Tevfik Sükûti, on June 12, 1920, along with Dramalı Rıza, because his name was mentioned among the plotters who were assigned to assassinate Damad Ferid Pasha.⁵

In November 1920, Topkapılı attempted to assassinate a British Intelligence Officer, Captain John G. Bennett, at whose hands many a Nationalist had suffered. Bennett was wounded but survived, albeit with a permanent limp.⁶

² FMA 20N1104 C38/1 Dos2, July 1921; Sami Sabit Karaman, *İstiklâl Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa* (n.p., n.d.), p. 14.

³ Kemal Koçer, *Kurtuluş Savaşlarımızda İstanbul (M.M. Grubu)* (n.p., n.d.), passim; Idem, "M.M. Grubu ve Aziz Ölüleri," *Yeni Sabah*, July 14, 1939, p. 3, cs. 1-2.

⁴ Kemal Öngören, "Üsküdar'dan Anadolu'ya Silah ve Cephaneler Nasıl Kaçırıldı?" *Perşembe* 20-38 (August 15, 1935 - March 16, 1936); Idem, *Perşembe* 38 (October 19, 1935): 10; Raif Karadağ, "Erenköyündeki Silah Deposunu Nasıl Boşaltmıştk?" *Dün ve Bugün* 2: 36 (July 13, 1956), pp. 22-27; Mithat Sanal, "Millî Mücadeleden Bir Yaprak," *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 2: 8 (September 1, 1968), pp. 28-34.

⁵ Jaeschke, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı Kronolojisi*, p. 107; *Alemdar*, June 1, 1920, p. 1, cs. 1-2.

⁶ Koçer, *Kurtuluş Savaşlarımızda İstanbul*, p. 26.

m.m.'s most significant contribution to the Nationalist cause was its intelligence work. A former tm agent, Captain Galip (Vardar), served as a liaison officer and interpreter in Damad Ferid's house. Through Galip Bey, who worked for Topkapılı, Mustafa Kemal received extremely valuable information regarding the strategy, position and formations of the Caliph's forces which were going to be sent against the Nationalists in 1920.⁷ While soldiers were being recruited to the Caliph's Army, Hüsamettin Bey's agents, who now worked for m.m., infiltrated camps and coffee houses where men gathered and spread word that the Sultan had called them to arms under British pressure, but that they should go over to the Nationalists and fight against their common enemy, the Greeks.⁸

When the Ottoman Chief of Staff, General Fevzi (Çakmak) escaped to Anatolia, Hüsamettin Bey followed. He proved very useful to Ankara through his tm network, which provided important information from İstanbul. However, before Hüsamettin Bey left İstanbul, he was involved in another counter-intelligence effort; one which had to do with the White Russians. By November 1920, General Wrangel, Commander of the Whites in southern Russia, had arrived in İstanbul with the remnants of his army. At about the same time, two warships and two submarines of the Russian fleet were being repaired in the Golden Horn. This seemed to corroborate Hüsamettin Bey's information that the Allies were planning to send a joint Greek-Russian fleet to Sinop. The armies were planning to occupy the Black Sea region while the fleet controlled the harbors to prevent the smuggling of arms and men to Anatolia.⁹ On November 18, the Allies censored news in the İstanbul newspaper, *Bosphore*, which announced that General Wrangel would fight against the Kemalist army.¹⁰ The mere fact that this piece of information was worth censoring lends credence to it.

In Wrangel's army were Muslim Circassians and Tatars both at the level of officers and enlisted men. During the war, tm had trained a number of Tatar youths in İstanbul to work against Tsarist Russia. These people were still in İstanbul and congregated at the "Tatar Charity Association."¹¹ m.m. agents asked the Tatars to make contact

⁷ Selâhattin Salıksık, "Kurtuluş Savaşının Gizli Örgütü, M.M. Grubu," *Hürriyet*, August 30 - September 12, 1972.

⁸ Ertürk, "MMSTM," pp. 269-271.

⁹ Ertürk, "MMSTM," pp. 354-355.

¹⁰ FMA 20N1126 C/41 Dos1.

¹¹ FMA 20N1101 C/37 Dos3, June 2, 1921. In 1921, the Ottoman Chief of Police, Hasan Tahsin, was to alert Major Streiff of the Allied Police Control against this association, claiming that it was a place where Bolsheviks made contacts.

with Muslims in Wrangel's army who disembarked for Friday prayers. Their main contact was Admiral Sadık Islamov (d. 1926), who helped spread the message in the ranks that the Nationalists in Ankara were not Bolsheviks and that Wrangel's army should not fight against fellow-Nationalists.¹²

According to an M.M. intelligence report, dated December 15, 1920, a Russian marshal and his aide had gone to Gallipoli to conduct propaganda among Wrangel's units and ensure that they would not fight against the Turkish Nationalists. When General Wrangel issued an order that the soldiers were to be transported to fight Kemalists, some rank and file soldiers rebelled and killed a number of pro-Wrangel and British officers. Marshal Polkovichev (?), Captain Mustafa (ev?), Colonel Saratev (skii?), General Anzerik and Colonel Stamoizin were arrested.¹³ The French military tribunal in Thrace sentenced Marshal Polkovichev and Colonel Stamoizin to death. Reportedly, the Marshal had declared three times that Mustafa Kemal was not a Bolshevik, but a patriot and a nationalist, before he was executed.¹⁴

Thus, counter-propaganda carried out by the İstanbul underground must have shown the Allies the impracticality of using Wrangel's army against the Nationalists. There was already a warning precedent; many soldiers from the Caliph's Army had gone over to the Nationalists.¹⁵ This episode illustrates continuity and change in the Ottoman intelligence establishment. M.M. was the beneficiary of TM's work. In this case, the Tatar youth that TM had trained as agents became the important link between the Nationalists and the White Russian army.

Women of the Underground

On January 13, 1920, the underground organized another demonstration in Sultanahmet Square. Approximately 10,000 people gathered to protest the potential internationalization of İstanbul and the

¹² Ertürk, "MMSTM," pp. 357-364.

¹³ I was unable to verify these names. The only list of the Russian dead are those who were buried in the Russian cemetery in Gallipoli obtained from V.F. Baumgarten, et al., *Russkie v Gallipoli* (Berlin: n.p., 1923). Aside from the problem of transliterating Russian names into Ottoman Turkish, it is possible that traitors, condemned to death by a military tribunal, might have been buried in unmarked graves.

¹⁴ TITE 39/13242.

¹⁵ Ertürk, "MMSTM," p. 318; Yahya Akyüz, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Fransız Kamuyu, 1919-1922* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), p. 167.

continuation of arrests. One of the speakers at the demonstration was Nakiye Hanım (Elgün, 1882-1954) who encouraged the listeners to fight against the "soiling hand of the invader."¹⁶ Three days later, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* published an extensive interview with her, highlighting her respectable teaching career and her support for the Nationalist cause.¹⁷ By making her an example of virtue, the paper tried to promote patriotism among the populace; the message was that if a respectable woman supported this cause, respectable men should do likewise and perhaps more.

In August 1920, Admiral de Robeck pointed to the role that Turkish women played in the resistance.

Attention has been drawn to the important role open to Turkish ladies in underground politics by some few details which have recently appeared in the Turkish press regarding the Nationalist and Unionist intrigues of the wife of KIAZIM Bey (Orbay), an ex-ADC of Enver Pasha. Our enquiries show that this lady who is also Enver Pasha's sister was connected with the Turkish Women's Association which was started in May 1920 with the main object of securing, through the help of the lady members of the Red Crescent Association regular correspondence with Anatolia... The Association which was in touch with a Unionist Centre at Rhodes, which was started by Azmi Bey, former chief of the Turkish police, whose wife travelled backwards and forwards between Constantinople and that island with Italian assistance. All the women's clubs and associations in Constantinople are controlled by this main Association and they were all used for political purposes under the cloak of charity... The Association was in close touch with Turkish ladies in Europe whose centre was at Munich under the direction of Princess Nimet Mukhtar, a member of the family of the former Grand Vizier, Said Halim Pasha. Constant communication is maintained by letters and personal visits between Rome, Lausanne and Munich and it is alleged that the centre at Munich is the headquarters of an intelligence organisation for the benefit of Mustapha Kemal. Although the Constantinople Association had been broken up by Turkish police, none of its principal members have been arrested and their activities, therefore, are not likely to cease.¹⁸

However, the arrest of women was becoming commonplace. Saim Hanım (Asker, d. 1951) was one of these women arrested for the protest speech she made at the Kadıköy demonstration on May 22,

¹⁶ FO 371/5162, February 3, 1920. From Admiral de Robeck to Curzon; "Une Manifestation A Stamboul," *L'Illustration* (February 7, 1920), p. 109.

¹⁷ "Nakiye Hanım Hemşiremizle Bir Hasbihal," *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, January 16, 1920, p. 1, cs. 5-6. Nakiye Hanım was the Principal of the Fevziye Lycée in Üsküdar. She was an active Nationalist who collaborated with Galatalı Şevket of *Karakol* and respective resistance groups. She served as a deputy from Erzurum in the National Assembly as of 1934.

¹⁸ FO 371/5170, August 16, 1920. From de Robeck to Curzon.

1919. After her release, she managed to escape to Anatolia, fought in the War of Independence and was wounded in the process. For her contributions to the cause, she was awarded the Independence Medal.¹⁹

Women who worked for M.M., such as Mediha Hanım (Orbay) and Şahende Hanım (a midwife in Topkapı, and mother-in-law of Recep Peker, Nationalist deputy and General Secretary of the Republican People's Party) were taken into custody that year. Although Şahende Hanım was tortured, she did not disclose information.²⁰

Another woman who worked for M.M. was the poet, Şüküfe Nihal (Başar, 1896-1973). Her husband, Ahmet Hamdi, was an agent of M.M. She disseminated much Nationalist propaganda in the form of leaflets.²¹

M.M. found other supporters of the Nationalist Movement in the Sultan's Palace, namely Naime Sultan (1876-?), Abdülhamid II's daughter, and Fehime Sultan (1875-1929), Sultan Murad V's daughter. Fehime Sultan was a particularly valuable source of information to the underground. She had no love for her uncle, Sultan Vahidettin, who had kept the children of Sultan Murad under close surveillance. The daughters in particular were practically kept under house arrest for years. Fehime Sultan's older uncle, Abdülhamid, had not even bothered arranging marriages for her and her sister until after they were thirty years of age. Fehime Sultan was a passionate constitutionalist and a patriot. In 1911, she had composed a piano sonata, entitled "Pour La Constitution." She was also independent in her personal life. She forced Vahidettin to dissolve her first marriage when she fell in love with an officer.²²

¹⁹ Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, *İstiklâl Harbinde Mücahit Kadınlarımız* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 1988), pp. 54-55; Arıburnu, *Millî Mücadelede İstanbul Müstahkemleri*, pp. 36-37.

²⁰ Hiçyılmaz, *Belgelerle Kurtuluş Savaşında Casusluk Örgütleri* (İstanbul: Yüce Yayınları, 1981), p. 83; Ertürk, "MMSTM," p. 311. Hüsamettin Bey and Şahende Hanım were arrested at the same time and were accused of a plot to overthrow the Damad Ferid Pasha cabinet. They were subsequently freed for lack of evidence.

²¹ Ertürk, "MMSTM," p. 414; Şehmus Güzel, "Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal Değişim ve Kadın," *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985) 3-4: 858-874; Halide Nusret Zorlutuna, *Bir Devrin Romanı* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1978), pp. 277-284; Adnan Giz, *Bir Zamanlar Kadıköy* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1988), pp. 187-193.

²² M. Çağatay Uluçay, *Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1985), p. 167; Şapolyo, *Osmanlı Sultanları Tarihi* (İstanbul: Rafet Zaimler Yayınevi, 1961), p. 413; "Fehime Sultan's Diary," Samih Tiryakioğlu Archive, Moda, İstanbul.

Fehime Sultan discovered Damad Ferid Pasha's secret plan to induce dissension between the people and the Nationalist forces by promoting partisanship for the Sultan-Caliph. She alerted M.M. that Ferid Pasha was negotiating with the Kurdish associations in İstanbul to arrange an anti-Nationalist uprising in the east. Moreover, Fehime Sultan cautioned M.M. about a certain Nazım Bey, a deputy from Tokat in the National Assembly. Nazım Bey (Ramsor, 1867-1935) was an agent of Damad Ferid who was paid 4,500 LT to start an opposition party in Ankara, which he did (the self-proclaimed People's Socialist Party), the *Halk İştirakiyyun Fırkası*.²³ In 1921, Nazım Bey was arrested, tried and sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor for establishing a secret communist party and for trying forcibly to take over the government.²⁴ Later that year, Nazım Bey and his friends were pardoned,²⁵ perhaps because Mustafa Kemal had good reason not to take Nazım Bey's "communism" seriously.

Defections to Ankara

Meanwhile, the Allies were faced with the problem of Turkish military and civilian officers who were leaving İstanbul to join the Nationalists.

Le départ des officiers turcs pour l'Anatolie est réglé par une commission composée de 8 membres aux ordres de Moustapha Kemal; elle facilite elle-même toutes les formalités pour le départ. Elle est d'accord avec le gouvernement et avec le Cie. Sérail-Séfaine qui donne la passage gratuit; les frais de voyage sont payés aux intéressés par la commission. En raison des difficultés créées ces derniers jours par le contrôle interallié pour la passage par la Sérail-Séfaine, le transport se fait actuellement par les bateaux du Lloyd Triestino. Une entente a été réalisée à ce sujet entre la commission et la Cie. Italienne qui a accepté de fournir, tous les dix jours un bateau pour les ports de la Mer Noire. La majorité des passagers seront des officiers, puisque les autres personnes n'ont aucun intérêt à passer en Anatolie. Le Lundi 3 Janvier, le bateau "Praga" du Lloyd Triestino devait quitter Constantinople pour la Mer Noire. Le commandant du bord a reçu une recommandation du Haut Commissaire italien pour le passage de plusieurs officiers turcs. Il les a logés dans la cabine "13" sur la porte de laquelle on a mis ensuite l'inscription "Réservé au

²³ Razi Yalkın, "Muhterem Casuslar," *Tarih Dünyası* 2: 12-14 (October 1 - November 1, 1950).

²⁴ Selek, *Anadolu İhtilâli*, pp. 573-574; Borak, "İlk Türk Komünistleri İstiklâl Mahkemesinde," *Günaydın*, July 25 - August 14, 1975.

²⁵ Zeki Sarıhan, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Günleri* 3 vols. (Ankara: Öğretmen Dünyası Yayınları, 1982) 3: 509.

capitaine." Il s'agissait de 3 officiers d'E.M. dont 2 colonels, et un général, 2 colonels d'Infanterie, 1 colonel d'artillerie. Avec eux, deux valises portant des munitions.²⁶

On the one hand, it was not a bad idea for the Allies to rid İstanbul of experienced, but unemployed officers. On the other hand, Allied prestige and authority were being challenged. By February 1921, a "solution" was found.

Les Hauts Commissaires ont estimé que leur intervention au sujet de cette question ne serait pas justifiée et qu'il appartient au Gouvernement Ottoman de prendre, s'il le juge à propos, des mesures à l'égard des officiers au fonctionnaires qui viedraient à manquer à leurs devoirs.²⁷

The Ottoman court martial had already, the year before, reacted by condemning to death in absentia those officers who joined Mustafa Kemal.²⁸ On July 6, 1921, the Ottoman Minister of War, Ziya Pasha (Minister from October 1920 to November 1922), of the Tefvik Pasha cabinet, asked the Grand Vizier's office to rescind the legal proceedings concerning 823 people who had joined the Nationalists. Ziya Pasha's request was approved by the Council of Ministers.²⁹ This act meant that the Ottoman cabinet overtly favored the Nationalists. The defection of officers to the Kemalists was one thing, but gun running was an entirely different matter.

Arms Smuggling

The bulk of quality war matériel that reached the Kemalist forces came from occupied İstanbul. The M.M. group alone managed to smuggle 38,000 tons of guns, ammunition, equipment and vehicles to Ankara.³⁰ During the first days of March 1921, the British authorities, alerted by an informant, searched the premises of the Messarburnu Guards and found 474 guns, 7 machine guns, 25 hand grenades and

²⁶ FMA 20N1110 C/42 Dos5, January and February 4, 1921. From Colonel Rougier to Charpy; FMA 20N1102 n.c. Dos 37/1, January 31, 1921. From Charpy to the French High Commissioner.

²⁷ FMA 20N1110 C/42 Dos5, February 15, 1921. From Colonel Rougier to Charpy.

²⁸ Jaeschke, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, p. 82.

²⁹ Hamdi Atamer, "Milli Mücadeleye Katılanlar Hakkında Askeri Yargıtay'ın Kararı," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 1: 3 (December 1956), pp. 3-8.

³⁰ Hüseyin Dağtekin, "İstiklâl Savaşında Anadolu'ya Kaçırılan Mühimmat ve Askeri Eşya Hakkında Tanzim Edilmiş Mühim Bir Vesika," *Tarih Vesikaları* 1: 16 (1955).

35 cases of ammunition. Moreover, 8 machine guns had been stolen from the Davutpaşa barracks.³¹ It is likely that all the hidden and stolen matériel were to be handed over to M.M. since that was the only viable underground group at the time. The Ottoman Minister of War, Ziya Pasha, tried to explain this away, citing that officers had not been paid for three months.

Le crise financière qui regne à Constantinople s'ajoutant aux conditions actuelles où se trouve Anatolie, a exposé les officiers et fonctionnaires militaires à des difficultés de vie insurmontables. A la suite de cet état des choses des incidents, comme vol d'armes, incidents qu'on constatait très rarement avant l'armistice, ont commencé à se produire.³²

On March 10, 1921, a motor-boat was caught in the Bosphorus, carrying 264 cases of ammunition to the Kemalist army.³³ By the end of the month, General Harington ordered that stringent measures be taken against the smuggling of war matériel, which was now "being practised upon an extensive scale."³⁴ At the weekly meeting of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control on April 4, 1921, Colonel A.N. Bekwith explained,

Selon la rapport, qui contient le nombre des effectifs de l'Armée Turque le 1^{er} Mars, lequel rapport fut reçu il y a deux jours, il paraît que, pendant le mois de février, il y avait lieu des pertes très sérieuses de matériels de guerre. Entre autres, 400 fusils, 400 caisses de munitions, 63 revolvers, 15 voitures de munitions, furent perdus.³⁵

Colonel Bekwith had spoken to Ziya Pasha regarding the matter.

Il a fait beaucoup des excuses, et il me paraît qu'il essayait d'abriter ces officiers subalternes. Il n'a guère démenti qu'il connaissait ces pertes au commencement de mars. Je lui ai demandé pourquoi, dans ces cas, il ne m'en avait pas averti. Il m'a répondu que les pertes les plus importants (c'est à dire 18 mitrailleuses) avaient été exposées, mais que les autres pertes avaient eu lieu peu à peu, et qu'il aurait été très difficile de rendre compte de chaque perte individuelle. Il n'a rien répondu quand je lui ai fait voir que ces pertes indiquaient une moyenne de 15 fusils et de 15 caisses de munitions par jour.³⁶

On May 21, 1921, 151 guns and bayonets were stolen by military cadets from the Beylerbeyi Gendarmery School.³⁷ During the sum-

³¹ FMA 20N1104 C38/1 Dos2, March 11, 1921. From Lieutenant Colonel Vicq to Charpy.

³² FMA 20N1104 C38/1 Dos2, March 8, 1921. From Ziya Pasha to Vicq.

³³ FMA 20N1106 C38/4 Dos1.

³⁴ FMA 20N1104 C38/2, n.n.

³⁵ FMA 20N1110 C41/1 Dos1.

³⁶ FMA 20N1110 C41/1 Dos1.

³⁷ FMA 20N1102 C37/1, n.n.

mer of 1919, approximately 800 students of the Military Academy in Kuleli, on the Asian side, had been forced out of their boarding school by the British in order to make room for Armenian orphans. After spending the summer in tents in the Kağıthane Meadow, on the Golden Horn, these students were moved to the Maçka barracks, on the European side. Muslim Indian guards usually overlooked occasions when the underground, with the help of the students, stole war matériel from the depots. When the Allies learned of the thefts, they moved the students back to the Anatolian side, to the Beylerbeyi Gendarmery School. One night, a group of Laz seamen from the Black Sea approached the school in a motor-boat. With the students' help, they removed the arms and munitions and took them to Anatolia.³⁸

Ziya Pasha promptly reported the theft to Colonel Bekwith. The Minister's letter ended with an apology, which was clearly a ruse: "Informé du fait, le commandant local de la gendarmerie se rendit immédiatement sur les lieux mais les voleurs s'étant déjà échappés à bord du moteur, ne put les arrêter."³⁹ There were other major thefts of munitions including from the arsenals of Çobançeşme (close to St. Stephano) from where 250,000 cartridges were stolen, and Karaağaç (on the Golden Horn) from where 500 cases of ammunition were lost.⁴⁰ Since the theft of war matériel took place mostly from arsenals for which Turkish authorities were responsible, the Allies decided that either all depots were to be guarded by Allied soldiers or that the materials should be destroyed.⁴¹ Colonel Bekwith was right to suspect complicity on the part of the Ottoman Ministry of War in these matters, but he did not have concrete evidence to accuse the Minister directly.

Not only was an Ottoman minister implicated in thefts of war matériel, but also the French occupation forces chose to turn a blind eye to such activities. On May 24, 1921, General Harington's office informed the French that "A certain amount of ammunition found its way from the ZEİTOUNBURNU (sic) arsenal to the Nationalists about the end of April or the beginning of May."⁴² Although General Haring-

³⁸ Interview with Retired Air Force General Tekin Arıburun (1905-1990), Ankara, April 20, 1986; Tahsin Ünal, "122 Yıllık Bir İrfan Yuvası, Kuleli Lisesi," *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 2: 7 (August 1, 1968), pp. 12-16; "New Armenian Orphanage in Constantinople," *The Orient* 7: 48 (October 17, 1920), p. 47.

³⁹ FMA 20N1110 C41/1 Dos1, June 10, 1921.

⁴⁰ Emrullah Nutku, "İstiklâl Savaşında Denizciler: İstanbul'da Yeraltı Çalışmaları," *Yakın Tarihimiz* 1: 12 (May 17, 1962).

⁴¹ FMA 20N1110 C41/1 Dos1.

⁴² FMA 20N1112 C/46 Dos1.

ton cautioned General Prioux, Commander of the French forces in Bakırköy, that he had reliable information on Kemalists who were planning once more to raid the Zeytinburnu arsenal,⁴³ the theft was accomplished anyway. One of the M.M. leaders, Major Kemal (General Koçer) maintained that the raid was conducted with the knowledge of the French High Commissioner, General Pellé.⁴⁴

There were not enough Allied soldiers to guard all the depots; therefore, the Allied Command decided to destroy the war matériel. Ziya Pasha objected, arguing that the Armistice Convention did not contain a clause which allowed for the destruction of Ottoman War matériel. Instead, the Minister was willing to let the French guard the arsenals.⁴⁵ Accordingly, on June 12, the French took over 1933 cases of artillery ammunition and 200 guns from the Davutpaşa Mosque depot to St. Stephano and Rami barracks.⁴⁶ Twelve artillery guns were retained in Rami, but 3 cases of explosives were destroyed.⁴⁷ Another 1339 guns, 570 bombs, and other ammunition were surrendered to the Maçka depot under British guard.⁴⁸

The Inter-Allied Commission on Disarmament recommended that after leaving 300 rounds of ammunition per man (there were 8000 Turkish soldiers in İstanbul, 2000 of whom were in the gendarmery) the rest of the war matériel should be destroyed by Ottoman authorities under Allied supervision.⁴⁹ However, General Harington was not about to take any chances.

I consider that the actual destruction of the S.A.A. (Surplus Artillery Ammunition) should be carried out by British and French troops and not by the Ottoman authorities... I would also further suggest that the Ottoman authorities are not informed of our proposed action, until we are ready to put our plans into execution. This will avoid special attempts being made by the Turks, to make away with the ammunition.⁵⁰

On September 8, 1921, the Inter-Allied Commission on Disarmament was informed that war matériel was disappearing from Tophane, an arsenal on the European shore, the seafront of which was not controlled. A British gunboat was immediately assigned to

⁴³ Ibid., August 15, 1921.

⁴⁴ Koçer, *Kurtuluş Savaşlarımızda İstanbul*, pp. 88-94; Himmetoğlu, KSİY, 1: 409.

⁴⁵ FMA 20N1110 C41/1 Dos2, n.d.

⁴⁶ Ibid., Dos1, July 8, 1921.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ FMA 20N1102 C37/1, n.n., June 12, 1921.

⁴⁹ FMA 20N1110 C41/1 Dos1, June 1, 1921. From Prioux to Pellé.

⁵⁰ FMA 20N1112 C/46 Dos1.

patrol the shore.⁵¹ Detonators, fuses and cartridges in the Bosphorus forts had already been destroyed on General Harington's orders. However, when the French decided to destroy shells, the Ottoman Minister of War objected again. An argument ensued between the Allies and the Minister as to whether Turkish war matériel was Allied property. The Directing Committee of Allied Generals overruled the Armistice clause which stated, "instruction (sic) for the method of employment of equipment, arms and munitions and means of transport will be carried out by the Turkish government."⁵²

The naval gunpowder factory in Okmeydanı had been sealed but was left under Turkish guard. In 1921, the underground took gunpowder from there to the shipbuilding yard in Aynalıkavak on the Golden Horn. The theft was carried out through the roof of the building so as not to disturb the seals on the doors and arouse suspicion.⁵³

The Allies did not want to advertise to the people of İstanbul that such thefts occurred. On September 20, the Allied censor eliminated news in the *Bosphore* which stated that the Allied police had discovered two large cannon in a boat on the Bosphorus which was being smuggled to the Kemalist army, and that the captain and his crew were arrested.⁵⁴

Sabotage

The Allies took stringent measures to prevent smuggling. This, in turn, increased the likelihood of sabotage by the underground. Hence, the forces of occupation were alerted against potential acts of sabotage. The Allied intelligence agents began to keep a closer watch on suspects.

Le nommé Souat, fils du Muezzin en Chef de la Grande Mosquée d'Eyoub, est à la tête d'une bande qui se propose de faire sauter les casernes Françaises des environs d'Eyoub. Il porte sur lui des documents très compromettants et possède en certain nombre de grenades à mains de bombes et d'autres munitions. Pour enquête discrète...⁵⁵

⁵¹ FMA 20N1091 C/27 Dos1.

⁵² Ibid., Minutes of the Meeting, Committee of Control and Organization, October 11, 1921.

⁵³ İrfan Hilâl, "Kelle Koltukta Çalışa Çabalaya Baruthaneyi Anadoluya Aktarmıştık," *Dün ve Bugün* 20 (March 16, 1956): 10-11.

⁵⁴ FMA 20N1127 C/42 Dos1.

⁵⁵ FMA 20N1106 C38/4 Dos1, September 23, 1921.

The young man was put under surveillance, but there was insufficient evidence to incriminate him directly.⁵⁶

In September 1921, General Harington claimed to have discovered a plot to assassinate him. The Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy, Andrew Ryan (1876-1949), later recalled that "there was some commotion over a local report of a plot to engineer a revolution in Constantinople and to assassinate General Harington. I believe that I was credited in some quarters with the authorship of this story."⁵⁷ In the verbatim report of interviews at İnebolu between Major J. Douglas Henry and Refet Pasha, Ankara's Minister of National Defense, had directly accused Ryan, Damad Ferid Pasha, and Sait Molla, the president of the Friends of England Society, of devising the story of the plot in order to bring down the Tevfik Pasha cabinet.

Why should we assassinate the general, whose every dealing with the Turks had been straight forward. If we wanted to remove anybody we should start with Mr. Ryan... We hold the view that Mr. Ryan does not want General Harington in Constantinople and this faked assassination plot very nearly succeeded in killing two birds with one stone.⁵⁸

This claim was built on information that all was not well between the British High Commission and the Military Command. Admiral Bristol was of the same opinion:

It appears from very reliable information that there is a difference of opinion between the British High Commission and the military command regarding both political and military procedures. The local British commercial interests backed by Ryan, chief political officer of the British High Commission are believed to have paramount influence with the Foreign Office, and, therefore controlling policy regarding Near East. It is believed that Harington proceeded to London with propositions to establish peace without further delay or else British troops together with British High Commission to evacuate Turkey.⁵⁹

Andrew Ryan was involved in rather suspicious dealings. For, example, he and Damad Ferid were indeed in close touch. It was very unusual for a Grand Vizier to communicate with a person of low rank, such as a political officer. Among the Ryan papers in St. Antony's College, Oxford, are a number of personal, handwritten

⁵⁶ FMA 20N1095 C/31 Dos3, October 1, 1921. From Colombani to Chief of Intelligence.

⁵⁷ Ryan, *The Last of the Dragomans*, p. 157.

⁵⁸ Şimşir, *BDOA*, 4: 108-109.

⁵⁹ U.S. Records, 867.00/1413, June 2, 1921. From Bristol to Secretary of State.

letters, in bad French, from the Pasha to Ryan. One letter, a cryptic, undated note referred to a "project."

Cher Monsieur Ryan,

Nous m'avez téléphone c'est après midi par l'appareil officielle qui transmet la voie confusément. J'ai compris que mon projet n'a aucun inconvénient et qu'il peut être exécuté. Pour éviter un malentendu veuillez me le confirmer en me disant: votre projet est bon, vous pouvez l'exécuter. Toujours Votre dévoué, Damad Feride.⁶⁰

Sir Horace Rumbold, the British High Commissioner, was not sure who the culprits of General Harington's supposed assassination plot were.

You will have seen from my telegrams that military authorities have unearthed a plot at Constantinople having for its objective to create a revolution in this town, seize the material of war in the Turkish government depots, produce dissatisfaction amongst the Indian troops and assassinate General Harington and other officers. The military authorities are confident that the plot is a genuine one and it is a fact that when the Turkish Minister of War and the Chief of Police were summoned to arrest the individuals suspected of complicity in the plot, they admitted that they knew of the existence of the Society to which the said individuals belonged, though they professed to be shocked at its objectives as revealed to them. My colleagues who are consulted at the time are sceptical about the genuineness of the plot.⁶¹

Sir Horace could not tell whether the plot was planned by a Kemalist organization or by one of the opposition parties to overthrow the Tefvik Pasha cabinet, in which case the pro-Ferid FEP was implicated.⁶²

The story of the "İstanbul plot" contained many half-truths and appeared to be a careless, but officious piece of intelligence work. The informant was a certain Cemali, who previously worked for the Italians, but was now in British employ as an agent of the Special Elements Office. In September 1920, a British agent's report from Ankara had drawn attention to a "Turkish Deliverance Committee," (Türk Kurtuluş Cemiyeti), which allegedly had the unanimous approval of the National Assembly.⁶³ The agent further alleged that the

⁶⁰ Ryan Papers.

⁶¹ Rumbold Papers, Nos. 215-221, September 14, 1921.

⁶² Rumbold Papers, Nos. 215-221, October 4, 1921. From Rumbold to Curzon; Bernachot, *Les Armées Françaises*, p. 220.

⁶³ *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları* 4 vols. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985) I: April 24, 1920 – February 21, 1921. No vote regarding such an issue was taken throughout 1920. Ankara may have fed this agent disinformation as a veiled threat.

committee was organized just like the "infamous" Unionist TM; its statute said that it was to plan terrorist acts in occupied territories.⁶⁴ The so-called Deliverance Committee in Ankara and the *Halâskâr-ı Vatan Cemiyeti* (Society for the Deliverance of the Country), an offshoot of the anti-Unionist FEP in İstanbul, could be interpreted as being the same organization because the titles were synonymous. This previous information might have obfuscated an already confusing situation. Further, Sir Horace may have had reason to expect FEP's and Friends of England Society's hand in spreading the rumor of an assassination plot. And the French and Italians may have used the opportunity to discredit General Harington since he had overreacted to the problem by threatening the Ottoman government with enforcing strict martial law. The French were particularly cynical,

It is an open secret in Constantinople that the French authorities did not feel that General Harington's action was justified by the evidence submitted. In fact, they doubted the existence of the plot and were inclined to believe that the British general had acted on information which he had received through Greek sources which were of course interested in putting Turks in the worst possible light in the eyes of the world.⁶⁵

The French government protested to British government about the action that General Harington proposed to take. In addition, the Allied High Commissioners, including Sir Horace, declared that General Harington should act on his own responsibility.⁶⁶

The Ottoman authorities randomly arrested twelve people who happened to have had police records; none of them belonged to any underground organization. While General Harington advertised the names of those arrested as having been the leaders of the secret organization, the real protagonists of the underground continued to work in relative safety,⁶⁷ and the plot remained a mystery.

Anti-Nationalist Organizations

Meanwhile, M.M. identified the militant anti-Nationalists in İstanbul by infiltrating their associations. Several societies had been estab-

⁶⁴ FO 371/5171, September 14, 1920. From de Robeck to Curzon; Bernachot, *Les Armées Françaises*, p. 221.

⁶⁵ U.S. Records 867.00/1450, n.d. From Bristol to Secretary of State.

⁶⁶ Hayri Mutlucağ, "Aciz Bir Hükümet, Küstah Bir Müstevli," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 1: 16 (March 1968), pp. 13-21; FO 406/47, September 22, 1921. From Curzon to Hardinge.

⁶⁷ Ahmet Hamdi Başar, "Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyet'e," *Barış Dünyası* 52 (September 1966): 57.

lished by the followers of the FEP and Friends of England Society in order to oppose the Nationalists.⁶⁸ Among these were the Association for the Elevation of the Country, (Osmanlı İlay-ı Vatan Cemiyeti), led by Kiraz Hamdi Pasha, a member of the FEP and its religious/revolutionary extension, the Path to Righteousness, (Tarikat-ı Salâhiye Cemiyeti). In addition, there was the Anatolian Association, (Anadolu Cemiyeti).⁶⁹

Ankara's representative, Hamid Bey, reported that the Anatolian Association was working to bring down the Tefvik Pasha cabinet and to declare the Ankara government illegitimate.⁷⁰ FEP activity was not lost on the French.

Agissements des anglophiles et des membres de l'opposition: Un nouveau comité sous le nom la "Comité Anatolien" se serait formé et travaillerait avec une grande activité. Un des chefs de ce nouveau parti, MEHMET ALI Bey, ex-Ministre de l'Intérieur et son frère KEMAL Bey, maire de Buyukdéré, ré-uniraient tous les soirs dans le Haut-Bosphore, les membres du comité des anglophiles. Parmi ceux-ci se trouveraient aussi deux arméniens: BOYADJIAN Effendi; ex-gouverneur, actuellement attaché au bureau de traduction du Haut-Commissariat Britannique et LEON PAPAZIAN, membre du Conseil d'administration de Péra; SAID MOLLA Bey, déploie à son tour, depuis quelque temps une nouvelle activité et rassemble, également les membres du parti des anglophiles. Il mène actuellement un vie très large alimenté par les fonds qu'il reçoit des autorités Britanniques. Toutes ces menées ont pour but de renverser le Cabinet actuel et le remplacer par un Ministère anglophile avec comme président FERID Pacha, ex-grand vèzir.⁷¹

M.M. had placed an agent in the Path to Righteousness Society, an Organization which pretended to be a form of Islamic masonry with mystic rituals.⁷² The Sultan and the FEP tried to counter the Nationalist block by investing in religious education and promoting religiously oriented political associations. At a time when the Ottoman government was having difficulty in paying the salaries of its soldiers,

⁶⁸ Çukurova, "Kurtuluş Savaşı Yıllarında İngiliz Muhhibler Cemiyeti," pp. 57-58.

⁶⁹ Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, 2: 518-523 and 576-585.

⁷⁰ Himmetoğlu, *KSYI*, 1: 346-347.

⁷¹ FMA 20N1104 C38/2, n.n., July 14 and 19, 1922. A branch of the Anatolian Committee which was supported by the abovementioned societies and Greece was reorganized on the island of Mytilene as late as 1927. At that time, some of its agents tried to infiltrate Turkey with the intention of assassinating Mustafa Kemal. Hacı Sami, Eşref Kuşçubaşı's brother (both of TM), was the leader of this plot. Hacı Sami was killed upon landing in Kuşadası. Eşref was implicated a second time, after having defected to the Greeks in 1920 with Ethem Bey, the Circassian. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, 2: 580; Kandemir, *Atatürk'e İzmir Suikastinden Ayrı 11 Suikast* (İstanbul: Ekicigil Yayınları, 1955), pp. 49-100.

⁷² TITE 39d/14392 D.1 B/4; 39/10896/13.

civil servants and teachers, approximately twenty-four schools of religion in Anatolia were being subsidized by the Sultah-Caliph, probably with money which came from the forces of occupation.⁷³

In İstanbul, the Consul General of the short-lived Republic of Azerbaijan (1918-1920), Mehmet Haşim Bey, who had remained in the Consulate under the new regime, was a Kemalist agent par excellence. He was able to gather information about anti-Nationalist societies and kept M.M. abreast of their nature. Mehmet Haşim, in a supposedly supportive attitude, asked the president of the Association for the Elevation of the Country, Yahya Adnan Pasha, whether this society was strong enough to unite smaller anti-Nationalist groups such as the Anatolian Association, the Guardian Officers Association (Nigehbân-ı Zabitan Cemiyeti) and the İstanbul Association.⁷⁴ Mehmet Haşim found out from Yahya Adnan Pasha that the Ottoman government did not grant the Anatolian Association a permit to function as an association.⁷⁵ The Pasha had said, however, that the Association for the Elevation of the Country intended to use the Anatolian Association as a counter-revolutionary force against the Nationalists.⁷⁶

On October 31, 1921, Mehmet Haşim reported that some members of the anti-Bolshevik Azerbaijani *Musavat* Party were working at home and in İstanbul to establish a strong organization that would lead the Azerbaijanis to revolt, whereupon they would revoke the treaty of friendship with Ankara and invite the British back to Azerbaijan.⁷⁷ The Guardian Officers Association, supported by the FEP and *Musavat* Party members, was preparing to assign Turkish officers to Azerbaijan, where they would lead a revolt against the Bolshevik government there. Mehmet Haşim identified these officers and provided Ankara with their photographs.⁷⁸ The Ankara government had to keep an eye on all anti-Bolshevik activity, because it could not afford to antagonize the revolutionary Russian government. The Nationalists had recently secured the northeastern border, which freed forces to concentrate on the Greeks invading from the west.

⁷³ Fehmi Yavuz, "Darü'l-Hilafeti'l-Âliye Medreseleri ve Kurtuluş Savaşı," in *Atatürk'ün 100. Doğum Yılında Türkiye'de Din Eğitimi Semineri 23-25 Nisan 1981* (Ankara: İlahiyat Vakfı Yayınları, 1981), pp. 67-72.

⁷⁴ TITE 39d/14323 D.3. September 8, 1921; Göztepe "Nigehbân İsimli Meşhur Askeri Cemiyet," *Dün ve Bugün* 18 (March 2, 1956): 20-21.

⁷⁵ TITE 39d/14321 and 14328 D.3, n.d.

⁷⁶ TITE 39d/14378 D3/1.

⁷⁷ TITE 39/16686, October 31, 1921.

⁷⁸ TITE 39/16685, October 21, 1921.

The pro-British faction of the Ottomans in İstanbul had spread themselves very thin by creating multiple associations so that their effectiveness diminished by the end of 1921. M.M. identified most of the active members of these associations. These people were included in the list of anti-Nationalists who were exiled from Turkey after the Lausanne Peace was signed in 1923.

The Felâh Group (Deliverance)

Gradually, Ankara formed a number of different underground groups in İstanbul and they were not necessarily aware of each others' existence. The major reason for this secrecy was because if one of the cells was exposed the others could continue to work safely.

In İstanbul, Staff Captains Neşet and Seyfi (General Düzgören, 1880-1948) were ordered by Ankara to start an underground group on September 23, 1920. This group was first called *Moeltke*, then *Hamza*, and *Mücahid* as of December 1920, and lastly, as of February 1921, it assumed the name *Felâh*.⁷⁹ The following year, Ankara added two more components to *Felâh*, namely War Materiel Manufacturers' Group (*İmalât-ı Harbiye*) and the Naval Assistance Group (*Muavene-i Bahriye*). *Felâh* recruited military personnel, informed Ankara of the position of the Greek army, smuggled war matériel, and maintained secret lines of telegraphic communication with Ankara.⁸⁰

Shortly after March 16, 1920, the Allies took over the Post Office in order to control and intercept all communication. They had asked for a diagram of the telegraphic network, but were told that none existed; a certain official knew all the lines by heart. The occupiers were ready to accept this kind of mismanagement from any Turkish administration. The official, now in British employ, but a member of *Felâh*, severed the lines to Anatolia. He had left two secret lines intact. Subsequently, for security purposes, the Nationalists' secret communication center was moved to the private residence of the Director of Telegraphs, İhsan Pere (1885-1969).⁸¹ Pere's involvement with *Felâh* was limited to the secret telegraph linkage between İstanbul and Ankara, but his was an invaluable service, because secret reports of the

⁷⁹ Aksoley, "İstanbul'da Milli Mücadele," *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 2: 9 (October 1, 1969), pp. 24-25.

⁸⁰ İhsan Birinci, "Milli Mücadele için Kurulan Önemli Cemiyet ve Çeteler," *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 3: 1 (January 1971), p. 34.

⁸¹ Ekrem Baydar, "Mustafa Kemal'in Gizli Teşkilâtını Ben İdare Ediyordum," *Cumhuriyet*, October 6 - November 2, 1970; Cf. Borak, "İstanbul Gizli Telgraf Merkezi," *Tarih Dünyası* 3-4: 28-35 (January 31 - November 26, 1952).

underground were transmitted to Ankara through his system. Ankara's requests for war matériel reached the underground through the same channel, as well as by couriers.

Contraband

In September 1921, the Directing Committee of Generals of the Inter-Allied Committee of Control and Organization agreed that firms from Allied countries could buy Ottoman war matériel. A British firm was interested in such purchases. At that juncture, the Italian General Mombelli intervened and stated that the matériel should be rendered useless because the Ottoman government was concerned that it might be sold to Greece by the purchasing firm. The French General, Charpy, supported his colleague by saying that this had been the rule in Bulgaria, Germany and Austria. Consequently, it was decided that "no exception should be made to the rule that all war material should be rendered useless before delivery."⁸²

Mustafa Kemal had requested fieldguns from İstanbul through *Felâh* for the upcoming January 1921 offensive against the Greeks. An Italian businessmen purchased these guns from the Ottoman Sales Commission at scrap price because their breech blocks had been removed. The merchandise was sent to Anatolia on board a ship which belonged to the Italian-owned Lloyd Triestino Company. Hüsnü Bey (Himmetoğlu) was a representative of that company as well as being a *Felâh* agent. He was the liaison between the underground and the Italians.⁸³

At the same time, the Minister of War, Ziya Pasha, submitted a request to the Allied Military Command to borrow breech blocks from the Maçka military arsenal. He claimed that these would be used for the firing of guns, the traditional announcement of the end of the Ramadan fast. The request was accorded. What was returned to the arsenal at the end of the month, however, were ordinary breech blocks, not the rapid firing ones that were borrowed.⁸⁴ The fieldguns that the Italian businessman bought and the rapid firing breech blocks that were "borrowed" from the arsenal may not have ended up exactly at the same location. Nonetheless, both parties of matériel were delivered to Anatolia. Since there was no objection to Ziya

⁸² FMA 20N1091 C/27 Dos1. Confidential Minutes of the 13th and 27th September, 1921 Meeting.

⁸³ Himmetoğlu, *KSİY*, passim.

⁸⁴ Baydar, "Mustafa Kemal'in Gizli Teşkilâtını Ben İdare Ediyordum."

Pasha's scheme from the Allied quarters, it may be assumed that the guards were either bribed or that they simply failed to notice the change.

Subsequently, *Felâh* decided to steal radio sets from the Selimiye depots. In 1921, the Selimiye barracks housed Russian refugees and British soldiers. The depots were guarded by Turkish soldiers. Lieutenant İhsan (General Aksoley) resorted to trickery. Back in August 1919, bubonic plague had broken out among the Turkish soldiers in the Selimiye barracks. The barracks had been emptied and were cleaned of rats.⁸⁵ Lieutenant İhsan arranged for a doctor from the neighboring Haydarpaşa Military Hospital to "diagnose" the plague in a Turkish soldier. When the incident was reported, the barracks were immediately evacuated and the theft was accomplished.⁸⁶

Felâh distinguished itself by smuggling loads of cargo by ship. Hüsnü Bey (Himmetoğlu), a warehouse owner and the Turkish representative of the Lloyd Triestino Shipping Company, rented ships from French and Italian companies for this purpose. In these endeavors, an Ottoman Armenian, Pandikian Efendi, Director of the Port Authority and an agent of the British Special Elements Office, and Charles Kalchi, the director of a French-owned shipping company, were Hüsnü Bey's most important helpers. Pandikian Efendi was aware of the smuggling and knew many people in the underground, but did not betray them. Instead, he smoothed the paperwork, distracted the British, and alerted the underground to threats of police raid. The largest quantity of weapons, artillery, and ammunition was smuggled on the ship *Ararat* on November 6, 1920. The cargo was delivered just before the İnönü battles of January 9-11 and March 27-30, 1921. By mid-1921, Pandikian Efendi had been reprimanded and some of his men were fired from their jobs for having helped the smugglers.⁸⁷

While payment for illegal freight presented problems at times, the financial procedures were mostly carried out through the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which was owned by an Anglo-French combine. The Deputy Director of the Bank, another Ottoman Armenian, Berch Keresteciyan Efendi (Türker, 1870-?), kept the money, which was transferred from Ankara, in a special account in the name of a certain

⁸⁵ Abdülkadir Noyan, M.D., *Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla Savaşlarımız* (Ankara: Tıp Fakültesi Yayınları, 1956), pp. 113-117.

⁸⁶ Aksoley, "İstanbul'da Milli Mücadele," *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 2: 10 (November 1, 1969), pp. 85-86; Hakkı Petek, "Kurtuluş Savaşında Selimiye Kışlasından Anadolu'ya Kaçırılan Telsizler," *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 2: 9 (October 1, 1969), pp. 74-81.

⁸⁷ Himmetoğlu, *KSİY*, 1: 406-412, 2: 85-87.

businessman, Osman. "Osman" was actually a member of *Felâh*. Thus, money reached the underground for payment of contraband.⁸⁸ Curiously enough, Berch Keresteciyan Efendi never got into trouble for manipulating bank processes.

The War Matériel Manufacturers' Group

According to the Armistice Convention, rifle bolts, locking rings, and breech blocks of artillery guns and the cartridges of machine guns were to be surrendered to the Allies. The Ministry of War established a commission to handle this matter. Two ideas clashed in the commission. One was to give the Allies an accurate count of the guns and related equipment. The other was to conceal the real numbers through underreporting. When adherents of the former idea overruled the second group's proposal, Lieutenant Colonel Eyüp Bey (General Durukan) formed a new underground group, the War Matériel Manufacturers' Group (İmalât-ı Harbiye), on March 19, 1920. Members of this group had access to eleven factories and four arsenals.

On December 16, 1920, the War Matériel Manufacturers' Group joined *Felâh*. Ankara officially recognized it as a sub-group of *Felâh* on May 23, 1921.⁸⁹ This group facilitated *Felâh*'s work by arranging for thefts of raw materials from factories; *Felâh* smuggled these materials from İstanbul.

The President of the Commission on Disarmament, General Mombelli, had declared that the raw materials in İstanbul factories belonged to the Allies, but they did not have any way of controlling the amounts used by these factories,

or of preventing leakage of this material from the factory to the outside world. For instance, some time ago, at the Boot Factory at Beicos there was a large quantity of raw hides, and one night some Kemalists came along and removed a considerable stock of these hides. The management of the factory did not report this to the Allies until some time later...⁹⁰

Most of the factories in İstanbul used to manufacture war matériel, but since the Armistice, the High Commissioners had decided to keep them open so that the workers remained employed. This time, how-

⁸⁸ Ibid., 1: 231.

⁸⁹ Himmetoğlu, "Büyük Zafer'e İstanbul'un Yardımı: Mümtaz Topçu Yarbayı Eyüp Bey," *Yakın Tarihimiz* 2: 22 (1962), pp. 265-266; Birinci, "Milli Mücadele İçin Kurulan Önemli Cemiyet ve Çeteler," p. 34.

⁹⁰ FMA 20N1091 C/27 Dos1, October 4, 1921. Minutes of the Meeting of the Directing Committee of Allied Generals.

ever, raw materials were supposed to be used to manufacture commercial articles. These factories were not under the protection of armed guards, nor could the Allies have spared any. Therefore, it was relatively easy to steal raw materials.

The Naval Assistance Group

Ankara had to make use of every source it could to prepare for an offensive against the Greeks. Thus far, the Nationalists had fought a defensive war. When a Naval Section was established in the War Ministry in Ankara on January 1, 1921, Ankara decided to make use of the Navy depots in İstanbul. Naval arsenals there contained artillery guns, airplanes, handguns and mines, which Ankara could use. Hence, an underground Navy group was formed. The Naval Assistance Group was organized in October 1921 under the leadership of Navy Captain Nazmi Bey. It was recognized as part of *Felâh* on December 15, 1921.⁹¹

Felâh and its components, the War Matériel Manufacturers' Group and the Naval Assistance Group cooperated in smuggling of arms. Hüsnü Bey (Himmetoğlu), provided his warehouse for storage of stolen matériel and also hired the porters. The Armenian Director of the İstanbul Harbor Company, Bohor Efendi, provided assistance with cranes and men when heavy cargo was to be transported. Members of the underground in the Customs Office prepared false manifestos. In addition, French and Italian shipping firms collaborated with the underground. At other times, the underground had to rely on fishing boats, which could only transport limited amounts of matériel. The Nationalists could not carry out much smuggling with what few gunboats they had.

The British Discover Felâh

Eventually, the British developed intelligence on *Felâh*, but, too late to be of practical value. A British intelligence report from İstanbul, dated October 4, 1921, and marked "Very Secret" informed London about how the Nationalist intelligence functioned. According to it,

The Headquarters of the Nationalist Intelligence is the MATBOUAT VE ISTIKHBARAT MOUDIARETIE (the Directorate of Propaganda and Information) and is at the army Headquarters, Angora... The Directorate controls propaganda, espionage and counterespionage, both in and outside

⁹¹ Himmetoğlu, *KİT*, 1: 252-255.

Anatolia. The organisation in İstanbul which is now known as the FELIAH Group, was formerly called the MUHARIB Group. Its name was changed in 1921... The Group is divided into three sections: a) An Intelligence Department. This is in close touch with the 2nd Bureau of the French General Headquarters in Constantinople and was formerly facilitated enormously by them in the obtaining of military information with regard to the state and location of the Greek troops by their directly supplying it with all data that they obtained from British Headquarters... b) An Adjutant General's Department, which forwards officers desirous of joining the Nationalist forces to Anatolia, and also similarly arranges for the transfer of specialists (telegraphists, wireless operators, etc.) c) A Quartermaster General's Branch, which arranges the purchase of arms and munitions, etc., and organizes the smuggling of arms, munitions, maps, military text-books, etc. The contre-espionage organisation in Anatolia is run by the Directorate through the AIN PE TESHKILATI. This is a military police organisation with agencies located in more important inland and seaboard towns. Its functions are A) Rigid passport control of all persons entering or leaving Anatolia. B) The surveillance of all foreigners in the more important towns. C) The selection of couriers to such places as Constantinople, etc. The organisation has a branch in Constantinople which issues passes to people wishing to proceed to Anatolia.⁹²

If the British had this much information about *Felâh* why then did they not try to suppress it? The answer may be threefold. First, one month after the Nationalist victory at the Second İnönü Battle (March 30, 1921), the Allied High Commissioners declared neutrality. Secondly, the Allied forces of occupation had built a considerable bureaucracy and were hampered by a myriad of paperwork and meetings. Finally, it may not have been easy to combat the underground. The structure of the underground was not only complex, but it also extended to people from all walks of life. Furthermore, various groups supported each other. For example, *Felâh* was supported by the War Matériel Manufacturers' Group and the Naval Assistance Group. M.M. covered intelligence and counter-propaganda.

Further, there was the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, another conduit through which Ankara received aid. During the Armistice,

⁹² Şimşir, *BDOA*, 4: 40-42.

⁹³ Demiray, ed. *Canlı Tarihler* 10 "Dr. Celâl Muhtar Özden,"; Emine Atabek, "General Besim Ömer Paşa (Akalm, 1862-1940)," paper submitted to the İstanbul University, Department of Deontology (Medical Ethics), Institute of Medical History, Cerrahpaşa Hospital, 1967.

The first Red Cross Society was established in Geneva in 1864. The purpose was to extend help and care to civilians who suffered in wars as well as to help the wounded soldiers. A counterpart of this Society, the Red Crescent, was formed in İstanbul in 1873, but did not function until 1908. One reason may have been the reluctance on the part of the military to involve civilians in their affairs. In 1911, General Besim Ömer revitalized the Society and trained nurses to serve both civilians and soldiers.

the Red Crescent was managed by medical doctors who formerly belonged to the CUP.⁹³ In 1920, the British suspected that money raised by the Indian Caliphate Delegation had been transferred to the Nationalists by the Red Crescent Society. Admiral de Robeck wrote to Lord Curzon that "the Pan Islamists in India and Turkey are now openly in touch with another through the Turkish Red Crescent Society."⁹⁴ Indeed, the money had been given to Dr. Nihat Reşat (Belger) of the Red Crescent in Europe, who transmitted the sum to Ankara.⁹⁵

On April 13, 1921, the British High Commissioner, Sir Horace Rumbold, informed Lord Curzon,

The Constantinople government have organised a Red Crescent mission for service with the Nationalist forces. General Harington reports that a considerable number of arms have disappeared from the stores which are under the control of the Minister of War. Steps have been taken to make an inventory of the contents of arms and munitions. There can be no doubt that these arms have found their way to the Nationalist forces.⁹⁶

The Red Crescent also donated money to the Nationalists from the sale of a farm and other property in Anatolia that belonged to the Society. Its mission was not confined to humanitarian aid.⁹⁷

Although the British had a fair amount of information about the underground, they were unable to dismember it. This was neither because of the imbecility of the former nor because of the absolute secrecy of the latter. The structure of the resistance groups were complex, but not impenetrable, as shown by the case of Mustafa Sagir, who infiltrated *Karakol*. The British intelligence knew at least of the Military Police, A.P. (Askeri Polis), and *Felâh*. Allied intelligence focused on the leaders or on those whom they assumed to be the leaders of such organizations. By exiling or imprisoning suspected leaders, the Allies thought that resistance would be quelled. Yet leadership was the least significant aspect of the Nationalist underground in İstanbul; it was a collective effort.

Finally, it may be argued that the British could have taken strict measures to stop the activists. The imperial aims of the Greeks, however, may have prevented the British from taking extreme measures against the Turks. Luckily for the Turks, the Greeks proved to be a not-so-docile instrument of the Supreme Council. Their armies did

⁹³ FO 371/5170, June 29, 1920.

⁹⁴ "Dr. Nihat Reşat Belger File," İstanbul University, Department of Deontology, Institute of Medical History, Cerrahpaşa Hospital.

⁹⁵ FO 406/46, p. 21.

⁹⁷ Demiray, "Dr. Celâl Muhtar Özden," p. 46.

not stop when they were told to do so. This signalled to the British that any challenge to their policies in the Aegean and the Mediterranean, whether it came from the Turks or Greeks, would be equally undesirable. Hence, the Allies declared neutrality in the Greek-Turkish war in 1921. Furthermore, the rapprochement between the Nationalists, the French and Italians allowed the shipping companies owned by citizens of these countries to take advantage of transporting contraband to Anatolia. The underground had many advantages and the Nationalist activists exploited these to the utmost.

CHAPTER EIGHT

TOWARDS EVACUATION

Between 1921 and 1923, Ankara gradually imposed its will both on İstanbul and on Europe. The Turkish peace had to be concluded in an entirely different manner from the way it was first envisioned by the Allies. Differences of opinion among the Allies only helped the Nationalists to accomplish the feat.

A convention between the Nationalists and the British for exchanging prisoners had been signed in London on March 16, 1921. Accordingly, by October 30th, all the prisoners of Malta had been released and most of them had gone to Ankara to enter public service. Following the Sakarya victory against the Greeks (August 22 – September 5, 1921), there was a waiting period of one year before the Nationalists undertook the final offensive.

The first western European country that recognized the Ankara government was France. On October 20, 1921, the French-Turkish accord was signed. Recognition was followed by a congratulatory message to Mustafa Kemal from the French veterans of the Gallipoli campaign on the occasion of the Sakarya victory. Former adversaries declared that they had never been enemies.

Le malheur qui précipita dans la guerre nos deux grands pays, amis éprouvés dans l'Histoire, fut si grand, que la fatalité nous mit des deux côtés de la barricade. Ainsi fut fait... Mais, même sur le champ de bataille, les coeurs turcs et français ne cessèrent de s'estimer: nous fûmes des adversaires, jamais des ennemis. Nous rendons hommage à votre bravoure, à votre loyauté, dont peuvent témoigner les blessés de nos fronts communs. Aujourd'hui que vous défendez, avec un héroïsme inlassable, le sol sacré de votre Patrie menacé par l'inapplicable traité de Sèvres, la plus belle marque d'estime et de vieille affection que peut vous donner, dans son ensemble, le peuple de France, ce sont "les anciens Combattants des Dardanelles" qui vous le portent. Réunis en assemblée générale, notre association a invité, à l'unanimité, son Comité à vous adresser ce salut spontané, écho de notre amitié séculaire. Nous souhaitons que les magnifiques efforts de l'armée nationaliste turque dirigés et soutenus par un chef tel que vous, reçoivent leur récompense. Nous souhaitons que soit maintenu, comme seule base d'une paix juste, l'accord conclu avec M. Franklin-Bouillon. Recevez nos vœux d'un même coeur afin que nos pays, par leurs gouvernements, interprètes de nos populations, se tendent

la main à tout jamais. Le Comité des Anciens Combattants de Dardanelles.¹

The anti-Kemalists in İstanbul panicked at the Nationalist victories. In January 1922, British intelligence reported that the pro-British Anatolian Association was negotiating with the Greek High Commissioner to form an autonomous Ottoman government in areas which were under Greek occupation. This government would conclude peace with the Greeks. At the same time, the Anatolian Association proposed that the Greek Commander-in-Chief train and equip a "voluntary" Turkish-Anatolian army to be sent against the Nationalists. The Greek High Commissioner agreed and forwarded the proposal to his home government for approval.² Since no mention is again made of this scheme, it may be assumed that the Greek government did not take it seriously. By March 1922, the opposition in İstanbul was crumbling. M.M. reported to Ankara that the FEP executive committee members were fighting among themselves for power.³

While the Greeks and Turks were preparing for a final showdown, the Greek Patriarchate in İstanbul tried to recruit all native Anatolian Greeks to help the Greek army. Towards the end of March, the Patriarch held meetings with Greek officers. The Patriarchal Council requested that all İstanbul and Anatolian Greeks eligible for military service be prepared for the upcoming confrontation in Anatolia.⁴

The final Nationalist offensive took place from August 26 to 30, 1922, ending in a decisive victory for the Turks. Throughout 1922, the Italians had been delivering airplanes to Ankara and the French were openly sending war matériel through Mersin, a port on eastern Mediterranean.⁵ On September 9, the Nationalist army entered İzmir.⁶ Despite severe Greek losses the British delegate in Athens, Sir Francis Oswald Lindley (1872-1950), wrote to Sir Horace,

The great point to remember is that the Greek army is down and out, unless it receives open assistance from us. In that event, I believe it would

¹ "Un Hommage français à Moustapha Kemal Ghazi," *Echos de l'Islam* 46 (March 15, 1922): 43.

² Şimşir, *BDOA*, 4: 183-184.

³ TITE 39/14118, March 17, 1922.

⁴ TITE 39/13245 F/2, March 23, 1922.

⁵ Şimşir, *BDOA*, 4: 347.

⁶ Youssouf Razi, "La Joie Turque," *L'Illustration* (September 23, 1922): 256.

be the cheapest army we could find with which to fight the Kemalists, if it comes to that.⁷

The Greeks may have lost the war, but they pressed to occupy İstanbul, perhaps as a prize for their efforts in trying to serve British policy. The Greeks were under a tremendous financial burden when they carried out the Anatolian offensives, despite rumors that they were equipped and financed by Great Britain. This burden was exacerbated by having advanced further inland in Anatolia, because they had difficulties with lines of transport, rough territory, poor villages and towns which could not provide enough food for them, and a Turkish force which was determined to protect its home country. Having realized the impossibility of continuing warfare in Anatolia, the Greeks might have considered an easy and abrupt end to the war by occupying İstanbul.

On July 28, 1922, they gave a note to the Paris Peace Conference asking for authorization to occupy the city. The Greeks argued that this would be the only way by which the Turks would be compelled to ratify the peace treaty.⁸ But the Allies, mainly the British, would not let them reap the best prize in Turkey, especially after they failed to defeat the Nationalists. The Supreme Council refused authorization. Meanwhile, the Allies prepared to defend İstanbul. The French zone (the Old City and the western suburbs) would be controlled by General Prioux with one battalion, tanks and armored cars. The British zone (Pera, Galata and Şişli) would be controlled by Colonel Ricketts with the 1st Hampshire Regiment with assistance from one Italian battalion. Soldiers distributed to the eastern and southern suburbs were composed of Inter-Allied troops. The British Navy was to support French artillery.⁹ The movement of Greek troops in Thrace caused grave concern to the Allies. On July 30, 1922, they decided that they would take certain measures against the Greek contingent in İstanbul. They prohibited Greek naval ships from leaving the port as well as the transportation of the remaining Greek troops to Thrace. They also intercepted the communications of Greek diplomats and military officials. Furthermore, they decided to expel the Greek military mission from İstanbul.¹⁰ On July 31, 1922, General

⁷ Rumbold Papers, No. 2, September 19, 1922.

⁸ "La Grecia chiede di occupare Constantinopoli," *Oriente Moderno* 3 (August 15, 1922), pp. 154-155.

⁹ FMA 20N1112 C/48 Dos1, n.d. Notes of Conference held at Headquarters, British Army in Constantinople.

¹⁰ Bernachot, *Les Armées Françaises*, p. 271.

Harington issued a proclamation to the Greeks that he intended to defend the neutral zone in Thrace, by force, if necessary.¹¹

The determination of the Allied forces to resist a potential Greek attack must have impressed the Greek government. By August 10, the Greek troop movements ceased. Nevertheless, on August 17, General Charpy was officially charged with the command of the troops for the defense of the Thracian sector and General Harington with the command of the troops for the defense of the Anatolian sector of İstanbul.¹²

Later in August 1922, there was yet another threat of a Greek attack on İstanbul. While the Athens government assured Britain that the Greek army would not approach the neutral zone, the British government approved the defense measures that General Harington had taken, and he was authorized to call on the Navy for help in the event of an attack. General Charpy ordered the French cavalry and troops to open fire if the Greeks passed the neutral line. However, the British troops had orders not to open fire immediately. First, a British officer was to go over to the Greeks with a white flag, and tell them to withdraw. Shooting was authorized only if the Greeks insisted on an advance. General Mombelli argued with the British that not to open fire would be a sign of uncertainty. If the Greeks were not stopped there, then it would be difficult to stop them elsewhere. Thus, the French and Italian generals convinced General Harington to amend his orders. In addition, the Allied generals decided to use Turkish soldiers in the event of armed conflict.¹³ The Greeks did not persist.

Not long before this, the Allies had been threatened with a Kemalist attack on Çanakkale (Dardanelles). The Allies had expected the Nationalists to attack İstanbul in 1921, when the Greek forces had evacuated İzmit peninsula after the Sakarya defeat.¹⁴ At that time, the Greeks had been able to launch a counteroffensive that threw the Kemalist forces back to the environs of Ankara. But now in 1922, after the decisive Turkish victory over the Greeks, 40,000 Turkish soldiers moved towards Çanakkale. The French and Italians withdrew their forces from the neutral zone, leaving the British to face the Turks alone.¹⁵ On September 22, General Harington ex-

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., p. 281.

¹³ FMA 20N1094 C/30 Dos1, Minutes of the Meeting of Allied Commanders Held on August 1, 1922.

¹⁴ FMA 20N1184 C/117 Dos2, September 19, 1921.

¹⁵ Armstrong, *Turkey in Travail*, p. 241; İlgar, "Kurtuluş Savaşının Sonunda İkinci Bir Çanakkale Savaşının Çıkmasına Ramak Kalmıştı," *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 1: 2 (March 1, 1970), pp. 64-70.

plained, in a personal note to Sir Horace, that he did not intend to evacuate İstanbul unless he was forced to do so, because the British had to hold on to the capital as a bargaining point.¹⁶

The French had decided to move their forces from Çanakkale when Lord Curzon brought a communiqué from Winston Churchill, Secretary of Colonial Affairs, to the French President Poincaré in Paris. The communiqué stated that the British intended to fight if the Turks pressed into the neutral zone. The Italians had already assured the Nationalists of their neutrality. By September 29, the British cabinet instructed Sir Horace Rumbold and General Harington to issue an ultimatum to the Turks. Both the diplomat and the general ignored this instruction.¹⁷ During this time of crisis, the small British land force under General Harington and Colonel Shuttleworth showed great restraint. The British were supported by the battleships and cruisers of the Mediterranean Fleet. But General Harington knew full well that the range of navy guns was meaningless further inland. Not a single shot was fired. Lloyd George had pressed for war with the Turks. Upon his return to England, General Harington found out that the British Prime Minister had tried to punish him for not obeying orders.

He had actually proposed a vote of censure on me that Sunday night for not having obeyed those telegrams in my pocket and thereby committed us to another war, and that Lord Curzon had walked out of the cabinet and refused to allow that vote of censure... Apparently, war would have kept Mr. Lloyd George and the Coalition Government in office.¹⁸

As a result of the Çanakkale crisis, the Lloyd George cabinet fell. The Nationalists and the Allied generals decided to hold a conference in Mudanya, the port of Bursa. At first the Mudanya Conference did not go smoothly. "There were some twenty-eight points on which we could not agree," wrote General Harington, upon which the Allied generals conferred with their governments.¹⁹ By October 9, they had decided that Eastern Thrace would be ceded to the Turks; Allied troops would be removed from İstanbul; and İzmir would become Turkish once again. On October 11, 1922, the Mudanya Armistice was signed, officially ending the Turkish-Greek war.

In a desperate effort to promote a pro-British attitude, the anti-Nationalists in İstanbul inaugurated an Anglo-Ottoman School in

¹⁶ Rumbold Papers, No. 9, September 22, 1922.

¹⁷ Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase*, pp. 270-275; Gilbert, *Sir Horace Rumbold*, pp. 258-270.

¹⁸ Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back*, p. 127.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

Yeldeğirmeni, on the Asian side in September 1922. Its director was a certain Dr. Niyazi Bey, a member of the FEP. Dr. Frew, an Anglican clergyman and British agent, was made honorary director. French intelligence reported that the school was directly subsidized by the British.²⁰ This school was built by the Germans before the war and was left vacant during the Armistice. It lasted only one year as a British school and disappeared in 1923. (Today it is a Turkish elementary school.)²¹

There was a sharp contrast between the defeatist attitude of the anti-Kemalists and the Nationalists' confidence. The latter began to assert themselves in İstanbul. Ankara ordered the Turkish police in İstanbul to identify acts of treason, starting with the minorities. The anti-Nationalist activists who were Turks were already well known to Ankara. Those Turks who had a serious reason to fear Nationalist retribution were leaving the country. On September 25, 1922, French intelligence reported that Colonel Halil Bey of the Turkish police and his staff were assigned to identify all middle-class Greeks and Armenians of İstanbul. Turkish police were trying to gather information about the sympathies and about direct help provided by these people to the Greek cause.²² One month later, the same source reported that the Ankara government was searching for traitors among non-Muslims and therefore, the FEP had become the champion of minority rights. A new group was formed within the FEP, led by Ali Kemal, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Vasfi Bey (Vice President of the Senate) and Sadık Bey (President of the FEP), in addition to two Armenians and two Greeks. The purpose of this group was to conduct active propaganda in Europe in order to mar Nationalist prestige and to oppose threats that would force the Christian population out of İstanbul.

While the anti-Nationalists made last minute efforts to counter the Nationalists, the Turkish population of İstanbul exulted in the military victories.

The manufacture of Turkish flags suddenly grew to an industry of huge proportions, and by the time news came that the armistice has been signed at Moudania, literally millions of flags fluttered all over the city.²³

Refet Pasha was assigned to take over Eastern Thrace in the name of the National Assembly. En route to that post, he arrived in İstanbul

²⁰ FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3, Intelligence Report, September 15, 1922.

²¹ Giz, *Bir Zamanlar Kadıköy*, p. 10.

²² FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3.

²³ "Stamboul Celebrates," *The Orient* 9: 11 (November 8, 1922), p. 98.

plained, in a personal note to Sir Horace, that he did not intend to evacuate İstanbul unless he was forced to do so, because the British had to hold on to the capital as a bargaining point.¹⁶

The French had decided to move their forces from Çanakkale when Lord Curzon brought a communiqué from Winston Churchill, Secretary of Colonial Affairs, to the French President Poincaré in Paris. The communiqué stated that the British intended to fight if the Turks pressed into the neutral zone. The Italians had already assured the Nationalists of their neutrality. By September 29, the British cabinet instructed Sir Horace Rumbold and General Harington to issue an ultimatum to the Turks. Both the diplomat and the general ignored this instruction.¹⁷ During this time of crisis, the small British land force under General Harington and Colonel Shuttleworth showed great restraint. The British were supported by the battleships and cruisers of the Mediterranean Fleet. But General Harington knew full well that the range of navy guns was meaningless further inland. Not a single shot was fired. Lloyd George had pressed for war with the Turks. Upon his return to England, General Harington found out that the British Prime Minister had tried to punish him for not obeying orders.

He had actually proposed a vote of censure on me that Sunday night for not having obeyed those telegrams in my pocket and thereby committed us to another war, and that Lord Curzon had walked out of the cabinet and refused to allow that vote of censure... Apparently, war would have kept Mr. Lloyd George and the Coalition Government in office.¹⁸

As a result of the Çanakkale crisis, the Lloyd George cabinet fell. The Nationalists and the Allied generals decided to hold a conference in Mudanya, the port of Bursa. At first the Mudanya Conference did not go smoothly. "There were some twenty-eight points on which we could not agree," wrote General Harington, upon which the Allied generals conferred with their governments.¹⁹ By October 9, they had decided that Eastern Thrace would be ceded to the Turks; Allied troops would be removed from İstanbul; and İzmir would become Turkish once again. On October 11, 1922, the Mudanya Armistice was signed, officially ending the Turkish-Greek war.

In a desperate effort to promote a pro-British attitude, the anti-Nationalists in İstanbul inaugurated an Anglo-Ottoman School in

¹⁶ Rumbold Papers, No. 9, September 22, 1922.

¹⁷ Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase*, pp. 270-275; Gilbert, *Sir Horace Rumbold*, pp. 258-270.

¹⁸ Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back*, p. 127.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

Yeldeğirmeni, on the Asian side in September 1922. Its director was a certain Dr. Niyazi Bey, a member of the FEP. Dr. Frew, an Anglican clergyman and British agent, was made honorary director. French intelligence reported that the school was directly subsidized by the British.²⁰ This school was built by the Germans before the war and was left vacant during the Armistice. It lasted only one year as a British school and disappeared in 1923. (Today it is a Turkish elementary school.)²¹

There was a sharp contrast between the defeatist attitude of the anti-Kemalists and the Nationalists' confidence. The latter began to assert themselves in İstanbul. Ankara ordered the Turkish police in İstanbul to identify acts of treason, starting with the minorities. The anti-Nationalist activists who were Turks were already well known to Ankara. Those Turks who had a serious reason to fear Nationalist retribution were leaving the country. On September 25, 1922, French intelligence reported that Colonel Halil Bey of the Turkish police and his staff were assigned to identify all middle-class Greeks and Armenians of İstanbul. Turkish police were trying to gather information about the sympathies and about direct help provided by these people to the Greek cause.²² One month later, the same source reported that the Ankara government was searching for traitors among non-Muslims and therefore, the FEP had become the champion of minority rights. A new group was formed within the FEP, led by Ali Kemal, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Vasfi Bey (Vice President of the Senate) and Sadık Bey (President of the FEP), in addition to two Armenians and two Greeks. The purpose of this group was to conduct active propaganda in Europe in order to mar Nationalist prestige and to oppose threats that would force the Christian population out of İstanbul.

While the anti-Nationalists made last minute efforts to counter the Nationalists, the Turkish population of İstanbul exulted in the military victories.

The manufacture of Turkish flags suddenly grew to an industry of huge proportions, and by the time news came that the armistice has been signed at Mudania, literally millions of flags fluttered all over the city.²³

Refet Pasha was assigned to take over Eastern Thrace in the name of the National Assembly. En route to that post, he arrived in İstanbul

²⁰ FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3, Intelligence Report, September 15, 1922.

²¹ Giz, *Bir Zamanlar Kadıköy*, p. 10.

²² FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3.

²³ "Stamboul Celebrates," *The Orient* 9: 11 (November 8, 1922), p. 98.

on October 19, 1922, and was greeted by joyous crowds and parades; prayers were held in major mosques.²⁴ Refet Pasha's other mission was to accelerate the Nationalists' takeover of İstanbul, although the status of the city remained unclear. Since the Nationalists anticipated that the Allies would forestall the evacuation of İstanbul and the Straits, they tried to press the occupiers by exerting their own authority in İstanbul. Meanwhile, İstanbul was growing dependent on Ankara in various ways. According to a censored piece of news in *Bosphore*, the Allied High Commissioners asked the Ankara government to send flour to the city urgently, because of an impending food shortage within 20 days.²⁵

By September 1922, Sultan Vahidettin's position had become untenable vis-à-vis the Nationalists. He informed the British High Commissioner that he was being "pressed"²⁶ to send congratulations to Mustafa Kemal on his final victory, but had refused to do so. The Sultan realized that he could never work with the Nationalists. If the Kemalists took charge in İstanbul, the only course left for Vahidettin would be to leave the city. In 1920, British authorities had promised the Sultan that they would protect him from any imminent danger. Based on that promise, Vahidettin contacted Andrew Ryan through an intermediary. Rumbold reported that,

During the conversation, the go-between intimated that the Sultan was considering whether he should make a show of "clemency" to the Kemalists, not in the hope of placating them, but to gain time. He asked whether this would create a bad impression on the Allied governments. Ryan knew my views sufficiently to say at once quite definitely that, if the Sultan took any action in this sense, the Allies would have no right to criticise his action, and said if the Sultan saw a personal advantage for himself in modifying his attitude towards the Kemalists, he should put on one side any consideration of the impression which would be created on the Allies.²⁷

All this proved futile, for the National Assembly abrogated the sultanate one month later, on November 1, 1922. Vahidettin decided to go into exile, both because he refused to remain only a as a Caliph -in-name only, devoid of even symbolic political power, and also because the Nationalists discreetly informed him that it would be in his best

²⁴ "Refet Pasha à Constantinople," *L'Illustration* (November 4, 1922), p. 436.

²⁵ FMA 20N1127 C/27 Dos1, October 25, 1922.

²⁶ Rumbold Papers, No. 11, September 26, 1922. From Rumbold to Curzon, "Secret and Personal."

²⁷ *Ibid.*

interest to leave.²⁸ Abolishing the sultanate was a radical enough step for the Nationalists. Having to try the Caliph for treason would have been distasteful as well as risky.

On November 16, 1922, the former Sultan sent a note to General Harington which stated that he wished to be removed from İstanbul. The next day, he secretly left on the British warship, *Malaya*. Edgar Lewis Browne, the correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*, who received word of the intended escape, contacted a Turkish colleague and indirectly informed Refet Pasha and Esat Pasha, the Military Commander and Governor of İstanbul. The journalists thought that a confrontation between the Nationalist administration and Vahidettin would make exciting news. To their chagrin, both journalists found that there was no reaction from either Pasha. Fehime Sultan, the Nationalists' informant from the Palace, had already sent word of the Sultan's plans. Vahidettin's choice could not have been more convenient for the Nationalist.²⁹ After a brief stay in Malta and Damascus, Vahidettin lived out his life in Italy, where he died in poverty in 1926. The National Assembly conferred the title of Caliph on the heir apparent, Abdülmecid Efendi.

When the National Assembly proclaimed the end of the sultanate on November 1, 1922, Tevfik Pasha's cabinet resigned in recognition of the Ankara government. The İstanbul municipality, the city administration, and the courts declared their loyalty to the National Assembly. By November 4, Refet Pasha announced that he was taking over the governance of İstanbul in the name of the National Assembly.³⁰

The prominent opposition figure, Ali Kemal Bey was arrested by Nationalist agents on November 5 to be taken to Ankara for trial by

²⁸ Interview with Retired Air Force Colonel Burhan Göksel, Ankara, February 15, 1986.

²⁹ Eski Bir Politikacı, "Osmanlı Sarayı'nın Son Günleri," *Yeni Sabah*, March 19 - May 21 1950; Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back*, pp. 129-132; Rumbold Papers, Nos. 66-68, November 16, 1922. From Acting High Commissioner Sir Nevile to Rumbold; Göztepe, *Vahidettin Gurbet Cehenneminde* (İstanbul: Sebül Yayınevi, 1978), pp. 13-16; Kısakürek, *Vahidüddin*, pp. 196-202; Şimşir, "Vahidettin'in Kaçışı ve Sonu," *Cumhuriyet*, November 26-29, 1973, p. 2, cs. 1-3; Mithat Sertoğlu, "Son Osmanlı Padişahı Vahidettin'in Saltanatı, Şahsiyeti ve Fırası," *Tarih Dünyası* 4: 33 (September 26, 1952), pp. 1342-1345.

³⁰ Şefik Okday, *Büyükbaşım Son Sadrazan Ahmet Tevfik Paşa* (İstanbul: Ata Ofset Basımevi, 1986); Kandemir, "Refet Paşa İstanbul'da," *Yakın Tarihimiz* 3: 35 (October 25, 1962), pp. 257-260; Seyfi Nutku, "Gençlik Anadolu'nun ilk Temsilcisi Refet Paşa'yı İstanbul'da Nasıl Karşıladı?" *Yakın Tarihimiz* *Ibid.*, pp. 261-263; Faik Reşit Unat, "Refet Paşa İstanbul'da," *Yakın Tarihimiz* 4: 51 (February 14, 1963), pp. 377-378; Tunaya, "Refet Paşa İstanbul'da," *Cumhuriyet*, October 19, 1977, p. 2, c.1.

the Independence Tribunal. As soon as he was arrested, fifty members of the FEP took refuge in the British Embassy.³¹

The Galata Stock Exchange and the customs were closed down by the Turkish Chief of Police, Colonel Esat Bey, until further notice from Ankara. İstanbul also received orders that all commerce and other relations between Turks and foreigners should cease.³² The Nationalists began to search for anti-Kemalists who were on their blacklist.³³

At the same time, Refet Pasha tried to assume jurisdiction over the police. On November 11, he met with Allied generals. They agreed that if the Allied police caught a Turk in the act of committing a crime, they were to hand the culprit over to the Turkish police. However, General Harington maintained that if a Turk committed a crime against the Allied forces or property, he should be tried by the Allies. The term "Allies" included the Greek High Commission contingent in İstanbul. Refet Pasha objected to the presence of General Kathekakis and the Greek High Commissioner, Kanelopoulos, because, he said, he had reason to suspect hostile acts on their part. While the Allied generals referred these problems to the High Commissioners, General Charpy stated that Turks were no longer being arrested by the French police in the French zone. General Harington procrastinated, because he had been informed that Refet Pasha would soon be leaving for Eastern Thrace, and felt that there was no point in coming to an agreement with him.³⁴

It appeared that the Nationalists would oppose by force all action taken by the Inter-Allied police. They published a curt warning to the Greeks of İstanbul that those who considered themselves to be Greek subjects and not Ottomans should leave the city before November 18.³⁵ The Nationalists had no means to enforce this decision. However, they intended to signal to the Greek Patriarchate and the Allies that sooner or later they would bring the İstanbul Greeks back under their administration. The former Ottoman Greeks had to decide for themselves whether they were Turkish citizens or foreigners.

³¹ FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3, November 6, 1922. There was no information as to how long the economic shutdown lasted. However, since this decision did not have a major impact on İstanbul that we know of, it must be assumed that it was temporary.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., November 10, 1922.

³⁴ FMA 20N1094 C/30 Dos1, November 22, 1922. Minutes of the Meeting Held Between Refet Pasha and Allied Generals.

³⁵ FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3, November 10, 1922.

The Nationalists took a different path in relaying the message that the British were not wanted in İstanbul; they resorted to violence. One night, a British soldier was killed in Kasımpaşa and another in Şişli. The killings appeared linked because both men were shot twice in the head.³⁶ A subsequent French intelligence report stated that a terrorist organization composed of Laz boatmen existed in Kasımpaşa and took orders from the Navy Ministry. The group had approximately 7,000 armed members under the command of Nationalist Navy officers.³⁷ Thus, the French had peripherally become aware of the *Muavenet-i Bahriye* (the Naval Assistance) group.

On occasion, nationalist righteousness got out of hand. On November 18, Ali Kemal Bey was murdered in İzmit, before he could reach Ankara for a trial, on the order of the local commander, Nurettin Pasha (1873-1932). Nurettin Pasha claimed that people had lynched Ali Kemal, but, in fact, he acted on his own initiative and had some thugs commit the crime.³⁸

The British were reluctant to transfer administrative authority to Refet Pasha. The Acting British High Commissioner, Sir Neville M. Henderson (1882-1942), wrote to Sir Horace, who had returned home.

After all your advice about seeing Refet as little as possible, I have already had two interviews with him, once alone, when he came yesterday to hand another note once more insisting on Angora having full control over the administration here and again today with the other two High Commissioners to discuss the suppression of Allied censorship. The High Commissioners agreed to suppression provided Refet prevented inflammatory articles in the Turkish press. What I am afraid of is that unless we take action soon, instead of our occupation of Constantinople being a card in our hand, we shall ourselves be a card in the hands of Angora.³⁹

The acting British High Commissioner did not want to recognize the new Caliph,⁴⁰ because he felt that doing so would be tantamount to recognizing the Ankara government. However, Sir Neville was obliged to accept Refet Pasha's invitation to an audience with the

³⁶ FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3, November 10, 1922.

³⁷ Ibid., December 6, 1922.

³⁸ Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım* 3 vols. (İstanbul: Altındağ Yayınevi, 1968) 3: 973-976; Rahmi Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subay'ın Hatıraları* 2nd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), pp. 262-265.

³⁹ Rumbold Papers, Nos. 66-68, November 16, 1922.

⁴⁰ Ibid., November 21, 1922.

Caliph, one which General Pellé also attended; but he understated this to the press as merely a personal visit.⁴¹

Towards the end of November, Refet Pasha requested of the High Commissioners that the Allied Military Courts Martial and Tribunals, where serious offenses against the Allied forces were tried, be abolished. Sir Nevile was trying "on principle, to get the status quo maintained," but if he saw that there was no serious difficulty, he was ready to accede to the proposal.⁴² Since the Nationalists did not raise the issue again, it may be presumed that the tribunals and courts martial were abolished.

In December, when the customs administration was turned over to Turkish authority, there was a problem between the Turkish administration and the Allies over passports. The Turkish administration was no longer willing to recognize the passports which had been issued by the Allies to Ottoman subjects as their "protégés." When Turkish customs officers tore up some of these passports, General Harington sent armed marines to escort people in the İstanbul port directly through passport control. Refet Pasha sent a note of protest to Harington because of the interference of the British marines.⁴³ General Harington then proposed to take action against Refet Pasha's stance by declaring martial law. Sir Nevile counteracted this by proposing to take "forcible action" instead.

By force I meant for instance that if the Turks closed town a British company for refusing to comply with the new Turkish Company Law regulations, that the G.O.C. (General Officer Commanding) should send down police or even troops to remove the seals or other obstacles placed on such a company's offices.⁴⁴

Although neither the Allies nor the Nationalists were ready to give in to the other, further incidents between them were carefully avoided.

After the establishment of a Nationalist administration in İstanbul, the National Assembly decided that taxes, fees, and customs dues imposed by the Ottoman government would continue until the end of the 1922 fiscal year. After that, customs dues would be increased five-fold. As of April 12, 1923, customs between İstanbul and Anatolia were abolished; salaries of civil servants were regulated; and the Ankara government officially took over the Ottoman public debt. An-

⁴¹ Ibid., November 29, 1922.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Rumbold Papers, Nos. 120-124, December 5, 1922; FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3, December 6, 1922; Young, *Constantinople*, p. 23.

kara made separate agreements with foreign businesses in İstanbul.⁴⁵ These included the İstanbul Reji (the Tobacco Monopoly), the Dersaadet Telephone Company, the İstanbul Trolley Company, the İstanbul Electric Company, the Üsküdar-Kadıköy Water Company, the Mudanya-Bursa Railway Company, the Aydın Railway Company and the Lighthouse Administration. Gradually, all of these businesses reverted to the Turkish State.

Although the Allied High Commissioners had agreed that all Ottoman subjects were under Ottoman police jurisdiction, the new Turkish administration was still not happy with Allied police jurisdiction over the İstanbul Greeks, whose status as citizens was not clear. The British conceded that there was no persecution of Ottoman Greeks, but they did not give up the right to exercise police jurisdiction over them.⁴⁶

In December 1922, the Inter-Allied Passport Control Commission demanded of the Turkish administration a one month reprise concerning the passports of non-Muslim Ottomans; those who wished to leave should be permitted to do so.⁴⁷ Refet Pasha compromised by demanding that the Allied authorities submit a list of persons who would be allowed to go within five days, as protégés of foreign powers. After that date, no Ottoman subject would be allowed to leave the city without a Turkish passport.⁴⁸

On other issues, it was the Allies' turn to procrastinate in order to maintain the status quo. When Refet Pasha objected to the arrest of a civilian Turkish agent by the Allies, he was simply told that the Allied gendarmery, security and intelligence organizations were authorized to carry out such arrests.⁴⁹

When Dr. Adnan (Adıvar) returned to İstanbul to act as an inter-

⁴⁴ Rumbold Papers, Nos. 130-136, December 12, 1922.

⁴⁵ Eldem, "Mütareke ve Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Ekonomisi," p. 74. On June 14, 1923, an agreement was reached between the Ankara government and the Reji that the former had the right to abolish the monopoly. The Reji was abolished in 1925. In the Lausanne Treaty, the Ottoman public debt was divided according to the former provinces of the Empire. Turkey finished paying its debt in 1954. Other provinces included Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Italian Dodecanese Islands, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Maan, Mosul, Mesopotamia, Hejaz, Nejd, Asr, and Yemen. Of these provinces, Greece, Albania, Yemen and Saudi Arabia did not pay.

⁴⁶ Rumbold Papers, Nos. 148-152, December 19, 1922.

⁴⁷ FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3, December 6, 1922.

⁴⁸ Ibid., December 7, 1922.

⁴⁹ FMA 20N1094 C/30 Dos4, December 7, 1922. Minutes of the Allied Police Commission Meeting.

mediary between Refet Pasha and the Allies, Sir Nevile was faced with more demands from the Nationalists.

Adnan Bey has been bombarding me both in writing and verbally with requests for modification of existing systems. He wants some alterations in the British Post Office arrangement. He wants the Eastern Telegraph Company to go back to its pre-war procedures. He wants free telegraphic correspondence with Germany. He wants us to hand over Hellenic subjects to the Turkish police and so on and so on. So far I have resisted everything, and so long as the Turks maintain their truculence at Angora and Lausanne, the less we give away the better.⁵⁰

While Sir Nevile thought that İstanbul was still a pawn in Allied hands against the Nationalists, a number of British intelligence officers were enraged at having to compromise with the Turks at all. They had worked hard to keep İstanbul under British control and refused to admit that this was a transition period.

General Harington removed the Commander of the Inter-Allied Police, Colonel Colin Robert Ballard (1868-1941), from his post for refusing to "obey an order to discuss with Refet an arrangement which he (Ballard) considered derogatory to British prestige."⁵¹ According to a French report, Ballard had refused to work with Refet Pasha, because he held the pasha responsible for the death of his friend, Ali Kemal Bey.⁵² Some British officers were furious with General Harington.

Colonel Ballard refused to be insulted any further and to go back and eat mud before Refet and so was heavily kicked out by an almost angry G.O.C.C. Maxwell followed and nearly all the old Allied police are to leave this week for England. What remains is put under the Provost Marshall and is ordered to assist the Turkish police in every way to carry out the arrests and other duties where Allied Military and Civilian personnel are concerned. (On the subjects of police authority and passport control) General Harington issued strong, firm, determined, clear, wonderful orders that he wanted to avoid all incident. Allah, Allah. He could not even bargain for a carpet with a third rate merchant much less the honor of a nation and the pride of an army.⁵³

The Italian Colonel Carpini, who was reportedly pro-Turkish, replaced Ballard as the President of the Inter-Allied Police Commission.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Rumbold Papers, Nos. 185-186, January 2, 1923.

⁵¹ Rumbold Papers, Nos. 114-115, December 4, 1922.

⁵² FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3, December 7, 1922.

⁵³ Ryan Papers, December 12, 1922. From Armstrong to Ryan.

⁵⁴ FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3, December 7, 1922.

Simultaneous changes were made in the Turkish police ranks, but for opposite reasons. Sadi Bey, the Director of Turkish Police, was replaced by an ardent Nationalist, Colonel Halil Bey, because the Nationalists believed that the former was an Allied sympathizer.⁵⁵

The Lausanne Peace Conference began on November 20, 1922, but the negotiations were broken off on February 4, 1923, because of a stalemate regarding the capitulations and the financial and economic terms of the treaty. Even before the negotiations were interrupted, Ankara's military representative in İstanbul, Selâhattin Âdil Pasha, had ordered the mobilization of new recruits; the first party of 83 armed soldiers left for Thrace on December 28, 1922.⁵⁶ It is possible that the Nationalists were not sure whether the Greeks would honor the decision to cede Eastern Thrace to Turkey. As a contingency measure, a British captain had arrived in the Dardanelles to enroll Russians still held in camps as a mercenary force.⁵⁷ The British may have taken this precaution so that there would be a force between the Greeks and Turks if a confrontation occurred, or they may have foreseen a conflict between themselves and the Turks, or both. After the peace talks collapsed, armed confrontation between the Turks and the Allies threatened. The Turkish authorities in İstanbul removed the Sacred Relics and other treasures from the Topkapı Palace and took them to Konya for safekeeping.⁵⁸

The French and British disagreed on how to deal with the possibility of a Turkish attack. General Charpy did not even respond to General Harington's proposals about the positioning of Allied soldiers in the Straits and in Thrace.⁵⁹ On December 4, 1922, General Charpy informed the French Ministry of War that General Harington intended to withdraw all the British troops from İstanbul to Çanakkale in case of a Kemalist attack. Charpy argued that from the standpoint of military discipline and Allied prestige, İstanbul should be defended. Marshal Foch, Chief of the French General Staff, agreed with Charpy. If there was to be a Kemalist attack, it would come from the direction of the İzmit peninsula, with the intention of capturing İstanbul. Therefore, the Allies should stand their ground in İstanbul. Meanwhile, Eastern Thrace, including Gallipoli,

⁵⁵ FMA 20N1104 C38/2 n.n. Intelligence Report, February 8, 1923.

⁵⁶ Enver Koray, ed. *Selâhattin Âdil Paşa'nın Hatıraları: Hayat Mücadeleleri* (İstanbul: Zafer Matbaası, 1982), p. 413.

⁵⁷ FMA 20N1105 C38/1 Dos3, January 5, 1923.

⁵⁸ Koray, *Selâhattin Âdil Paşa'nın Hatıraları*, p. 415.

⁵⁹ Bernachot, *Les Armées Françaises*, pp. 327-328.

was transferred to Turkish authority without incident.⁶⁰ The uncompromising attitude of the Turks in Lausanne and the interruption of the conference did not seem to bother the French government.

The Lausanne Conference resumed on April 23, 1923. A few days earlier, Selâhattin Âdil Pasha, in İstanbul, sent a courteous note to the Allied military commanders informing them that on April 23rd, parades celebrating the anniversary of the founding of the National Assembly were to take place.⁶¹ For the first time since the Armistice, a Turkish minister did not ask permission to take a certain course of action. This time, Selâhattin Âdil Pasha chose only to inform the Allies. The parades went smoothly.

That same month, General Charpy had his officers draw up an evacuation plan.⁶² However, the inevitability of evacuating İstanbul did not prevent General Charpy from taking exception to an article which appeared in the İstanbul newspaper, *Aurora*. The article, entitled "L'évacuation de Constantinople et la paix," referred to the danger of keeping the Nationalist and Allied forces so close together and the burden of occupation on the British national budget. According to the article, the occupation cost the British one million pounds a month. The article urged evacuation before the Lausanne Treaty was signed. General Charpy brought it to the attention of the French High Commissioner and asked that the Allied censors protest articles which discussed the occupation.⁶³ Probably, the military faction of the occupiers could not reconcile themselves to evacuation without losing a real battle with the enemy.

Meanwhile, authority still continued to be a source of friction between the Allies and the Turkish administration. In June 1923, Turkish police began to enforce a visa requirement on Allied subjects who traveled to Anatolia from İstanbul. In retaliation, General Harington ruled that no Turkish citizen would be allowed to enter or exit İstanbul without securing a visa from Allied consulates or from the Inter-Allied Passport Bureau. Refet Pasha was to be informed that this rule would be enforced in case the Turks caused an incident regarding the travel of Allied subjects.⁶⁴ General Harington had bluffed, and the Turkish administration humored him. The mere administrative structure of the passport bureaus would have made Harington's rule difficult to enforce, because each bureau was an-

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 329-330.

⁶¹ FMA 20N1106 C38/4 Dos1, April 21, 1923.

⁶² FMA 20N1184 C/114 Dos2, April 13, 1923.

⁶³ FMA 20N1106 C38/4 Dos1, May 5, 1923.

⁶⁴ FMA 20N1094 C/30 Dos4, July 16, 1923.

swerable to its own High Commission. The British general could only enforce the rule in his own zone unless he could have the other High Commissioners agree with him. The line of authority once again would have interfered with efficiency, but General Harington's bluff was not challenged by the Turks. Harington's gesture reminded the Turks that the Allies were still the occupiers, not guests.

On July 24, 1923, the Lausanne Conference ended and the treaty was signed by all parties. Consequently, the administrative war in İstanbul came to an end. By August 25, the Allied forces of occupation began to prepare for evacuation. The Allies planned to sell their stores to the Turks.⁶⁵ Public and private buildings requisitioned by the Allies, as well as the leftover war matériel, were given back to the Turks. On August 29, General Harington gave a tea party in honor of the Turkish military. This was reciprocated with a garden party by the latter on September 19.

General Charpy invited all the other Allied generals to pay their last respects to their dead in the Gallipoli and İstanbul cemeteries. General Harington, as a symbolic gesture, gave the Union Jack in his Headquarters to the Crimean Church in Galata where it is today displayed next to the Union Jack of the Crimean War.⁶⁶

On October 6, there was an orderly ceremony in which the Allied and Turkish generals saluted each others' flags, the change of guard took place, and the Allied generals embarked and were gone. The First Infantry Division of the Turkish Armed Forces entered the city the same day.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Ibid., Dos2, August 24, 1923. Confidential Minutes of the Meeting of Allied Generals.

⁶⁶ I am indebted to Prof. Mete Tunçay for sharing this information with me.

⁶⁷ Hüseyin Hüsnü Erkilet, "6 Ekim'de İstanbul'a Nasıl Girmiştik?" *Yakın Tarihimiz* 3: 32 (October 4, 1962), pp. 163-164.

CONCLUSIONS

Nearly one-third of İstanbul was devastated by fires during the Armistice. Given the increase in the cost of living, unemployment, and the influx of refugees, it is remarkable that there were no epidemics of tragic dimensions. Spanish influenza had killed more people worldwide in the aftermath of World War I than the War itself.¹ Although cases of influenza appeared in İstanbul occasionally, it did not affect the city nearly as much as it did other countries. The irony of it almost compels one to conclude that, having remained in a state of war from 1918 to 1923, Turkey must have remained immune to influenza.

The spread of disease was controlled very effectively in İstanbul despite the poverty of hundreds of thousands of the city's inhabitants. The efforts of ethnic community services, in addition to the Red Crescent, the Allied Red Crosses, the Russian White Cross, the American Near East Relief Agency, and the Allied Urban and Quarantine Commissions achieved this result.

The Ottoman government was bankrupt. The "provisional" Allied Financial Commission tried to draw from as many financial resources as it could and even increased the city taxes. However, nothing helped relieve the situation.

The İstanbul municipality also lacked money. The Allies' Urban, Sanitary and Quarantine Commissions saved the municipality of major responsibilities. İstanbul would have suffered a worse fate than just occupation had these matters been left in the hands of a bankrupt municipality.

Educational services seemed adequate in the city when both Turkish and foreign schools were considered. Not many Turkish families could afford education for their children beyond primary school, but those who could had a range of schools to choose from. Prospects for higher education and employment opportunities for women were harbingers of intellectual as well as of social enlightenment for Turkey. The female population began to gain a certain consciousness. This was not confined to well-to-do women who managed the Protec-

¹ Doris Lessing, *The Wind Blows Away Our Words* (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1987), p. 19.

tion of Women (Himaye-i Nisvan) and Protection of Children (Himaye-i Etval) branches of the Red Crescent Society. Women took up employment in the service sector and in the general labor force in greater numbers than before. In addition, there was a ready cadre of female teachers, graduates of the Teachers' College (Dârü'l Muallimat), who became part of the enthusiastic educators in the early years of the Turkish Republic. Ottoman feminists were an added incentive in transforming socio-economic nationalism to political nationalism.

In short, İstanbul survived the hardships of war and occupation with relatively little damage to its institutions and to the psychological welfare of its populace. People endured homelessness, unemployment and food shortages. At the same time, they realized that Turkey was still in a state of war. The people of İstanbul were reminded daily of this fact by the presence of the occupiers and the insults they received from the Greek minority. Subsequently, Nationalist victories alleviated the psychological dimension of suffering. The municipality bestowed honorary citizenship on Mustafa Kemal Pasha and named the avenue in Şişli, where he had lived, *Halâşkâr Gazi Caddesi* (The Savior Ghazi's Avenue) as İstanbul's expression of gratitude to him.

The domestic political situation in İstanbul during the Armistice can best be described as ambivalent, if not chaotic. It was a time of uncertainty. The Sultan was not sure whether he had the loyal support of the military or of the Allies. On several occasions he had threatened to abdicate. In 1920, the British gave him private assurance that they would safeguard his person. Although the Sultan had communicated with the Nationalists in Ankara, it would be safe to assume that a meaningful dialogue was not established.

Vahidettin's policy was to remain in İstanbul at all cost. He refused to contemplate going to Anatolia or collaborating with the Nationalists. As Caliph, he considered himself to be the guardian of the Prophet's Sacred Relics. He feared that if he were absent from the capital, the British might confiscate the Relics and hand them over to a new (perhaps an Arab) Caliph of their own choice. He also feared the British might sequester the historic treasures of the Ottoman dynasty, which were housed in the Topkapı Palace. Based on these suspicions, the Sultan believed that he was bound in honor to the Ottoman dynastic heritage and the Caliphate. Furthermore, he felt bitter towards the Nationalists because he thought that their movement was adventurism. His resentment was compounded by the knowledge that the Nationalists had twice asked the heir apparent, Abdülmecid Efendi, to join them. (Abdülmecid had declined both

offers.)² Vahidettin, who kept a close watch over the heir apparent, must have known about this. Therefore, he became convinced that the Nationalist were disloyal to the person of the sovereign. (Vahidettin did not take into account that he had condemned the Nationalist leaders to death in absentia.)

Public opinion in İstanbul, as reflected in the press, was divided sharply between the pro- and anti-Nationalists. From 1918 to 1920, political trends in İstanbul ranged from opting for an American or a British mandate to rejecting any form of foreign tutelage. Following the formation of the National Assembly in Ankara, there was only one option left to the Turks and to people who considered themselves Ottoman subjects. One either supported the Nationalist cause or was accused of treason. On April 29, 1920, the National Assembly adopted the Treason Law (*Hiyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu*), which treated action, speech, and writing directed against the Nationalist Movement as treason. From then on, acts or words would be evaluated by the Nationalists in terms of pros or cons. They chose not to discriminate among subtleties when independence was at stake. Anti-Kemalist journalists, academicians, and politicians persisted until the Nationalists' triumph was assured. Success, in this case, proved to be the determining factor between right and wrong as the victors defined it.

The Allied occupation forces did not set up a complex administrative organization until after March 16, 1920. The control machinery was established under the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control and Organization. Subcommissions in this system involved the police, the gendarmery, and requisitioning, censorship, passport control, the military, and finances. The military-bureaucratic organization heralded the Allied intention to stay.

İstanbul was to remain both the seat of the Caliph and the Ottoman government, which meant closer control of both by the Allies. Yet the government in Turkey did not remain the same. The Ottoman Parliament dissolved itself when two of its members were dragged out of the building and arrested by the British on March 16, 1920. Shortly afterwards, the Sultan officially dissolved an already non-existent Parliament. Many deputies escaped to Anatolia. The Allies had consistently underestimated the Nationalists' ability to establish their own Parliamentary regime. In a letter to Sir Cecil Crowe in Paris, Admiral Webb, Assistant High Commissioner in 1919,

² "Hüseyin Nakıp Bey's Correspondence," Taha Toros Archives, Etiler, İstanbul. Hüseyin Nakıp Bey was private secretary to Abdülmecid Efendi; Asım Gündüz, *Hatıralarım*, İhsan İlgar, ed. (İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1973), pp. 41-44.

stated "The situation in the interior, due practically entirely to the Greek occupation of Smyrna, is getting more hazy and unsettled. Were this anywhere but Turkey, I should say we were on the eve of a tremendous upheaval."³

The Allied controls in İstanbul were not as effective as they should have been. Within a few months of the Armistice in Europe (November 11, 1918), the Allies had parted ways both concerning "high politics" and the definition of the chain of command in İstanbul. Allied authorities did not always enjoy cooperation from the Turks either. Many members of the Turkish police force alerted people whose names were on the "to be arrested" list and gave them time to escape.⁴ Moreover, the British control officers on the one hand, and the Turkish police and gendarmery on the other, disagreed on procedure. On August 6, 1921, a British lieutenant had decided to check out two Turks to see if they were carrying arms. The Turks ran away, upon which the British officer ordered the two Turkish gendarmery soldiers under his command to fire at the runaways. The soldiers disobeyed him. The British arrested these soldiers the next day and expelled them from the force.⁵ Hence, obedience to foreign authority was problematic for both sides. While the French and Italians successfully avoided incidents whereby their authority would be openly challenged, the British tried to impose their authority more rigidly.

The Allied administration in İstanbul faced other problems, such as the Russian refugees, Bolshevik propaganda, and strikes by Turkish workers supported by the Turkish Socialist Party. The Allies were involved with the strikes, because these impeded functioning of the city. The trolley, electricity company and dockyard strikes involved the Allies not only because the first two companies were owned by their own nationals, but also because they were in charge of public order. In addition, the Allies had to keep surveillance on Bolshevik agents of influence in İstanbul. Fear of Bolshevism made the Allies extremely sensitive to propaganda.

The Allies, mainly the French, helped Russian refugees. Here was yet another reason why the French were disappointed with their allies. Neither the British nor the Italians made a common cause to help them in this expensive and exhausting endeavor.

³ *British Documents On Foreign Policy*, IV: 733.

⁴ Interview with Zeynep Menemencioglu, İstanbul resident, Moda, İstanbul, June 27, 1988. Samih Rifat Bey (1874-1932), her father, was one such person who escaped with the help of the Turkish police. A member of the underground, and a man of letters, Samih Rifat Bey organized the Turkish Linguistic Society in Ankara in 1932.

⁵ FMA 20N1095 C/31 Dos3, August 13, 1921.

Throughout the Armistice, the Allies, the Ottoman Palace, and the FEP believed that the Turkish peace would be concluded at the political-diplomatic level. Only the CUP members and Kemalists believed in armed opposition to the partition of their country. "My husband was not less of a patriot," said Ali Kemal Bey's wife, Sabiha Hanım (Kuneralp), "He just ended up on the losing side. For a while there, it was indeed a 50-50 proposition."⁶ When the Nationalists succeeded, it was no miracle. It took almost five years of organized and systematic resistance in İstanbul and elsewhere to achieve victory.

While it is not possible to compare the quantity of material support the Nationalists received from Anatolia and from İstanbul (because Turkish Military Archives are closed to most researchers) it would be safe to assume that war matériel that came from İstanbul surpassed in quality those found in Anatolia. During the war, the CUP leadership had İstanbul well stocked with the best of the available war matériel, which had been received as German aid, in case the city was attacked. Many mosque basements were turned into war supply depots. The Ottoman War Ministry and General Staff supported the Nationalists during the Armistice, except for brief periods when Damad Ferid Pasha assumed the War and Foreign Ministries in addition to his Grand Vizirate. Major institutions in the city, such as the boatmen's, porters', coachmen's, artisans', and manufacturers' guilds, women's groups, certain religious institutions, and the Red Crescent Society, as well as individuals collaborated with the military in the resistance. Consequently, as a rare phenomenon in Turkish history, an organized people's movement, dictated its choice to the rulers of the society.⁷ Opponents of the Nationalists who believed that the main driving force in Turkish society was religion were mistaken. The desire for freedom proved to be a stronger drive.

⁶ Interview with Mrs. Sabiha Kuneralp, Kalamış, İstanbul, November 25, 1986.

⁷ In order to account for the current Turkish predicament in domestic politics, such as "resurgent Islam," some social scientists argue that the Nationalist Movement was not a genuine people's movement. It was led by an élite who collaborated with the local notables and landowners. Hence, the social reforms that the Nationalists imposed from the top did not really take root. See Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışında Bir İnceleme* (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 1988). This approach is not only a reaction to rigid official history in Turkey, but also a convenient tool to explain social change. However, historically it accounts for very little.

EPILOGUE

Through the years, the Russian community in İstanbul shrank because of deaths and emigration of the young. By the late 1980s, about ten to fifteen Russians survived from that era, among whom were Baroness Valentina Taskin (86, musician), Georgevich Timchenkov (82, musician),¹ and Madame Tatiana Ivanova 84).²

Claude Farrère and Pierre Loti streets are still there in the Cağaloğlu district. Damad Ferid Pasha's residence on the Bosphorus in Baltalimanı is now the İstanbul University Guesthouse. Enver Pasha's office at the former Ministry of War is now the İstanbul University faculty dining room. The Maçka Gun Arsenal is part of the İstanbul Technical University. Fehime Sultan's palace in Ortaköy on the Bosphorus is the Gazi Osman Pasha Secondary School. Robert College, on its Rumeli Hisarı campus, became the Bosphorus University. Bağlarbaşı Üsküdar American School for Women and the Arnavutköy College for Women, which has become the new Robert College, are remnants of the American educational system. The Director of the Admiral Bristol Hospital is still an American. Reminiscing about the difficulties that Admiral Bristol created for his grandfather, Dr. Cemil Pasha (the mayor of İstanbul), Professor Dr. Cemalettin Topuzlu said, "Isn't that ironic? Today, I perform all of my surgeries at the Admiral Bristol Hospital."³

What used to be the CUP headquarters sits in a dilapidated state across from the offices of the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* in Cağaloğlu. By 1991, the Crimean Church in Galatasaray was included in the architectural restoration activities to preserve the Beyoğlu (Pera) district's historic flavor. On May 8, 1993, the Church was opened for worship and is currently serving the Anglican community of İstanbul.⁴ Foreign embassies in Pera are now consulates general, but the Pera Palace still attests to the grandeur of the "belle époque" (1890-1950) of İstanbul.

¹ "Atatürk'e Piyano Çalan Barones," *Hürriyet*, July 28, 1988, p. 2, cs. 1-4.

² Interview with Madame Tatiana Ivanova, Gayrettepe, İstanbul, December 1988.

³ Interview with Professor Dr. Cemalettin Topuzlu, Baltalimanı, İstanbul, May 26, 1989.

⁴ "Kırım Kilisesi" (The Crimean Church). *Maison Française* (June 1998), pp. 188-195.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Original Sources

- French Military Archives, Premier Guerre Mondiale-Campagne Contre Allemagne (1919-1923), Corps d'Occupation de Constantinople. Château de Vincennes, Paris, FMA 20N-.
- Great Britain, Foreign Office, General Correspondence, Turkey (1919-1923). Public Record Office, London. FO 371-.
- , Foreign Office, Confidential Print, (1919-1923). Public Record Office, London. FO 406-.
- İstanbul University Medical School, Department of Medical History, Cerrahpaşa and Çapa Hospitals. Dossiers on Dr. Esat Işık Pasha, Dr. Bahaettin Şakir, Dr. Cemil Topuzlu Pasha and Dr. Nihat Reşat Belger. Turkish Revolutionary History Institute, Ankara University. Correspondence, M.M. (The National Defense Group). Papers of Topkapılı Canbaz Mehmet Bey. TITE 39-.
- United States Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1910-1929. Political Affairs. (Washington, D.C.: Microfilm, U.S. Records 867-). The American Library, Ankara.
- Bristol, Mark Lambert, MS, War Diary. The National Archives, Washington, D.C. Boxes 16-17, Subject files 36-38.
- Eldem, Vedat, MS, Mütareke ve Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Osmanlı Ekonomisi. Hacettepe University, Turkish Economic History Seminar 8-10 June, 1973. Ankara University Political Science Faculty Library.
- Ertürk, Hüsamettin, MS, Milli Mücadele Senelerinde Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa. General Fevzi Çakmak, ed. General Tefvik Apay, translit. Turkish General Staff, Institute of Strategic Research and War History Library, Ankara.
- Morey, Grace, MS, Medical and Social Agencies Available for the Relief of Dependent Women and Children in Constantinople, 1921. Bosphorus University, Near East Collection, İstanbul.
- Rumbold, Horace, Correspondence, MS Rumbold/30. Oxford University, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
- Ryan, Andrew, Correspondence, Box V-VI Series 589. Oxford University, St. Antony's College, The Middle East Centre, Oxford.
- Taylor, Charles T.C., MS, "Many Happy Returns: The Autobiography of Major Charles Theodore Cochrane Taylor." Oxford University, St. Antony's College, The Middle East Centre, Oxford.

Public Documents

- İğdemir, Uluğ, ed. *Heyet-i Temsiliye Tutanakları*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1975.
- Meray, Seha L. and Olcay, Osman, eds. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Çöküş Belgeleri*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1977.
- Şimşir, Bilâl, ed. *British Documents On Atatürk (1919-1939)* 4 vols. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1979.
- Tableaux Indiquant le nombre de divers éléments de la population dans l'Empire Ottoman au 1^{er} Mars 1330 (14 Mars 914)*. Constantinople: Imp. Osmanié, 1919.
- TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, 4 vols. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985.
- Woodward E. L. and Butler, R. eds. *Documents on British Foreign Policy (1919-1939)* Series I vols. IV, VIII, XIII. London: Oxford University Press, 1952-.

Newspapers and Periodicals

- | | |
|------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Alemdar | The Acorne |
| Diken | Askeri Mecmua |
| Echos de l'Islam | Askeri Tarih Mecmuası |
| Karagöz | Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi |
| Tasvir-i Efkâr | Barış Dünyası |
| Tevhid-i Efkâr | Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi |
| | Belleten |
| | Büyük Mecmua |
| | Dün ve Bugün |
| | Harp Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi |
| | Hayat Tarih Mecmuası |
| | L'Illustration |
| | The Orient |
| | Oriente Moderno |
| | Sohbetler |
| | Tarih Aynası |
| | Tarih Dergisi |
| | Tarih Dünyası |
| | Tarih Hazinesi |
| | Tarih Konuşuyor |
| | Tarih Vesikaları Dergisi |
| | Yakın Tarihimiz |

Books

- Abadan, Yavuz. *Harp Sonu Muahedelerine Nazaran Lozan'ın Hususiyetleri*. İstanbul: Arkadaş Basımevi, 1938.
- Adıvar, Halide Edip. *Mor Salkımlı Ev*. İstanbul: Atlas Kitabevi, 1970.
- , *Memoirs of Halide Edib*. New York: Arno Press, 1972.
- , *Turkey Faces West: A Turkish Viewpoint of Recent Changes and Their Origin*. New Haven, Connecticut: Arno Press, 1973.
- , *Türk'ün Ateşle İmtihanı*. 8th ed. İstanbul: Atlas Kitabevi, 1985.
- Ağaoğlu, Süreyya. *Bir Ömür Böyle Geçti*. İstanbul: İshak Basımevi, 1975.
- Ahmet Rasim. *Gülüp Ağladıklarım*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1978.
- , *Dünya İstanbul'da Hovardalık: Fuhs-i Atik*. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1987.
- Akdemir, Aziz Hüdaî. *Dünyada ve Bizde Casusluk*. İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1949.
- Aksel, Malik. *İstanbul'un Ortası*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1977.
- Akşin, Sina. *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele*. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1983.
- Akyüz, Yahya. *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Fransız Kamuoyu, 1919-1922*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1975.
- Alemdar, Korkmaz. *Türkiye'de Yayınlanan Fransızca Bir Gazetenin Tarihi*. Ankara: İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi Yayınları, 1978.
- Altay, Fahrettin. *Görüp Geçirdiklerim: 10 Yıl Savaş ve Sonrası, 1912-1922*. İstanbul: İnsel Yayınları, 1970.
- Ambarcıoğlu, Namık, comp. *Mütareke Yıllarından Vesikalar—Ahmet E. Yatman'ın Mütareke Devrinde Yazdıkları*. İstanbul: Vakit Kitabevi, 1946.
- Angell, Norman. *The Political Conditions of Allied Success: A Plea for the Protective Union of the Democracies*. New York and London: Putnam and Sons, 1918.
- Apak, Rahmi. *Yetmişlik Bir Subay'ın Hatıraları*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988.
- Arıburnu, Kemal. *Milli Mücadelede İstanbul Mitingleri*. Ankara: Yeni Desen Matbaası, 1975.
- Armstrong, Harold. *Turkey in Travail*. London: John Lane, 1925.
- Atay, Faliş Rifka. *Niçin Kurtulmamak?* İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1953.
- , *Mustafa Kemal'in Mütareke Defteri*. İstanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955.
- , *Batış Yılları*. İstanbul: Dünya Yayınları, 1963.
- , *Atatürk'ün Hatıraları, 1914-1919*. Ankara: n.p. 1965.
- Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. *Suyu Arayan Adam*. Ankara: Türkiye Matbaası, 1959.
- , *Tek Adam*. 3 vols. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966.
- , *İkinci Adam*. 3 vols. 6th ed. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1984.
- Azan, Paul. *Franchet d'Espèrey*. Paris: n.p. 1949.
- Balçioğlu, Semih and Öngören, Ferit, eds. *Elli Yılın Türk Mizah ve Karikatürü*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1973.
- Banoğlu, Niyazi Ahmet. *Atatürk'ün İstanbul'daki Hayatı*. 2 vols. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1973.
- Beysanoğlu, Şevket. *Süleyman Nazif*. Ankara: İş Matbaacılık, 1970.
- Bello, C.G. *Notes et Réflexions Sur La Turquie, L'Angleterre, la France et le Problème de Constantinople*. Paris: Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, 1920.

- Bennett, John Godolphin. *Witness*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1962.
- Berkem, Süreyya Sami. *Unutulmuş Günler*. İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1960.
- Bernachot, Jean. *Les Armées Françaises en Orient Après L'Armistice de 1918*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1970.
- Beyatlı, Yahya Kemal. *Çocukluğum, Gençliğim, Siyasi ve Edebi Hatıralarım*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1973.
- Bilsel, Cemil. *Lozan*. 2 vols. İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1933.
- Blaisdell, Donald C. *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1929.
- Bleda, Mithat Şükrü. *İmparatorluğun Çöküşü*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1979.
- Borak, Sadi. *Ata ve İstanbul*. İstanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Yayınları, 1983.
- Bozok, Salih and Cemil. *Hep Atatürk'ün Yanında*. İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1985.
- Brown, Demetra Vaka. *The Unveiled Ladies of Stamboul*. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923; reprint ed., Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries, 1971.
- Busch, Briton Cooper. *Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923*. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1976.
- Calwell, C.E. *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson*. 2 vols. London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1927.
- Castle, Wilfred T.F. *Grand Turk; an Historical Outline of Life and Events, of Culture and Politics, of Trade and Travel During the Last Years of the Ottoman Empire and the First Years of the Turkish Republic*. London: Hutchinson, 1943.
- Cebesoy, Ali Fuat. *Milli Mücadele Hatıraları*. İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1953.
- , *Moskova Hatıraları*. İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1955.
- , *Siyasi Hatıraları*. İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1957.
- Cumming, Henry H. *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East*. London: Oxford University Press, 1938.
- Çankaya, Ali Mücelitoğlu. *Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, 1859-1949*. 8 vols. Ankara: Örnek Matbaası, 1954.
- Çavdar, Tevfik. *Talât Paşa: Bir Örgüt Ustası'nın Yaşam Öyküsü*, 2nd ed. Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 1984.
- Çukurova, Bülent. *Kurtuluş Savaşında Haberalma ve Yeraltı Çalışmaları*. Ankara: Ardıç Yayınları, 1994.
- Daniel, Robert L. *American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820-1960*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1970.
- De Novo, John A. *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1963.
- Demirtaş, Bülent, ed. *Miralay Mehmet Arif Bey: Anadolu İnkılabı*. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1987.
- , *Meclis-i Mebusan ve Âyan Reisi Ahmed Rıza Bey'in Anıları*. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1988.
- Dichl, Charles. *Constantinople*. Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1924.
- Dinamo, Hasan İzzet. *Kutsal İsyan*. 8 vols. İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1966.
- , *Türk Kelebeği*. İstanbul: Yalçın Yayınları, 1981.
- Duru, Kâzım Nami. *İttihat ve Terakki Hatıralarım*. İstanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1957.
- Duru, Orhan. *Amerikan Gizli Belgeleriyle Türkiye'nin Kurtuluş Yılları*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1978.

- Dwight, H.G. *Constantinople Old and New*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.
- , *Constantinople Settings and Traits*. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1926.
- Dwight, Henry Otis. *Constantinople and Its Problems*. London and Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier, 1901.
- Ekrem, Selma. *Unveiled: The Autobiography of a Turkish Girl*. New York: I. Washburn, 1930; reprint ed., London: Geoffrey Bles, 1931.
- Emre, Ahmet Cevdet. *İki Neslin Tarihi*. İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1960.
- Evans, Laurence. *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924*. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.
- Ferrell, Robert H. *Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917-1921*. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1985.
- Felek, Burhan. *Yaşadığımız Günler*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1974.
- , *Geçmiş Zaman Olur ki*. İstanbul: Felek Yayıncılık, 1985.
- Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace*. New York: Avon Books, 1989.
- Gaillard, Gaston. *The Turks and Europe*. London: Thomas Murky and Co., 1921.
- Galanti, Avram. *Türkler ve Yahudiler*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1947.
- Gençosman, K.Z. *Devlet Kuran Meclis*. İstanbul: Hürriyet Yayınları, 1981.
- Georgeon, François. *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*. Translated by Alev Er. Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986.
- Gilbert, Martin. *Sir Horace Rumbold: Portrait of a Diplomat (1869-1941)*. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1973.
- Gordon, Leland J. *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930*. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Philadelphia Press, 1932.
- Gökbilgin, Tayyib. *Milli Mücadele Başlarken*. 2 vols. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959.
- Göldaş, İsmail. *İstanbul İlkokul Öğretmenlerinin Grevi (1920)*. İstanbul: Kardeşler Basımevi, 1984.
- Göztepe, Tarık Mümtaz. *Osmanoğullarının Son Padişahı Vahideddin Mütareke Gayyasında*. İstanbul: Sebül Yayınevi, 1969.
- , *Osmanoğullarının Son Padişahı Vahideddin Gurbet Cehenneminde*. İstanbul: Sebül Yayınevi, 1978.
- Graves, Philip P. *Briton and Turk*. London: Hutchinson, 1941.
- Graves, Robert Windham. *Storm Centers of the Near East: Personal Memoirs 1879-1929*. London: Hutchinson, 1933; reprint ed., New York: AMS Press, 1975.
- Gürkan, Kâzım İsmail. *Darülfünun Grevi*. İstanbul: Garanti Matbaası, 1971.
- Gürün, Kâmurân. *Savaşın Dünya ve Türkiye*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1986.
- Hatıralar: Cemal Paşa, Bahriye Nazırı ve 4. Ordu Kumandanı* ed. Behçet Cemal. İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1977.
- Harington, Charles. *Tim Harington Looks Back*. London: John Murray, 1940.
- Harp Kabinelerinin İsticvabı*. İstanbul: Vakıf Matbaası, 1933.
- Harris, Geroge S. *The Origins of Communism in Turkey*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967.
- Hasan Amca (Hasan Vasfi). *Doğmayan Hürriyet 1908-1918*. İstanbul: M. Sıralar Matbaası, 1958.
- Helmreich, Paul C. *From Paris to Sèvres: the Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the*

- Peace Conference of 1919-1920*. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1974.
- Hiçnılmaz, Ergun. *Türk Spor Tarihi*. İstanbul: Demet Ofset Tesisleri, 1974.
- , *Belgelerle Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa ve Casusluk Örgütleri*. İstanbul: n.p. 1979.
- , *Belgelerle Kurtuluş Savaşında Casusluk Örgütleri*. İstanbul: Yüce Yayınları, 1981.
- Himmetoğlu, Hüsnü. *Kurtuluş Savaşında İstanbul ve Yardımları*. 2 vols. İstanbul: Ülkü Matbaası, 1975.
- Howard, Harry N. *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923*. New York: H. Fertig, 1966.
- İdikut, İhsan. *Türk Lawrensleri*. İstanbul: Öztürk Matbaası, 1953.
- İleri, Suphi Nuri. *Sèvres ve Lozan*. İstanbul: Arkadaş Matbaası, 1934.
- İstanbul, 1914-1923*, ed. Stefanos Yerasimos 2nd ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997.
- Jenkins, Hester Donaldson. *An Educational Ambassador to the Near East*. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1925.
- Johnson, Clarence Richard, ed. *Constantinople Today; or the Pathfinder Survey of Constantinople: A Study in Oriental Social Life*. New York: Macmillan, 1922.
- Kandemir, Feridun. *İstiklâl Savaşında Bozguncular ve Casuslar*. İstanbul: Yakın Tarihimiz Yayınları, 1964.
- , *Milli Mücadele Başlangıcında Mustafa Kemal: Arkadaşları ve Karşıdakiler*. İstanbul: Yakın Tarihimiz Yayınları, 1964.
- , *Hatıraları ve Söyleyemedikleriyle Rauf Orbay*. İstanbul: Sinan Matbaası, 1965.
- Kansu, Mazhar Müfit. *Erzurum'dan Ölümine Kadar Atatürk'le Beraber*. 2 vols. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986.
- Kaplan, Mehmet et al. *Devrin Yazarlarının Kalemile Milli Mücadele ve Gazi Mustafa Kemal*. 2 vols. İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1981.
- Karacan, Ali Naci. *Lozan Konferansı ve İsmet Paşa*. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1943.
- Karal, Enver Ziya. *Birinci Cihan Harbinden Lozan Muahedesine Kadar Türkiye'nin Siyasi Olayları*. İstanbul: n.p. 1959.
- Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri. *Gençlik ve Edebiyat Hatıraları*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1969.
- , *Vatan Yolunda*. İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1980.
- , *Politikada 45 Yıl*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984.
- Karay, Refik Halit. *Üç Nesil Üç Hayat*. İstanbul: Semih Lütfi Kitabevi, n.d.
- , *Minelbab İlelmihrab*. İstanbul: İnkılâp ve Aka Kitabevleri Koll. Şit., 1964.
- Kemalettin Şükrü. *Mütareke Acıları*. İstanbul: Selâmet Matbaası, 1930.
- Kent, Marian. *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*. Winchester, Massachusetts: Allen and Unwin, 1984.
- Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. *Vahidüddin*. İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1968.
- Koçer, Kemal. *Kurtuluş Savaşlarımızda İstanbul (M.M. Grubu)*. İstanbul: Vakıf Basımevi, 1946.
- Koray, Enver, ed. *Selâhattin Âdil Paşa'nın Hatıraları: Hayat Mücadeleleri*. İstanbul: Zafer Matbaası, 1982.
- Korle, Sârâ E., ed. *Geçmiş Zaman Olur ki—Prences Mewhibe Celâleddin'in Anıları*. İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1987.
- Kurat, Yuluğ Tekin. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Paylaşılması*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1986.

- Kutay, Cemal. *Kurtuluşun ve Cumhuriyetin Mânevi Mimarları*. Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1973.
- , *İstiklâl Savaşının Mâneviyat Ordusu*. İstanbul: C. Kutay Kitaplığı, 1977.
- , *Lauren's'e Karşı Kuşçubaşı ve Özel Örgütün Kuruluşu*. İstanbul: C. Kutay Kitaplığı, 1978.
- , *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*. İstanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları, 1980.
- , *Üç Devirde Bir Adam—Fethi Okyar*. İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1980.
- , *Şehit Sadrazam Talât Paşa'nın Gurbet Hatıraları*. 3 vols. İstanbul: By the Author, 1983.
- , *Üç Devirde Mehmet Şeref Aykut (1874-1939)*. İstanbul: Teknografik Matbaacılık ve Ticaret A.Ş., 1985.
- Lloyd George, David. *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*. 2 vols. New Haven, Connecticut: University of Connecticut Press, 1939.
- Loti, Pierre. *La Mort de Notre Chère France en Orient*. Paris: Calmann-Levy, Editeurs, 1920.
- Lowry, Heath W. *The Story Behind Ambassador Margenthau's Story*. İstanbul: The ISIS press, 1990.
- Luke, Harry. *Cities and Men*. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1953.
- , *The Old Turkey and the New*. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1955.
- Mansel, Philip. *Constantinople, City of the World's Desire, 1453-1924*, 2nd ed. London: Penguin Books, 1997.
- Marston, F.S. *The Peace Conference of 1919*. London: Oxford University Press, 1944.
- Mazıcı, Nurşen. *Atatürk Döneminde Muhalefet (1919-1926)*. İstanbul: Dilmen Yayınevi, 1984.
- Mears, Elliot Grinnell, ed. *Modern Turkey; a Politico-Economic Interpretation 1908-1923*. New York: Macmillan, 1924.
- Meinertzhagen, R. *Middle East Diary 1917-1956*. London: The Cresset Press, 1959.
- Meray, Seha L. *Prof. Ahmet Selâhattin Bey*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1976.
- Menemencioğlu, Zeynep. *Masal Gibi*. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1982.
- Mısıroğlu, Kadir. *Kurtuluş Savaşında Sarıklı Mücahitler*. 6th ed. İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1980.
- Monroe, Elizabeth. *Britain's Moment in the Middle East*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1963.
- Morgan, Jacques Jean Marie de. *Contre les barbares de l'Orient; études sur la Turquie, ses félonies et ses crimes; sur la marche des Alliés dans l'Asie antérieure; sur la solution de la question d'Orient; reformant de nombreux articles parus de 1915 à 1917 dans l'Eclair de Montpellier et dans la Revue de Paris*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1918.
- Morgenthau, Henry. *Secrets of the Bosphorus*. 2nd ed. London: Hutchinson and Co., 1918.
- , *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1918.
- Morkaya, Burhan Cahit. *Mudanya, Lozan ve Ankara*. İstanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1933.

- Mufty-Zadé K. Zia Bey. *Speaking of the Turks*. New York: Duffield and Company, 1922.
- Nayral Martin de Bourgon, Pierre Emile Joseph. *Dix ans de souvenirs 1914-1924*. 8 vols. Nîmes: Impr. De Chastanier frères et Alméras, 1933.
- , *The Near East From Within*. 2nd ed. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1918.
- Nicolson, Harold. *Peacemaking 1919*. London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1933.
- , *Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925, A Study in Post-War Diplomacy*. London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1934.
- Noyan, Abdülkadir. *Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla Savaşlarım*. Ankara: Ankara Tıp Fakültesi Yayınları, 1956.
- Okday, İsmail Hakkı. *Yanya'dan Ankara'ya*. İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1975.
- Okday, Şefik. *Büyükbabam Son Sadrazam Ahmet Tevfik Paşa*. İstanbul: ATA Ofset Basımevi, 1986.
- Orbay, Rauf. *Cehennem Değirmeni: Siyasi Hatıralarım* 2 vols. İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, n.d.
- Orga, İrfan. *Portrait of a Turkish Family*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950.
- Ortaylı, İlber. *İstanbul'dan Sayfalar*. İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1986.
- , *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Mentese'nin Anıları*. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986.
- Osmanoğlu, Şadiye. *Hayatımın Acı ve Tatlı Günleri*. İstanbul: Bedir Yayınevi, 1966.
- Önelçin, Adnan, comp. *Nutuk'un (Söylev'in) İçinden*. İstanbul: Yüce Yayınları, 1981.
- Özalp, Kâzım. *Milli Mücadele 1919-1922*. 2 vols. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1985.
- Paillarès, Michel. *La Kemalisme devant des Alliés*. Constantinople et Paris: By the Author, 1922.
- Paker, Esat Cemal. *Siyasi Tarihimizde Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları*. İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1952.
- Pears, Edwin. *Turkey and Its People*. London: Methuen, 1911.
- , *Forty Years in Constantinople*. New York: Appleton and Co., 1916.
- Pech, Edgar. *Les Alliés et la Turquie*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1925.
- Peker, Nurettin. 1918-1923: *İstiklâl Savaşının Vesika ve Resimleri*. İstanbul: Gün Basımevi, 1955.
- , *Öl, Esir Olma*. İstanbul: Okat Yayınları, 1966.
- Powell, Alexander E. *The Struggle for Power in Moslem Asia*. New York and London: The Century Co., 1923.
- Presland, John. *Deedes Bey*. London: Mac Millan and Co. Ltd., 1942.
- Price, Claire. *The Rebirth of Turkey*. New York: Thomas Seltzer, 1923.
- Price, G. Ward. *Extra-Special Correspondent*. London: George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd., 1957.
- Puaux, René. *Constantinople et la question d'Orient*. Paris: By the author, 1920.
- Rıza Nur. *Hayat ve Hatıratım*. 4 vols. İstanbul: Altındağ Yayınevi, 1968.
- Rochefoucauld, Gabriel. *Constantinople avec Loti*. Paris: Les Editions De France, 1928.

- Ross, Frank A. Fry, Luther and Sibley, Elbridge. *The Near East and American Philanthropy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1929.
- Rouillon, Léon. *Mon Beau Voyage (Le Turquie et ses Ennemis jugés par un Soldat Français)*. Paris: Les Gêmeaux, 1923.
- Ryan, Andrew. *The Last of the Dragomans*. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1951.
- Sarıhan, Zeki. *Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü 1918-1922*. 3 vols. Ankara: Öğretmen Dünyası Yayınları, 1982.
- Selek, Sabahattin. *Anadolu İhtilâli*. 5th ed. İstanbul: Örgün Yayınları, 1981.
- Sertel, M. Zekeriya. *Hatırladıklarım*. İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1977.
- Sertoğlu, Murat. *Mustafa Sagır*. İstanbul: Güven Basın ve Yayınevi, n.d.
- Sforza, Carlo. *Makers of Modern Europe*. Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1928.
- Simavi, Lütfi. *Osmanlı Sarayı'nın Son Günleri*. İstanbul: Hürriyet Yayınları, 1973.
- Sonyel, Salâhi R. *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*. 2 vols. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1973.
- Sorgun, M. Taylan, ed. *İttihat ve Terakki'den Cumhuriyet'e Bitmeyen Savaş: Halil Kut Paşa'nın Hatıraları*. İstanbul: Yedi Gün Yayınları, 1972.
- Soysal, İlhami. *Kurtuluş Savaşında İşbirlikçiler*. İstanbul: Gür Yayınları, 1985.
- , *150'likler*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Gür Yayınları, 1985.
- Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemal. *Başımıza Gelenler: Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya 1918-1922*. İstanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1939.
- , *Hariciye Hizmetinde 30 Sene*. 4 vols. İstanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1955.
- , *Yok Edilmek İstenen Millet*. İstanbul: Selek Neşriyatı, 1957.
- Su, Kâmi. *Köprülü Hamdi Bey ve Akbaş Olayı*. Ankara: Kurtuluş Ofset Basımevi, 1984.
- Sylvester, A.J. *The Real Lloyd George*. London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1947.
- Şapolyo, Enver Behnan. *Kemal Atatürk ve Milli Mücadele Tarihi*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Rafet Zaimler Yayınevi, 1958.
- Şimşir, Bilâl. *Malta Sürgünleri*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976.
- Tansel, Fevziye Abdullah. *İstiklâl Harbinde Mücahit Kadınlarımız*. Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 1988.
- Tengirşek, Yusuf Kemal. *Vatan Hizmetinde*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1981.
- Tepeyran, Ebubekir Hazım. *Belgelerle Kurtuluş Savaşı Anıları*. İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1982.
- Tevetoğlu, Fethi. *Türkiye'de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler (1910-1960)*. Ankara: By the Author, 1967.
- , *Atatürk'le Samsun'a Çıkanlar*. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1987.
- , *Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988.
- Tokgöz, Ahmet İhsan. *Matbuat Hatıralarım 1888-1923*. İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1930.
- Topuzlu, Cemil. *80 Yıllık Hatıralarım*. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Yayınları, 1982.
- Trask, Roger R. *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform 1914-1939*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1971.

- Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler (Mütareke Dönemi 1918-1922)* vol. 2, 2nd ed. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986.
- Tunçay, Mete. *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, 1908-1925*. 3rd ed. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1978.
- Türk İstiklâl Harbi*. 8 vols. Ankara: T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Resmi Yayınları, 1975.
- Türk İstiklâl Harbine Katılan Tümen ve Daha Üst Kademelerdeki Komutanların Biyografileri*. Ankara: T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1972.
- Türkçeldi, Âli Fuat. *Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi*. Ankara: Güney Matbaacılık ve Gazetecilik T.A.O., 1948.
- , *Görüp İyittiklerim*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1949.
- Uçuk, Cahit. *Bir İmparatorluk Çökerken*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995.
- Uluğ, Naşit. *Siyasi Yönleriyle Kurtuluş Savaşı*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1973.
- Ulagay, Osman. *Amerikan Basınında Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı*. İstanbul: Yelken Matbaası, 1974.
- Uran, Hilmi. *Hatıralarım*. Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959.
- Us, Mehmet Asım. *Gördüklerim, Duyduklarım, Duygularım*. İstanbul: Vakıf Matbaası, 1964.
- Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya. *Saray ve Ötesi*. İstanbul: İnkılâp ve Aka Kitabevleri Koll. Şti., 1965.
- Ünüvar, Safiye. *Saray Hatıralarım*. İstanbul: Çağaloğlu Yayınevi, 1964.
- Walder, David. *The Chanak Affair*. London: Hutchinson and Co., 1969.
- Walworth, Arthur. *Wilson and His Peacemakers*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1986.
- Williams, Talcott. *Turkey, A World Problem Today*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1922.
- Woolf, Leonard S. *The Future of Constantinople*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1917.
- Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahit. *Siyasal Anılar*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1976.
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim*. 3 vols. İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1970.
- Yerasimos, Stefanos. *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri: Ekim Devriminden Milli Mücadeleye*. İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1979.
- Young, George. *Constantinople*. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1926.
- Ziyaoğlu, Rakım. *İstanbul Kadınları-Şehreminleri-Belediye Reisleri ve Partiler Tarihi: 1453-1971*. İstanbul: İsmail Aygün Matbaası, 1971.
- Zorlutuna, Halide Nusret. *Bir Devrin Romanı*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1978.
- Zürcher, Erik Jan. *The Unionist Factor*. Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1984.

Articles

- Akgün, Seçil. "Ana Hatlarıyla General Moseley Raporu: Türkiye'de Amerikan Mandası." *Belleten* XLVIII (January-April 1984): 95-108.
- Aksoley, İhsan. "Gizli Teşkilat ve Felâh Grubunun Kuruluşu." *Cumhuriyet*, 5 November 1970, p. 3, cs. 1-4.

- Akşin, Sina. "Osmanlı Padişahlarının Toprak ve Hilafet Adına Verdikleri Ödünler." *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 26: 3-4 (1976); reprint Ankara: Yankı Matbaası, 1976.
- , "Franco-Turkish Relations at the End of 1919." Reprint from *Turcica*, İstanbul-Paris: Editions ISIS, n.d.
- , "1919 Sonu ve 1920 Başında Karşı İhtilâl Cephesinden Görünümler." In *Mustafa Kemal'i Anlamak*. Fahriniş Kadıbeşegil, ed. Ankara: Oluşum Yayınları, 1981, pp. 11-15.
- Alexandris, Alexios. "The Constantinopolitan Greek Factor During the Greco-Turkish Confrontation of 1919-1922." *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 8 (1982-1983): 137-167.
- Allen, W.E.D. "The Near Eastern Riddle." *Asiatic Survey* 19: 58 (April 1923), pp. 232-239.
- Arıkan, Baha. "Hiyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu." *Cumhuriyet*, 12 August 1960, p. 2, c. 3.
- Attrep, Abe. "A State of Wretchedness and Impotence: A British View of İstanbul and Turkey, 1919." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9: 1 (February 1978), pp. 1-9.
- Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. "Son Osmanlı Paşası Halil Paşa'nın Hatıraları." *Akşam*, 10 October - 29 December 1967.
- Banoğlu, Niyazi Ahmet. "Günü Gününe Zaferin Hikâyesi." *Dünya*, 26 August - 13 September 1956.
- , "İstanbul'un Kurtuluşu." *Dünya*, 6 October 1956, p. 2, c. 2.
- , "Milli Kongre ve Faaliyetleri." *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 3: 7 (November 1986), pp. 197-209.
- Baykal, İsmail. "Abdülmecid Efendi ve Sarayında Cereyan Eden Bazı Olaylar." *Takım Tarihimiz* 4: 47 (17 January 1963), pp. 246-251.
- Bayur, Hikmet. "1918 Birakışması Sırasındaki Tinsel Durum ve Mustafa Kemal'in İki Demeci." *Belleten* 32: 128 (October 1968), pp. 479-497.
- Besbelli, Saim. "I. Dünya Harbinde Başkent İstanbul'u İşgal Etmek İsteyen İtilaf Devletleri Kuvvetlerine Karşı Alınan Savunma Tedbirleri." *Askeri Tarih Dergisi* 1: 2 (September 1976), pp. 3-12.
- Bıykoğlu, Tevfik. "I. Dünya Harbinde (1914-1918) ve Mondros Mütarekesi Sıralarında (30 Ekim 1918 - 11 Ekim 1922) Boğazlar Problemi." *Belleten* 35: 97 (January 1961), pp. 81-93.
- Borak, Sadı. "Başkomutan ve Karşısındakiler." *Cumhuriyet*, 10 November - 22 November 1977, p. 1, c. 2.
- Can, Fahri. "Dr. Adnan Bey'i Anadolu'ya Nasıl Geçirdim?" *Dün ve Bugün* 1 (4 November 1955): 14-15.
- , "Milli Mücadele ve Hanedan." *Yakın Tarihimiz* 3: 36 (1 November 1962), pp. 315-316.
- Cavit Bey. "Mütareke Günlerinin Feci Tarihi." *Tanin*, 11 August 1945 - 22 December 1946.
- Cilay, F. "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Son Sadrazamı Tevfik Paşa Bize Hatıralarını Anlatıyor." *Perşembe*, 30 May - 11 July 1935.
- "Constantinople in Wartime." *The Living Age* (9 February 1918): 373-374.
- Coşar, Ömer Sami. "1919'da Mustafa Kemal ve İstanbul Basını." *Milliyet*, 19 - 23 September 1968.
- Cruikshank, A.A. "The Young Turk Challenge in Postwar Turkey." *The Middle East Journal* 22: 1 (Winter 1968), pp. 17-28.

- Çınay, Vasfi. "Mütarekede İstanbul." *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 1: 5 (1 June 1968), pp. 17-22.
- , "Kurtuluş Sevinci." *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 1: 5 (1 July 1968), pp. 14-17.
- "Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu'nun Kurucularından Hamiyet Hanım." *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 1: 1 (1 February 1969), pp. 69-71.
- Davison, Roderic H. "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne." In *The Diplomats, 1919-1939*, Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Desire-Vuillemin, Genevieve. "L'Occupation de la Thrace occidentale par l'armée française d'Orient (Octobre 1919 - Mai 1920)." *Revue Historique des Armées (France)* 3: 1 (1976), pp. 124-157.
- Dumont, Paul. "Les Organisations socialistes et la Propagande Communiste à İstanbul Pendant l'occupation Alliée, 1918-1922." *Etudes Balkaniques (Bulgarie)* 15: 4 (1979), pp. 31-51.
- , "Bolchevisme et Orient. Le parti communiste turc de Mustafa Suphi, 1918-1921." *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* 18: 4 (October - December 1977), pp. 377-409.
- Duran, Tülay. "İstanbul'un İşgali." *Belgelerle Türk Tarih Dergisi* 11: 66 (1973), pp. 11-20.
- Ebcioğlu, Hikmet Münir. "Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın'ın Eski Devir Hatıraları." *Dünya*, 14 - 27 May 1953.
- Engin, Fahri. "Vahidettin'in Kaçışı ve Sonrası." *Yakın Tarihimiz* 3: 39 (22 November 1962), pp. 385-386.
- Ergin, Feridun. "I. Dünya Savaşında ve Atatürk Döneminde Fiyatlar ve Gelirler." *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 3: 7 (November 1986), pp. 59 - 84.
- Erkan, Hamza Osman. "İşgal Altındaki İstanbul'da Ayasofyayı Kurtaran Kahraman." *Dün ve Bugün* 32 (15 June 1956: 5).
- "General İsmail Hakkı Tekçe'nin Anıları." *Günaydın*, 10 November - 17 December 1977.
- Gerçekçi, Hikmet. "Üç Günün Hikâyesi—Atatürk'le Samsun'a Gidiş." *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 2: 9 (October 1967), pp. 14-18.
- Himmetoğlu, Hüsnü. "M.M. Grubu ve Gerçek Yüzü." *Yakın Tarihimiz* 3: 32 (4 October 1962), pp. 165-170.
- , "Anadolu'ya Silah Kaçaklığı." *Hürriyet*, 17 - 25 July 1973.
- İçmez, Niyazi. "Bir 30 Ağustos Hatırası." *Tarih Konuşuyor* 4: 19 (August 1965), pp. 1591-1592.
- İnci, Tevfik. "Kurtuluş Savaşının Deniz Cephesi." *Cumhuriyet*, 30 August - 8 September 1970.
- İskender, Fahrettin. "Mütareke Senelerinde Ele Geçmeyen Hırsız Çetesi." *Akşam*, 12 March - 30 April 1936.
- "İstanbul'a Göz Dikildiği Günlerde." *Dün ve Bugün* 33 (22 June 1956): 8, 27.
- "İstanbul'un Kara Günü." *Dün ve Bugün* 20 (16 March 1956): 21-22.
- İlgar, İhsan. "Türkiye'deki İtilaf Devletleri Başkumandanı Harington'un Gizli Raporu." *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 1: 2 (1 March 1970), pp. 64-70.
- Jaeschke, Gotthard. "VI. Mehmed'in İngiltere'ye 2. Anlaşma Teklifi." *Belleten* 38: 151 (July 1974), pp. 493-497.
- Jensen, Peter Kincaid. "The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10: 4 (November 1979), pp. 553-565.

- Kandemir, Feridun. "Sirkeci'de Patlayan Bomba." *Tarih Hazinesi* 1: 1 (15 November 1950), pp. 19-20.
- "Kılıç Ali Hattatlarını Anlatıyor." *Milliyet*, 14 October 1951 – 30 April 1952.
- Kılıç, Salih. "Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak Anadolu'ya Nasıl Kaçtı?" *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 2: 12 (1 January 1968), pp. 23-26.
- "Korgeneral Ekrem Baydar'ın Hatıraları." *Cumhuriyet*, 6 October – 2 November 1970.
- Kuran, Ercüment. "The Turkish National War of Independence and Admiral Bristol, the United States High Commissioner in İstanbul (1919 – 1923)." *Cultura Turcica* 11: 1-2 (1987), pp. 89-100.
- Kurat, Yuluğ Tekin. "Bir İmparatorluğun Son Nefesi Mondros." *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 7/8: 48 (September 1971), pp. 38-43.
- Kutay, Cemal. "4 Kasım 1922: Son Osmanlı Kabinesinin Son Buhran Günü." *Tarih Konuşuyor* 4: 22 (November 1965), pp. 1769-1772.
- , "I. Dünya Savaşından Çıkışımızın Hatıraları." *Tarih Konuşuyor* 7: 47 (October 1967), pp. 3398-3401.
- Kürkçüoğlu, Ömer. "İngiliz Parlamentosunda Türkiye Üzerine Tartışmalar." In *Seha L. Meray'a Armağan* 2 vols. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1981, 2: 429-486.
- Le Lannou, Yves. "La Fin de L'empire Ottoman Vue Par La Presse Française (1918-1923)." *Turcica* IX/2-X (1978): 176-195.
- Lybyer, Albert Howe. "Turkey Under the Armistice." *The Journal of International Relations* 12: 4 (April 1922), pp. 456-458.
- Macfie, A.L. The British Decision Regarding the Future of Constantinople, November 1918 – January 1920." *The Historical Journal* 18: 2 (1975), pp. 391-400.
- , "The Straits Question: The Conference of Lausanne (November 1922 – July 1923)." *Middle East Studies* 15 (February 1979): 211-238.
- "Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak İşgal Altındaki İstanbul'u Anlatıyor." *Dün ve Bugün* 8 (23 December 1955): 3-4.
- Moralı, Seniha Sami. "Lâfife Bekir Çeyrekbaşı ve Türk Kadın Birliği." *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 1: 3 (1 April 1969), pp. 75-77.
- "Mudanya Konferansı." *Yakın Tarihimiz* 3: 33 (11 October 1962), pp. 193-195.
- "Osmanlı Sarayı'nın Son Günleri." *Yeni Sabah*, 19 March – 21 May 1950.
- Ökte, Ertuğrul Zekâi. "Anadolu Harekâtına Kimler Nasıl ve Ne Zaman Katıldılar?" *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 12: 69-72 (June 1973).
- Özgiray, Ahmet. "İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri Sir Horace Rumbold'a Göre 1918-1920 Yıllarında Türkiye." *Edebiyat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi* (İstanbul) 2 (1981): 101-153.
- Özgönder, Hasan. "Milli Mücadele Kahramanlarından Telgrafçı Manastırlı Ahmet Hamdi Martonaltı." *İletişim* (April 1982): 245-253.
- Price, Claire. "Mustapha Kemal and the Greek War." *Current History* 14 (August 1921): 754-761.
- "Rıza Tevfik Anlatıyor." *Yeni Sabah*, 1 August – 28 September 1948.
- Selâhattin Âdil Paşa. "İstanbul'un Kurtuluşu." *Yakın Tarihimiz* 3: 32 (4 October 1962), pp. 161-162.
- Sertoğlu, Mithat. "İngilizlerin Kuvay-ı Milliye'yi Bolşeviklere Karşı Kullanma İstekleri." *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 12 (September 1968): 3-5.

- Sonar, Ziya. "Wilson Prensipleri Cemiyeti ve Atatürk'ün Tabiri ile İstanbul'daki İleri Gelen Birtakım Kişiler ve Geniş Yankılar." *Tarih Konuşuyor* 3: 16 (May 1965), pp. 1275-1279.
- , "Wilson Prensipleri Cemiyeti Etrafında Bilinenler ve Gizlilikler." *Tarih Konuşuyor* 3: 18 (July 1965), pp. 1453-1456.
- , "Mütareke Basını ve Fırkacılık Ruhu." *Barış Dünyası* 40 (September 1965): 36-41.
- Sonyel, Salâhi R. "Son Osmanlı Padişahı Vahidettin ve İngilizler." *Belleten* 39: 154 (1975), pp. 257-264.
- , "İngiliz Gizli Belgelerine Göre İşgal Gücünün Türkiye'de Son Günleri ve Cumhuriyet'in Kuruluşu." *Belleten* XLII: 165 (January 1978), pp. 105-146.
- , "The Secret Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1919 in the Light of British Foreign Office Documents." *Belleten* CXXXIV (July 1970): 451-462.
- Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemal. "Ayasofya Nasıl Havaya Uçurulacaktı?" *Tarih Dünyası* 1: 2 (1 May 1950), pp. 52-53.
- Sugar, Peter F. "A Reinterpretation of the Significance of General James G. Harbord's Mission." In *Uluslararası Atatürk Konferansı Tebliğleri* 2 vols. Semih Tezcan and Kriton Curi, eds. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1981, 2: 432-452.
- Sümer, Mine. "Wilson Prensipleri Cemiyetinin Amerika Cumhurbaşkanı Wilson'a Gönderdiği Bir Muhtıra." *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3: 4-5 (1965), pp. 237-245.
- Sümer, Tülin. "Türkiye'de ilk Defa Kurulan Kadınları Çalıştırma Derneği." *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 2: 10 (July 1968), pp. 59-63.
- Şahsuvaroğlu, Halûk. "Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın 9. Ordu Müfettişliğine Tayini." *Cumhuriyet*, 6 July 1960, p. 2, c. 3.
- , "19 Mayıs 1919'dan Önceki Günler." *Cumhuriyet*, 18 May 1960, p. 2, c. 3.
- Şimşir, Bilâl. "Vahdettin'in Kaçışı ve Sonu." *Cumhuriyet*, 26 – 29 November 1973.
- Tekeli, İlhan and İlkin, Selim. "Kurtuluş Savaşında Talat Paşa ile Mustafa Kemal'in Mektuplamaları." *Belleten* XLIV: 174 (April 1980), pp. 301-345.
- Toros, Taha. "Eski Nafia Nazırı Ali Münif Yeğena'nın Hatıraları: İstibdattan Cumhuriyet'e." *Akşam*, 26 October – 21 December 1955.
- Tunaya, Tanık Zafer. "Mütareke Devrinin Özellikleri (1918-1922)," in *Prof.Dr. Ümit Doğanay'ın Anısına Hatıra*. 2 vols. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1982. 1: 383 – 412.
- , "Refet Paşa İstanbul'da." *Cumhuriyet*, 19 October 1977, p. 2, c. 1.
- Turan, Şerafettin. "Mondros Mütarekesi Ertesinde Mustafa Kemal'in Orduya, Siyasete ve İngilizlerin Tutumuna İlişkin Düşünceleri." *Belleten* XLVI: 182 (April 1982), pp. 337-346.
- "The Turk On Top Again," *Outlook* 126 (December 1920): 670-671.
- "Turkey's Latest Hero: Mustapha Kemal Pasha," *Current Opinion* 70 (March 1921): 331-333.
- Unat, Faik Reşit. "Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya 9. Ordu Kıtaatı Müfettişi Sıfatıyla Verilen Vazife ve Selâhiyetlere Dair Bazı Vesikalar." *Tarih Vesikaları* 2: 12 (April 1943), pp. 401-409.
- , "Refet Paşa İstanbul'da." *Yakın Tarihimiz* 4: 51 (14 February 1963), pp. 377-378.

- Yalkın, Razi. "Muhterem Casuslar." *Tarih Dünyası* 2: 12 (1 October 1950), pp. 519. 664.
 Yates, A.C. "What Constantinople Means to Britain and Islam." *Asiatic Review* 15 (July 1919): 336-337.

INDEX

- Abdülhamid II, 40-42, 50, 94-95
 Ahmet İzzet Pasha (Furğaç), 97, 101-103
 Ahmet Rıza Bey, 16, 53-54
 Ali Fethi (Okyar), 3, 96
 Ali Fuat Pasha (Cebesoy), 3
 Ali Rıza Pasha, x, xi, 11, 68
 Bennett, Capt. John G., 65, 116
 Bouillon, Franklin, 17, 140
 Bourgon, Gen. Nayral, 64
 Bristol, Adm. Mark Lambert, xiii, 12, 31, 39, 54-55, 61, 66, 89, 110, 112, 127, 161
 Calthorpe, Sir Somerset Arthur Gough, xi, 1, 46, 55-56, 60-61, 64
 Cemal Pasha (Mersinli), 40, 42, 96-97
 Cemil Pasha (Topuzlu), 38-39, 161
 Charpy, Gen., 16, 83-84, 92, 133, 143, 148, 153-155
 Clemenceau, Georges, 8
 CUP (Committee of Union and Progress), x, 6, 12, 22-24, 40-44, 46-47, 50, 52, 56-58, 88, 94-97, 102, 104-107, 115, 137, 160-161
 Curzon, Lord George Nathaniel, xi, 1, 7-11, 13, 63, 67, 138, 144
 Çürüksulu Mahmut Pasha, 65
 Damat Ferid Pasha, x, xi, 3, 6, 18, 26, 37, 41, 43-44, 55, 57, 67, 75, 88, 108, 112, 116-117, 121, 127-128, 160-161
 Defrance, Albert, 61, 63
 Defrance, Jules, 16
 Denikin, Gen. Anton Ivanovich, 82
 Enver Pasha, 4, 13, 23, 40, 42, 95-97, 99, 101-102, 106, 119, 161
 Esad Pasha (İşık), 51-52, 66, 103-104, 107, 147
 d'Espèrey, Gen. Franchet, 61-64, 68, 70
 Eşref Sencer (Kuşçubası), 96, 99
 Felâh, 5, 132-138
 Feminism, 22-26
 Fevzi Pasha (Çakmak), 104, 117
 FEP (Freedom and Entente Party), 2, 5-6, 41, 45-46, 58, 88, 129-131, 141, 145, 148, 160
 Galatah Şevket, Col., 100, 111, 113
 George, Lloyd, 3, 7, 55, 144
 Halil Pasha (Kut), 100-102, 111
 Hamid Bey (Hasancan), 16-17, 130
 Harington, Gen. Charles, 64, 71, 75-76, 83-84, 87, 91, 123, 125-127, 129, 143-144, 147-148, 150, 152-155
 Hüsamettin Bey, Lt. Col. (Ertürk), 97-99, 104, 106, 108, 115, 117
 Hüsnü Bey (Himmetoğlu), 133-134, 136
 İmalât-ı Harbiye, 5, 132, 135-136
 İsmet (İnönü), 104, 107; İnönü, battles: 134
 Kara Kemal, 96-97, 100, 105-106, 113
 Karakol (Black Arm/Police), 5, 66, 94, 98-113, 115, 138
 Karakol, Stf. Col. Kara Vasıf, 12, 54, 65, 99-100, 110, 113
 Kâzım Pasha (Karabekir), 3, 107
 Kolchak, Adm. Alexander Vasilevich, 82
 Lausanne Peace Conference, xiii, 153-155
 Lausanne Peace Treaty, 18-19, 58, 132, 153-155
 L'Illustration, 13
 Mehmet Cavid Bey, 111
 Mehmet Reşad V, 40, 42
 Memduh Şevket (Esental), 97, 105-106
 Milne, Gen. George, 10, 62-65, 68-70, 82
 Montagu, Edwin, 7-8
 Muavenet-i Bahriye (Naval Assistance Group), 5, 132, 136-137, 149
 Mudanya Armistice, 144-145
 Mudanya Conference, 13, 144
 Mudros Armistice, ix, xi, xii, xiii, 1-2, 7, 10, 20, 23, 28, 36, 39, 41, 44-46, 48, 51, 59, 61, 68-69, 77, 88, 94, 96-98, 103, 105, 126, 135, 137, 154, 156-157, 159-160
 Mudros Convention, 1, 125, 135
 Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk), xi, 2-3, 11-13, 16, 41, 48, 52, 54, 57-58, 81, 86, 89-90, 94, 96, 100-103, 105-107, 109-110, 113, 115-119, 121, 133, 140, 157
 M.M. (Müdafa-i Milliye: National Defense Group), 5, 115-118, 120-123, 125, 129-131, 137, 141

- Nuri (Conker), 96
 Ottoman Debt Administration, 22, 37
 Ottoman Red Crescent Society, 5, 29, 94, 137-138
 Paris Peace Conference, x, 1, 4, 53, 71, 109, 142
 Pellé, Gen. Maurice, 17, 31, 79, 91, 125, 150
 Rauf Bey (Orbay), 1, 3, 12, 65, 96
 Refet Pasha (Bele), 3, 18, 127, 145, 152, 154
 Robeck, Sir John M., 8-11, 13, 82, 99, 111, 119, 138
 Rumbold, Sir Horace, 17, 71, 79, 128-129, 138, 141, 144, 146, 149
 Ryan, Andrew, 4, 10, 55, 127-128, 146
 Salih Hulusi Pasha, x, xi, 11, 66
 Sforza, Count Carlo, 60-61
 Shuttleworth, Col., 69, 144
 Şeref Bey (Aykut), 12
 Talât Pasha, 4, 13, 40, 42, 96-97, 106
 Tasvir-i Efkâr, 13, 119
 Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa, 4-5, 94-98, 103
 Tevfik Pasha, x, 42, 107, 127, 147
 Treaty of Sèvres, xi, 3, 12, 18, 37, 43, 45, 71
 Turkish Socialist Party, 81, 88-89, 92-93; strikes: 90-91, 159
 Turkish Workers' and Farmers' Socialist Party, 81, 93
 Vahidetin, Mehmed VI, x, 3, 5-8, 10-11, 18, 41-44, 48, 54, 57, 59, 146-147, 157-158
 Venizelos, Eleutherios, 47-48
 Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry, 62, 64, 70
 Wilson, Lt. Gen. Sir H.F.M., 13, 62, 64
 Women of the Underground, 118-121
 Wrangel Gen. Peter Nicolaevich, 82-84, 117-118
 Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşek), 17
 Ziya Pasha, xi, 122-125, 133


ILLUSTRATIONS



Princess Fethiye Sultan and husband, imperial spy for the nationalists



Mlle. Tatiana Ivonovna, a Russian refugee in İstanbul (1920)



War material Manufacturers' Group



An Italian, French, British and an Ottoman officer walking down a street in Istanbul while a little boy and an adult watch with disclaim.

ISBN 90-04-11259-6



9 789004 112599

C.1